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Abstract
A standard approach in historically minded disciplines to documents and other artefacts 
that have become suspect is to concentrate on their dissimilarities with known genuine 
artefacts. While such an approach works reasonably well with relatively poor forgeries, 
more skilfully done counterfeits have tended to divide expert opinions, demanding 
protracted scholarly attention. As there has not been a widespread scholarly consensus 
on a constrained set of criteria for detecting forgeries, a pragmatic maximum for such 
dissimilarities—as there are potentially an infinite numbers of differences that can be 
enumerated between any two artefacts—has been impossible to set. Thus, rather than 
relying on a philosophically robust critical framework, scholars have been accustomed to 
approaching the matter on a largely case-by-case basis, with a handful of loosely 
formulated rules for guidance. In response to these shortcomings, this dissertation argues 
that a key characteristic of inquiry in historically minded disciplines should be the ability 
to distinguish between knowledge-claims that are epistemically warranted—i.e., that can 
be asserted post hoc from the material reality they have become embedded in with 
reference to some sort of rigorous methodological framework—and knowledge-claims 
that are not.
An ancient letter by Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–215 CE) to Theodore, in which two 
passages from the Longer Gospel of Mark (also known as the Secret Gospel of Mark) are 
quoted, has long been suspected of having been forged by Morton Smith (1915–1991), its 
putative discoverer. The bulk of this dissertation consists of four different articles that 
each use different methodological approaches. The first, a discourse analysis on scholarly 
debate over the letter’s authenticity, illuminates the reasons behind its odd character and 
troubled history. Second, archival research unearths how data points have become 
corrupted through unintended additions in digital-image processing (a phenomenon 
labelled line screen distortion here). Third, a quantitative study of the handwriting in 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore shows the inadequacy of unwittingly applying palaeographic 
standards in cases of suspected deceptions compared to the standards adhered to in 
forensic studies. Additionally, Smith’s conduct as an academic manuscript hunter is found 
to have been consistent with the standard practices of that profession. Finally, a study of 
the conceptual distinctions and framing of historical explanations in contemporary 
forgery discourse reveals the power of the methodologic approach of WWFD (What Would 
a Forger Do?), which has recently been used in three varieties (unconcealed, concealed, 
and hyperactive) to construe suspected documents as potential forgeries—despite its 
disregard of justificatory grounding in favour of coming up with free-form, first-person 
narratives in which the conceivable functions as its own justification. Together, the four 
articles illustrate the pitfalls of scholarly discourse on forgeries, especially that 
surrounding Clement’s Letter to Theodore.
The solution to the poor argumentation that has characterized the scholarly study of 
forgeries is suggested to be an exercise in demarcation: to decide (in the abstract) which 
features should be acceptable as evidence either for or against the ascription of the status 
of forgery to an historical artefact. Implied within this suggestion is the notion of 
constraint, i.e., such that a constrained criterion would be one that cannot be employed 
to back up both an argument and its counter-argument. A topical case study—a first step 
on the road to creating a rigorous standard for constrained criteria in determining 
counterfeits—is the alternative narrative of an imagined creation of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore by Smith around the time of its reported discovery (1958). Concealed indicators of 
authority, or the deliberate concealment of authorial details within the forged artefact by 
the forger, is established as a staple of the literary strategy of mystification, and their post  
hoc construction as acceptable evidence of authorship is argued to follow according to 
criteria: 1) that the beginning of the act of decipherment of a concealed indicator of 
authority has to have been preceded by a literary primer that is unambiguous to a high 
degree, 2) that, following the prompting of the literary primer, the act of deciphering a 
concealed indicator of authority has to have adhered to a technique or method that is 
unambiguous to a high degree, and 3) that, following the prompting of the literary primer 
and the act of decipherment, both of which must have been practiced in an unambiguous 
manner to a high degree, the plain-text solution to the concealed indicator of authority 
must likewise be unambiguous to a high degree.
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Abbreviations
Abbreviations used in this study (but not in the published articles, which follow the 
idiosyncrasies of their respective journals) follow the disciplinary standards as set in the 
most recent edition of The SBL Handbook of Style, except for the following:1
Theod. Clement of Alexandria, Letter to Theodore.
This usage follows the standards set in Michael J. Kok, “Secret Gospel of 
Mark,” in e-Clavis: Christian Apocrypha (CANT 15; 2016); 
https://www.nasscal.com/e-clavis-christian-apocrypha/secret-gospel-of-
mark/.2
WWFD What Would a Forger Do?
This acronym refers to the contemporary method of constructing physical 
artefacts as forgeries, as discussed in Timo S. Paananen, “WWFD or What 
Would a Forger Do: A Critical Inquiry of Poorly Argued Contemporary Cases 
for Forgery,” 1–24.
1 “Abbreviations,” in The SBL Handbook of Style (2nd edition; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2014) 
117–260.
2 Note that this departs from The SBL Handbook of Style, in which Theod. refers to Theodotus’s On the Jews; 
however, of the “Old Testament Pseudepigrapha” (label used in SBL Handbook) it is noted in 
“Abbreviations,” 125–126 that, “authors whose works survive only in a small number of fragments 
should not normally be abbreviated.”
1 Introduction
The least interesting question one might ask about Titus Flavius Clemens, also known as 
Κλήμης  λεξανδρεύςὁ Ἀ  (Clement of Alexandria; ca. 150–215 CE), and his Letter to Theodore 
(Theod.) is whether the document was forged3 by Morton Smith (1915–1991).
This suspicion was raised only gradually over a lengthy research process into the letter in 
question, an interest that was kindled in late 2005 following the watershed publication of 
The Gospel Hoax by Stephen C. Carlson,4 then ignited in 2008, following an exceptional 
review of yet another book on the topic, Peter Jeffery’s The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled 
(2007).5 This review was penned by the foremost author on the textual contents of 
Clement’s letter, Scott G. Brown,6 who did not waste time challenging the various claims 
of forgery, including those of Carlson and Jeffery, that exploded in the latter half of the 
2000s.7 For close to a decade the question of whether Theod. was, in fact, forged by Smith, 
remained the inescapable, all-encompassing topic of discussion, wherever this 
remarkable document has been brought forth.
3 A decision in principle I had already made in Timo S. Paananen, “WWFD or What Would a Forger Do: A 
Critical Inquiry of Poorly Argued Contemporary Cases for Forgery,” 1–24, at 2 n. 1, is to “Note that the 
terms ‘fake,’ ‘faked,’ ‘forgery,’ ‘forged,’ ‘faux,’ etc. are used … interchangeably to refer in the most 
general manner to physical artefacts (including documents) that deceive their readers, whether 
intentionally or not.”
4 Stephen C. Carlson, The Gospel Hoax: Morton Smith’s Invention of Secret Mark (Waco, Tx.: Baylor University 
Press, 2005).
5 Peter Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled: Imagined Rituals of Sex, Death, and Madness in a Biblical 
Forgery (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).
6 Scott G. Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel: Rethinking Morton Smith’s Controversial Discovery (Studies in 
Christianity and Judaism / Études sur le christianisme et le judaïsme 15; Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2005).
7 Scott G. Brown, “Review of The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled: Imagined Rituals of Sex, Death, and Madness in 
a Biblical Forgery, by Peter Jeffery,” Review of Biblical Literature (2007) 1–47; 
http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/5627_5944.pdf. Apart from Brown’s response to Jeffery, his most 
important contributions to authenticity challenges include “The Question of Motive in the Case against 
Morton Smith,” Journal of Biblical Literature 125 (2006) 351–383; “Factualizing the Folklore: Stephen 
Carlson’s Case against Morton Smith,” Harvard Theological Review 99 (2006) 291–327; “The Letter to 
Theodore: Stephen Carlson’s Case against Clement’s Authorship,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 16 
(2008) 535–572; “Mar Saba 65: Twelve Enduring Misconceptions,” in Splendide Mendax: Rethinking Fakes 
and Forgeries in Classical, Late Antique, and Early Christian Literature (ed. Edmund P. Cueva and Javier 
Martinez; Groningen: Barkhuis & Groningen, 2016) 303–330. Two further articles Brown co-authored 
with Allan J. Pantuck are to be added here: Allan J. Pantuck and Scott G. Brown, “Morton Smith as M. 
Madiotes: Stephen Carlson’s Attribution of Secret Mark to a Bald Swindler,” Journal for the Study of 
Historical Jesus 6 (2008) 106–125; Scott G. Brown and Allan J. Pantuck, “Craig Evans and the Secret Gospel 
of Mark: Exploring the Grounds for Doubt,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark 
in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; 
Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 101–134.
9
However, after penning several popular articles on the topic,8 composing a master’s thesis 
in the University of Helsinki on the topic,9 curating an academic research blog (largely) 
on the topic,10 editing and publishing original studies by other scholars on the topic,11 
conducting my own minor research on the topic,12 cultivating professional connections 
and friendships with many people interested in the topic,13 and spending considerable 
time contemplating a Th.D. dissertation on the topic, I perceived how the grey-rain 
curtain (that was this topic) turned all to silver glass and was rolled back, revealing more 
twisted and complex, original and imaginative issues to be pursued beyond this topic. 
Such a realization took place, at least partly, due to the abundance of scholars who did 
and will, no doubt, continue to treat this topic as the most pertinent affair, even if I have 
personally ceased to do so. In fact, some recent developments in the academic community 
at large evidence the gravity scholars place on the matters of authenticity, as has been 
demonstrated by cases such as the Jacob ossuary,14 the Artemidorus papyrus,15 the Gospel 
of Jesus’ Wife,16 the Jordan lead codices,17 etc.18
8 Timo S. Paananen, “Kuka kirjoitti Salaisen Markuksen evankeliumin? Osa 1: Morton Smith vs. Stephen 
C. Carlson,” Vartija 121 (2008) 83–97; Timo S. Paananen, “Kuka kirjoitti Salaisen Markuksen 
evankeliumin? Osa 2: Morton Smith vs. Peter Jeffery,” Vartija 121 (2008) 123–132.
9 Timo S. Paananen, “Salaisen evankelistan salaliitto: Uusin keskustelu Klemens Aleksandrialaisen 
kirjeestä Theodorokselle” (Master’s Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2009).
10 Timo S. Paananen, Salainen evankelista: On Clement’s Letter to Theodore and the Longer Gospel of Mark 
[blog]; https://salainenevankelista.blogspot.fi/.
11 Scott G. Brown and Allan J. Pantuck, “Stephen Carlson’s Questionable Questioned Document 
Examination: A Guest Post,” in Timo S. Paananen, Salainen evankelista: On Clement’s Letter to Theodore 
and the Longer Gospel of Mark [blog] (2010); https://salainenevankelista.blogspot.fi/2010/04/stephen-
carlsons-questionable.html.
12 Timo S. Paananen, “A Short Interview with Quentin Quesnell,” in Timo S. Paananen, Salainen evankelista:  
On Clement’s Letter to Theodore and the Longer Gospel of Mark [blog] (2011); 
https://salainenevankelista.blogspot.fi/2011/06/short-interview-with-quentin-quesnell.html.
13 For my everlasting delight, I was able to convince Roger Viklund to lend his considerable expertise on 
matters I knew nothing about, and his keen eye and demeanour supplemented my own outlook so well 
that two of the four articles that constitute the bulk of this dissertation were co-authored with him: 
Roger Viklund and Timo S. Paananen, “Distortion of the Scribal Hand in the Images of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore,” Vigiliae Christianae 67 (2013) 235–247; Timo S. Paananen and Roger Viklund, “An Eighteenth-
Century Manuscript: Control of the Scribal Hand in Clement’s Letter to Theodore,” Apocrypha 26 (2015) 
261–297.
14 As noted in Paananen, “WWFD,” 6 n. 25, “The forgery trial … (482/04 State of Israel v. Oded Golan) was 
concluded on March 14, 2012 after more than seven years of court proceedings, when judge Aharon 
Farkash ruled that Golan was acquitted of all charges of forgery, though he was convicted of illegal 
trading of antiquities.”
15 Jürgen Hammerstaedt, “Simonides ist nicht an allem schuld! Die Debatte um den Artemidor-Papyrus,” 
in Die getäuschte Wissenchaft: Ein Genie betrügt Europa—Konstantinos Simonides (ed. Andreas E. Müller et al.; 
Göttingen: V&R Unipress / Vienna University Press, 2017) 257–78.
16 Gesine Schenke Robinson, “How a Papyrus Fragment Became a Sensation,” New Testament Studies 61 
(2015) 379–94.
17 Samuel Zinner, Son of the Star: Bar Kokhba and the Jordanian Lead Books—Overview, Assessment, Interpretation 
(A Free Online Educational Report; 2017); http://www.leadbookcentre.com/downloads/son-of-the-star-
bar-kokhba-and%20the-jordanian-lead-books.pdf.
18 To offer a terse answer to this question: “It is my perspective that Clement’s Letter to Theodore (including 
the so-called Secret Gospel of Mark) was not forged by Morton Smith—not at least according to the 
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The transformation of my own perspective is evident in the articles that constitute this 
study. The first of these, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” is already somewhat distanced from 
the physicality of the manuscript of Theod. itself, as it concentrates on the discourses 
performed on the manuscript, in its aim for a broader study of heavily contested 
scholarly topics, offering universally applicable remedies to these issues, as explicated in 
section 2.1 and chapter 3.19 In my subsequent plunge into investigations of the quality of 
the scribal line (called “scribal hand” in the abstract) in the two articles co-authored with 
Roger Viklund, “Distortion of the Scribal Hand” and “Control of the Scribal Hand,” the 
manuscript of Theod. faded further into the background towards the end of the latter. In 
“Control of the Scribal Hand” a crucial observation is made: the standard approach to 
suspected forgeries in historically minded areas of study20 has been hindered by its 
fetishization of the notion of dissimilarity. Indeed, as Albert S. Osborn, one of the key 
figures in forensic studies, has noted, “A perfect forgery cannot be detected by anyone.”21 
That is, an artefact that cannot be distinguished from a known genuine artefact cannot be 
declared a forgery.
This leads to one of the peculiar problems of the study of forgeries, that as a distinct 
genre the historical counterfeit is defined by its worst examples.22 In other words, a 
admissible state of the present evidence.”
19 Timo S. Paananen, “From Stalemate to Deadlock: Clement’s Letter to Theodore in Recent Scholarship,” 
Currents in Biblical Research 11 (2012) 87–125.
20 As noted in Paananen, “WWFD,” 2 n. 1, “During the 20th cent. the extent … has been documented in a 
number of important studies. For literary fakes, see especially James Anson Farrer, Literary Forgeries 
(New York: Longmans, 1907); Wolfgang Speyer, Die literarische Fälschung im heidnischen und christlichen 
Altertum (Munich: Beck, 1971); Anthony Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western 
Scholarship (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); K. K. Ruthven, Faking Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). In biblical studies, the recent standard has been set in 
Bart D. Ehrman, Forgery and Counterforgery: The Use of Literary Deceit in Early Christian Polemics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). For non-literary faked artefacts, see A. Vayson de Pradenne, Les fraudes 
en archéologie préhistorique (Paris: Émile Nourry, 1932); Karl E. Meyer, The Plundered Past (New York: 
Atheneum, 1973); Maxwell L. Anderson, Antiquities: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017).”
21 Albert S. Osborn, Questioned Documents: A Study of Questioned Documents with an Outline of Methods by Which  
Facts May Be Discovered and Shown (2nd edition; Toronto: Carswell, 1929) 367.
22 Cf. Robert W. Mitchell, “The Psychology of Human Deception,” Social Research 63 (1996) 819–861, at 851: 
“The only understanding we have of deception is from failed deceptions or those revealed by their 
perpetrators.” Cited in Javier Martínez, “Hippias of Elis: Lessons from One Master Forger,” in Fakes and 
Forgers of Classical Literature: Ergo decipiatur! (ed. Javier Martínez; Studies in the Reception of Classical 
Antiquity 2; Leiden: Brill, 2014) 163–178, at 163. Martínez’s inference, however, that “Studying 
successful historical forgers thus requires that there not be a scholarly consensus as to their status as 
forgers,” is difficult to sustain as such a study would be as likely to end up being about “successful 
historical not-forgers” (tentatively leaving aside its inherent nonsensicality), for how would we even 
tell the difference when, qua definitione, we could not? And were we to try and circumvent the problem 
by simply performing a close reading on the work of a suspected forger as if they were a forger, we would 
most likely just produce a hyperactive rendition of the (imagined) actions of the (suspected) forger, as 
documented in Paananen, “WWFD,” 14–16.
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historical fake has first to be identified as such, and a positive identification follows only 
(sans confession) from the subsequent identification of serious enough mistakes on the 
part of the forger.23 While a poor forgery can thus be quickly dismissed by the unanimous 
assessment of scholars, the more skilful ones tend to divide expert opinions and lead to 
prolonged debates that could potentially drag on for decades.24 Thus the stated aims25 of 
the two articles establish a pragmatic limit for scholarly suspicion that would otherwise 
devolve into an indefinite period of “exploring the grounds for doubt,”26 essentially 
ignoring the evidence of similarity in favour of coming up with ever more contrived 
evidence of dissimilarity.
The transformation was brought to completion by the time of “WWFD”. In this article the 
manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore has been fully relegated to the background—
only one example of its kind among others (though, it must be said, one of the most 
important of its kind). Here, the focus has shifted to the unwitting scholarly tendency to 
construct their respective exposures of forged artefacts as exercises in intentionalizing, 
framing, and justifying the acts of the (alleged) forger with the self-constructed internal 
coherence of their self-written narrative. The aim of the article in documenting WWFD, 
or What Would a Forger Do? as I colloquially labelled this phenomenon, became the first 
step in the larger effort to create constrained27 criteria for fakes, a project that would 
23 Similarly Sanna Nyqvist and Outi Oja, Kirjalliset väärennökset: Huijauksia, plagiaatteja ja luovia lainauksia 
(Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2018) 44, who observe literary fakes to be a “paradoksaalinen kirjallisuudenlaji” 
(paradoxical genre of literature). Cf. Thierry Lenain, Art Forgery: The History of a Modern Obsession 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2012) 271: “Only an exposed fake may be said to be ‘perfect’ … a fake does not 
exist as such before having been discovered.” Emphasis original.
24 Succinctly put in Lenain, Art Forgery, 18: “in some instances … questions of authenticity may remain 
dramatically open, and … some fakes can indeed remain undetected over very long periods of time.” Cf. 
one of the “basic facts” enumerated in Christopher A. Rollston, “Forging History: From Antiquity to the 
Modern Period,” in Archaeologies of Text: Archaeology, Technology, and Ethics (ed. Matthew T. Rutz and 
Morag M. Kersel; Joukowsky Institute Publication 6; Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2014) 176–197, at 176: 
“Scholars are able to detect poor quality forgeries, but high quality forgeries have sometimes duped 
even the best of scholars.”
25 Namely, to note uniform similarities of the “scribal hand” between the most accurate archival data 
points (as opposed to using poorly reproduced copies and adhering to poorly understood principles of 
forensic document examination), and compared to other, non-contested eighteenth-century 
manuscripts (as opposed to using poorly understood principles of forensic document examination with 
a non-representative sample of details from other, non-contested eighteenth-century manuscripts).
26 It is hardly coincidental that one of the more recent examples of a contrived attempt to establish Smith 
as the forger of Clement’s Letter to Theodore is literally subtitled “Exploring the Grounds for Doubt”; Craig 
A. Evans, “Morton Smith and the Secret Gospel of Mark: Exploring the Grounds for Doubt,” in Ancient 
Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 
York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 75–100.
27 As observed in Paananen, “WWFD,” 3 n. 5, “I have chosen to use the word ‘constrained’ to refer to the 
qualitative aspect of such criteria, as the terms ‘formal’ or ‘standard’ do not capture the core weakness 
of contemporary usage of such methodological tools. A criterion can be considered constrained when it 
cannot be used equally well—after satisfying its condition(s)—to argue for both A and ¬A, i.e., both for 
an argument and its opposite. Examples of constrained criteria within the academic study of history 
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entail a paradigm shift in the way forgeries are studied—from considerations applied on a 
case-by-case basis that followed a loose set of rules of thumb to a set of more rigorous 
standards.28 As documented in the article, no such criteria exist at the moment.29 There 
are at least four significant reasons to contemplate the question of constrained criteria to 
the study of forgeries, regardless of whatever formulations scholars would wish to assert 
as adequate (if any).
First, there has been a renewed academic interest in counterfeits of all kinds.30 Though 
individual fakes and forgeries have been historically debated at length,31 after the early 
twentieth century scholars have tended to exhibit a certain reluctance in tackling the 
subject. Thus, half a century ago, Joseph Naveh noted that “allegations of forgery are not 
the scholarly fashion of the moment,”32 while Richard D. Altick and John J. Fenstermaker 
reminded their students that, “Scholars encounter forgeries by no means as often as 
writers about the adventurous side of literary research, eager for a touch of melodrama, 
(widely understood) include various notions of intertextuality, where, e.g., psychological 
experimentation has suggested that in the genre of ‘prose narrative material’ the common use of at 
least sixteen consecutive words between two documents strongly suggests one of the two documents 
has been used as the source for the other … the notion of provenance (i.e., the discovery of an artefact 
as part of a controlled excavation and its unbroken chain of custody afterwards), which virtually 
guarantees authenticity of the artefact … the use of Bayesian statistics to assess the available historical 
evidence … In other words, such criteria have a built-in, inherent control on their conclusions to avoid 
a methodological free-form that would otherwise follow from their application.”
28 One promising attempt to produce such controlled criteria for the classification of literary forgeries has 
recently been made in Francesca Tomasi et al., “Towards a Taxonomy of Suspected Forgery in 
Authorship Attribution Field,” in DH-CASE ’13: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Collaborative 
Annotations in Shared Environment: Metadata, Vocabularies and Techniques in the Digital Humanities (New 
York: ACM, 2013) Article No.: 10. For an earlier, more broadly applicable system, see also Umberto Eco, 
The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) 182–188.
29 Paananen, “WWFD,” 2–5. Cf. Eco, Limits of Interpretation, 197, 200: “It thus seems that our modern culture 
has outlined ‘satisfactory’ criteria for proving authenticity and for falsifying false identifications. All 
the aforementioned criteria, however, seem useful only when a Judge is faced with ‘imperfect’ forgeries 
… semiotic approach to fakes shows how theoretically weak are our criteria for deciding about 
authenticity.” Interestingly, the question of criteria has also been brought up within art history 
regarding aleamorphs (unintentional features that are perceived as hidden images) and cryptomorphs 
(intentional features that are subsequently recognized as hidden images); e.g., Horst W. Janson, “The 
‘Image Made by Chance’ in Renaissance Thought,” in De Artibus Opuscula XL: Essays in Honor of Erwin 
Panofsky (vols. 2; ed. Millard Meiss; New York: New York University Press, 1961) 1:254–266, at 262 n. 39: 
“Clearly, there must be a line of demarcation somewhere between ‘unconscious symbols’ that may 
reveal the stato dell’animo of their creator and those betraying only the stato dell’animo of the beholder.” 
However, as James Elkins, Why are Our Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity (New 
York: Routledge, 1999) 167 wryly notes, “after stating the problem in this way, Janson does not return 
to it.”
30 Nyqvist and Oja, Kirjalliset väärennökset, 110 note that the study of fakes has been recently found to be, 
e.g., a gateway to the study of the values and practices of the literary cultures that produced such fakes.
31 Consult esp. Grafton, Forgers and Critics.
32 Joseph Naveh, “Aramaica Dubiosa,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 27 (1968) 317–325, at 317, though 
Naveh later concludes, “Nevertheless, forgeries do occur. It is therefore legitimate to raise questions 
concerning forgeries, but, needless to say, with the necessary reservation and caution.”
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may imply.”33 Nowadays, on the contrary, scholars feel free to casually acknowledge that 
forgeries “flourish in all archaeological, cultural, and artistic spheres from all 
chronological periods of the world’s cultures.”34
Second, scholarly attitudes are closely tied to larger shifts in cultural discourses. As many 
cultural critics have observed, the mainstream early twenty-first-century Western 
culture has become cognisant of the possible existence of “half-hidden clues, tell-tale 
signs, and secret messages,”35 then “obsessed with connections and interpretation.”36 
David Aaronovitch has called ours a period of “fashionable conspiracism,” and as 
explored further in sub-subsection 2.5.3.2, some scholars have dedicated themselves to be 
in for a pound, rather than a penny.37
Third, the forgers themselves have begun to receive personal vindication as creative 
artists in their own right, as post-structuralist literary notions have transformed the once 
universally condemned practice to an act of celebrated genius,38 one perceived as a 
powerful form of criticism that challenges the spurious notion of the “authentic”.39 
Nowhere is this vindication more prominent than when the act of the discovery of fake 
artefacts is presented as a methodology akin to a puzzle, in which the fake artefacts 
provide the very means for their own detection. By this point, the act of writing history 
33 Richard D. Altick and John J. Fenstermaker, The Art of Literary Research (4th edition; New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1993 [1st edition, 1963]) 60. On forgeries within the discipline of archaeology, Oscar White 
Muscarella, “The Antiquities Trade and the Destruction of Ancient Near Eastern Cultures,” in A 
Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East (ed. D.T. Pott; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 107–
124, at 119–120 notes that, “Scholarly awareness of forgeries of ancient Near Eastern artifacts began in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries but then declined … At present, relatively few scholarly references 
to forgeries occur in archaeological literature.”
34 Oscar White Muscarella, “Forgeries of Ancient Near Eastern Artifacts and Cultures,” in Critical 
Approaches to Ancient Near Eastern Art (ed. Brian A. Brown and Marian H. Feldman; Berlin: Gruyter, 2013) 
31–53, at 31. Emphasis original.
35 Timothy Melley, Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2000) 16.
36 Jane Parish, “The Age of Anxiety,” in The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences (ed. 
Jane Parish and Martin Parker; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 1-17, at 8.
37 David Aaronovitch, Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2008) 3.
38 Lenain, Art Forgery traces the attitudes towards art forgery from that of the positive appreciation of 
mimetic mastery (of early modern fakes) to that of universal condemnation (late modern fakes). For 
examples of the latest change, see, e.g., Nick Groom, The Forger’s Shadow: How Forgery Changed the Course 
of Literature (London: Picador, 2002); Jonathon Keats, Forged: Why Fakes are the Great Art of Our Age 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
39 See especially chapter 3 of Ruthven, Faking Literature. Thus also Julia Abramson, Learning from Lying: 
Paradoxes of the Literary Mystification (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 2005) 14: “The author 
of a mystifying text shapes a work to imitate a recognized form, with the aim of commenting critically 
on that form or on its current mode of production or reception. In this way mystification identifies a 
trend, and the critical project contains a didactic element.” Cf. Eckart Voigts-Virchow, “Shelley, Malley, 
Carey: A Performative Hermeneutics of Faking and Hoaxing,” Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik 56 
(2008) 175–191, at 176: “A fake is both a critique of the artistic field and a piece of art in its own right.”
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“becomes a matter of revelation through signs, and signs the mechanism of history … 
akin to cryptography.”40 The faker-auteur is construed as sure of themselves, confident 
enough in their ability to manufacture fakes to employ a particular strategy of 
mystification—viz., leaving an autobiographical trail of clues pointing towards the true 
authorship of the artefact.41 Consequently, the thrill of the discovery of new historical 
artefacts has been expanded by the post-structuralist thrill of deconstructing existing 
ones, and the uncovering of fake historical artefacts has become a battle of wits against 
the ingenuity of the manufacturer of the fake. Such a challenge offers the tempting 
possibility of a demonstrably firm resolution of either / or (i.e., either authentic or faked) 
instead of the more usual open-ended discourse characteristic of the academic study of 
history.42
Fourth, and most importantly, academic study, including the study of fakes and forgeries, 
should be an intellectual endeavour that, unlike other intellectual endeavours, is 
distinguished only by its strict adherence to scholarly methodologies.43 In practice, 
without a clear understanding of the methodological practices scholars have chosen to 
employ—the precise thing we are currently lacking in the study of fakes and forgeries—
the end result can remain nominally within scholarship (i.e., pass the initial peer review) 
yet produce results of the most surprising kind, as I will discuss in section 1.2.
40 Brian P. Bennett, “Hermetic Histories: Divine Providence and Conspiracy Theory,” Numen: International 
Review for the History of Religions 54 (2007) 174–209, at 176.
41 On the notion of mystification as a strategy, see Jean-François Jeandillou, Esthétique de la mystification: 
tactique et stratégie littéraires (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1994) 25, 27. Tom Keating, an English art 
forger, would sometimes write, inter alia, “this is a fake” on the canvas he would use for creating a 
forged painting (visible only using X-radiation); Tom Keating, Frank Norman and Geraldine Norman, 
The Fake’s Progress (London: Hutchinson, 1977) 85. Another English art forger, Eric Hebborn, once 
inserted his own initials on a faked drawing; Eric Hebborn, The Art Forger’s Handbook (Woodstock, N.Y.: 
Overlook Press, 1997) 68.
42 A point made in Groom, Shadow, 66. For another plausible explanation (of the sociology of deviance) for 
the prevalent positivist attitude of scholars engaged in forgery-hunting, see Benjamin Kelly, “Deviant 
Ancient Histories: Dan Brown, Erich von Däniken and the Sociology of Historical Polemic,” Rethinking 
History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 12 (2008) 361–382.
43 My emphasis on scholarly methodologies here and elsewhere is rooted in the pragmatic notion that 
historians—indeed, anyone working within a professional community of experts, especially within the 
humanities—cannot dictate the reception of their own academic history writing but are in this regard 
at the mercy of the community as a whole; peer-review par excellence. The talk of methodologies and 
criteria are, consequently, intended to facilitate the community with rational means for carrying out 
their duties of review and criticism. As I have noted in Paananen, “WWFD,” 16 n. 84, “This, I believe, is a 
broadly held consensus across all academic disciplines, as scholarly views diverge only on the specific 
content of this difference-making distinction.” Cf. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., “The Challenge of Poetics to 
(Normal) Historical Practice,” Poetics Today 9 (1988) 435–452, at 445: “The only referent that can be 
found for ‘history’ … is the intertextuality that results from the reading of sets of sources combined 
with (guided by?) the readings of other historians of these same or other sources synthesized in their 
expositions. ‘History’ refers in actual practice only to other ‘histories’.”
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One example I use in “WWFD” for a constrained criterion is the notion of provenience, 
which is emphasised in archaeology and related fields—the notion that discoveries have 
to take place in situ (i.e., as part of controlled archaeological excavations), since no 
amount of expertise can guarantee the authenticity of non-provenienced artefacts.44 
While this criterion is useful for illustrating the concept of constraint, I am less sure of its 
cross-disciplinary applicability. While the consideration of provenience is, of course, 
occasionally beneficial in trying to differentiate authentic from inauthentic objects, it 
should only be yet another rough rule of thumb to begin with.45 First, there are historical 
examples of fake artefacts being salted into archaeological excavations either by the 
labourers or by the directors themselves.46 Second, even when an artefact has been 
unearthed in situ, its provenance, especially its chain of custody, has to remain intact as 
well, as an artefact that has emerged after a break in the chain of custody could well have 
been changed to a fake one.47
44 Paananen, “WWFD,” 3 n. 5.
45 Cf. Aaron Demsky, “Reading Northwest Semitic Inscriptions,” Near Eastern Archaeology 70 (2007) 68–74, 
at 68–69: “It is obvious that a document purchased on the antiquities market is suspect … However, I 
would not dismiss a document from consideration if it was without a proper provenance.” Similarly 
Martin Heide, “The Moabitica and Their Aftermath: How to Handle a Forgery Affair with an 
International Impact,” in New Inscriptions and Seals Relating to the Biblical World (ed. Meir Lubetski and 
Edith Lubetski; Issue 19 of Society of Biblical Literature Archaeology and Biblical Studies; Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2012) 193–242, at 231: “Non-provenanced antiquities cannot be ignored; 
they must be published and assessed. They should be clearly indicated as ‘non-provenanced,’ but 
otherwise dealt with adequately.” This notion is sharply contested in Oscar White Muscarella, “Bazaar 
Archaeology,” in Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Vorderasiens: Festschrift für Rainer Michael Boehmer (ed. Uwe 
Finkbeiner; Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1995) 449–453, at 452: “For, even if it is argued that it cannot be 
proven that the discs are forgeries, it equally cannot be proven that they are genuine. This is significant, 
and it manifests that the discs are lost to archaeology—even if in fact they are genuine.” Emphasis 
original. Note that both Demsky and Heide incorporate the concept of provenience within their use of 
the word provenance.
46 Thus Paul T. Craddock, Scientific Investigation of Copies, Fakes and Forgeries (London: Routledge, 2009) 471: 
“Archaeological sites can be salted by the digging labourer when the director is foolish enough to offer 
a reward for interesting finds, as exemplified by Boucher de Perthes … Archaeological excavations can 
also be salted by the director and, where the material is unique, suspicions may be aroused. For 
example, the stone tools found on the excavations of … Shinichi Fujimura.” Likewise, Oscar White 
Muscarella, “Antiquities Trade,” 118, 121–122: “Museum-employed curators and archaeologists exhibit 
and publish forgeries, sometimes knowingly, obeying museum orders for fear of offending rich 
collectors or their colleagues … Archaeologists also, innocently or not, publish forgeries as ancient 
artifacts. A prominent example is the archaeologist Roman Ghirshman, whose many publications, both 
monographs and exhibition catalogues, are standard scholarly texts. He was the most prolific publisher 
of Iranian forgeries, baptizing them as ancient productions and providing them with forged (by him) 
proveniences … Forgeries implanted by archaeologists at their sites have also occurred in Japan … and 
is alleged to have happened at a site in the United States.” For yet another example, see Christopher A. 
Rollston, “The Bullae of Baruch ben Neriah the Scribe and the Seal of Ma’adanah Daughter of the King: 
Epigraphic Forgeries of the 20th Century,” in Joseph Naveh Volume (ed. Hillel Geva and Alan Paris; Eretz-
Israel: Archaeological, Historical and Geographical Studies 32; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 
2016) 79–90, at 80.
47 For the difference between provenience and provenance, see Rosemary Joyce, “When Is Authentic? 
Situating Authenticity in the Itineraries of Objects,” in Creating Authenticity: Authentication Processes in 
Ethnographic Museums (ed. Alexander Geurds and Laura Van Broekhoven; Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2013) 
39–57, at 44–45.
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Scholars have nevertheless suggested provenience as an important factor for manuscript 
finds, a focus that could easily be more trouble than it is worth.48 For starters, as noted by 
Harold Love, most manuscript discoveries are made “by simply looking in the catalogue 
of a library,”49 while uncatalogued or poorly catalogued archives are traditionally combed 
through by solitary textual scholars, a practise ill-suited to securing a provenience for the 
manuscripts analogous to the condition in archaeology that discoveries be made in situ.50 
The most pressing issue by far, however, is the current state of many of the ancient 
treatises routinely used in contemporary historical study, as many of the universally 
recognised early Christian writings (to take a few specific examples) cannot be assigned a 
provenience apart from citing, for example, a particular dealer of antiquities—sometimes 
even that much is uncertain.51 Elevating this principle to a constrained criterion would 
thus remove large amounts of material from the hands of historians on the basis of their 
lack of suitable provenience—more so the farther back the discovery of the artefacts 
date.52
48 E.g., Bruce Chilton, “Provenience: Reply to Charles Hedrick,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The 
Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 York University Christian 
Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 67–74.
49 Harold Love, Attributing Authorship: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 184. 
Cf. Richard D. Altick, The Scholar Adventurers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950) 88: “At the 
outset, the routine of the manuscript hunter is fairly well established. He goes to the most obvious 
places first. He consults a great array of scholarly reference books, such as the catalogues of 
manuscripts owned by the British Museum and the various libraries at Oxford and Cambridge. He 
writes to, or visits, all the large libraries that have manuscript collections.”
50 For a brief overview of manuscript hunting as an historical profession, see Paananen and Viklund, 
“Control of the Scribal Hand,” 263–265. Cf. Altick, Scholar Adventurers, 89–90: “He must comb every 
library, large and small, every archive, every institution where manuscripts may conceivably be kept; 
he must go through innumerable catalogues of book dealers and auctioneers to find out what 
manuscripts have turned up for sale in the last hundred years or so, and then try to trace them as they 
passed from collector to collector … [under] a persistent suspicion that librarians and collectors, 
however systematic their cataloguing methods, often do not know what they actually possess.”
51 The Gospel of the Savior (Papyrus Berolinensis 22220) was sold by an antiquities dealer named Karl J. 
Möger to the Egyptian Museum of Berlin in 1967, while the Egerton Gospel (Papyrus Egerton 2) was sold 
by an unknown antiquities dealer to the British Museum in 1934; Charles W. Hedrick, “Secret Mark: 
Moving on from Stalemate,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. 
Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: 
Cascade Books, 2013) 30–66, at 41. For the disturbing provenance of the Gospel of Judas (Codex Tchacos), 
see Herbert Krosney, The Lost Gospel: The Quest for the Gospel of Judas Iscariot (Washington: National 
Geographic Books, 2006). Even such landmark finds as The Chester Beatty Papyri, The Dead Sea Scrolls 
and the Nag Hammadi codices were not discovered in situ and are, strictly speaking, non-provenanced 
(though, as Christopher A. Rollston, “Non-Provenanced Epigraphs II: The Status of Non-Provenanced 
Epigraphs within the Broader Corpus of Northwest Semitic,” MAARAV 11 (2004) 57–79, at 77–78 notes, 
the particularities with the discovery of the whole collection of The Dead Sea Scrolls warrants a special 
consideration: six of the Qumran caves, e.g., were spotted by archaeologists after their arrival to study 
the initial five caves, located by non-archaeologists).
52 There is a tendency even for discoveries thought to have been made under reasonable conditions to be 
found out to include irregularities, especially manuscripts possessing contemporary religious 
significance. On the most recent case of papyrus fragments from Luke (Papyrus 4), the provenience of 
which were revealed to have been fabricated, see Brent Nongbri, God’s Library: The Archaeology of the 
Earliest Christian Manuscripts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2018) 247–268.
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I thus discuss the topic of developing constrained criteria for various aspects of forgeries 
in subsection 2.5.2, after introducing the necessary background information in section 1.3 
and subsection 2.5.1. This is a necessary next step on the road away from simply 
documenting WWFD—or “poorly argued contemporary cases for forgery,” as it is labelled 
in the article title. One such approach is developed in section 3.1, the aim of which is no 
less audacious than to effect a fundamental shift in the study of fakes and forgeries, one 
rigorously critical framework at a time.
Notwithstanding, the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore—the manuscript allegedly 
discovered by Smith then lost again by the staff of the library of the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate of Jerusalem—remains at the heart of this study as a contemporary 
touchstone exemplifying all that can go wrong in a study in authenticity. Some key facts 
on the background and contents of the manuscript of Theod. have thus to be established 
before venturing further on.
1.1 The Manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore
The most commonly related story of discovery of the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore is that of Smith himself.53 Briefly recounted,54 Smith was once again on an 
extended manuscript hunting trip in 1958, when he stumbled upon this previously 
unknown manuscript in the library of the monastery of Mar Saba, Israel. The text was 
copied on the blank end papers of a printed book, a collection of the authentic letters of 
Ignatius of Antioch (ca. 35–107 CE) by Isaac Voss (1646).55 Smith photographed the 
manuscript pages for further study, and published two treatises in 1973, a popular 
account and interpretation of his trip and the contents of the manuscript, and a 
53 Morton Smith, The Secret Gospel: The Discovery and Interpretation of the Secret Gospel According to Mark (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1973) 1–25.
54 This story is narrated in much greater detail in “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 88–89; “Control of the Scribal 
Hand,” 263–269, for which only a few recent developments can be added. Most substantially, Stephan 
Hüller and Daniel N. Gullotta, “Quentin Quesnell’s Secret Mark Secret: A Report on Quentin Quesnell’s 
1983 Trip to Jerusalem and His Inspection of the Mar Saba Document,” Vigiliae Christianae 71 (2017) 353–
378 documents the last-known encounter with the manuscript of Theod. Based on his journal, notes, 
photographs, and letters concerning his 1983 trip to Jerusalem, Quentin Quesnell would have gained 
access, hours at a time, to the manuscript on multiple occasions for study; Hüller and Gullotta, “Quentin 
Quesnell,” 369–375. Other noteworthy details include the possibility that Smith’s original catalogue 
number (MS65) had been superseded by another (MS76), that the manuscript had been assessed by the 
library staff to have been written in 1672, and that Quesnell had seen numerous other Mar Saban 
manuscripts of a similar handwriting, photographs of which are currently located at Smith College 
Archives, part of their collection of Quentin Quesnell papers; Hüller and Gullotta, “Quentin Quesnell,” 
371, 374, 374 n. 96.
55 Isaac Voss, Epistulae genuinae S. Ignatii Martyris (Amsterdam: Blaeu, 1646).
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scholarly, critical edition of the text with an extensive commentary.56 The original 
remained at the monastery until a party of four scholars transferred it to Jerusalem in 
1976. Unfortunately, no scientific tests could be performed on the manuscript at that 
time.57 Though entrusted to the care of the library of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem, the manuscript went missing sometime during the 1980s, or perhaps early 
1990s, and its whereabouts have remained unknown ever since despite numerous 
attempts to locate it.58
The text of the letter59 appears to be a response by Clement of Alexandria to a certain 
Theodore, concerning a variant of the Gospel of Mark that Theodore had encountered in 
the hands of the Carpocratians, one of the multitude of early Christian groups. Clement 
affirms that the Alexandrian church used an expanded version of the Gospel of Mark—
Smith titled this the Secret Gospel of Mark60—a copy of which the Carpocratians had 
obtained. In the words of Clement, however, of the various Carpocratian claims,
τ  μ ν ψεύδεται παντελ ς, τ  δέ, ε  κα  ληθ  τινα περιέχει, ο δ  ο τως ὰ ὲ ῶ ὰ ἰ ὶ ἀ ῆ ὐ ᾽ ὕ
ληθ ς παραδίδοται. Συγκεκραμένα γ ρ τ ληθ  το ς πλάσμασι ἀ ῶ ὰ ἀ ῆ ῖ
παραχαράσσεται στε, το το δ  τ  λεγόμενον, κα  τ  λας μωρανθ ναιὥ ῦ ὴ ὸ ὶ ὸ ἅ ῆ
(some are altogether falsifications, and others, even if they do contain some true 
elements, nevertheless are not reported truly. For the true things being mixed with 
inventions, are falsified, so that, as the saying goes, even the salt loses its savor). 
(Theod. I.12–15)
Theodore had especially inquired about the words γυμν ς γυμνὸ ῷ (naked man with naked 
man; Theod. III.13), which, according to Clement, are not part of the extended Gospel of 
Mark. In response to the misinformation which Theodore had received, Clement cites two 
56 The popular account contains the discovery story referred to above; Smith, Secret Gospel. The critical 
edition is Morton Smith, Clement of Alexandria and a Secret Gospel of Mark (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1973).
57 Guy G. Stroumsa, “Comments on Charles Hedrick’s Article: A Testimony,” Journal of Early Christian 
Studies 11 (2003) 147–153.
58 For details, see Paananen and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 267–269.
59 For text of the letter in its original Greek I have used A. K. M. Adam, “Fragment of the Letter of Clement 
to Theodore, Containing the Secret Gospel of Mark: A Study Edition” (Oxford: Quadriga, 2018); 
http://akma.disseminary.org/2018/04/clement-to-theodore-the-secret-gospel-of-mark/. For the 
English translation I have used Morton Smith’s original translation as revised by Scott G. Brown in 
Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel, xii–xiii, xvii–xxii. Note that all translations from Theod. are by Smith (as 
revised by Brown), while all other translations from other sources, unless specifically noted, are mine.
60 Clement uses two labels for this version of Mark: πνευματικώτερον ε αγγέλιονὐ  (a more spiritual 
Gospel; Theod. I.21–22) and τ  μυστικ ν ε αγγέλιονὸ ὸ ὐ  (the mystic Gospel; Theod. II.6, II.12). Apart from 
Smith’s translation of the latter as the Secret Gospel of Mark that has become the standard in scholarship 
(e.g., Michael J. Kok, “Secret Gospel of Mark,” in e-Clavis: Christian Apocrypha (CANT 15; 2016); 
https://www.nasscal.com/e-clavis-christian-apocrypha/secret-gospel-of-mark/), these passages are 
variously referred to as the Mystic Gospel of Mark and the Longer Gospel of Mark. For a discussion on the 
merits of each, consult Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel, xi, 215–219.
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passages from the extended gospel in full, locating the first between Mark 10:34 and 
10:35, and the latter after the first sentence in Mark 10:46:61
και ρχονται ε ς Βηθανίαν, κα  ν κε  μία γυν  ς  δελφ ς α τ ς ἔ ἰ ὶ ἦ ἐ ῖ ὴ ἧ ὁ ἀ ὸ ὐ ῆ
πέθανεν. Κα  λθο σα προσεκύνησε τ ν Ιησο ν κα  λέγει α τ , Υ  ἀ ὶ ἐ ῦ ὸ ᾽ ῦ ὶ ὐ ῷ ἱὲ
Δαβ δ λέησόν με. Ο  δ  μαθητα  πετίμησαν α τ . Κα  ργισθε ς  ησο ς ὶ ἐ ἱ ὲ ὶ ἐ ὐ ῇ ὶ ὀ ὶ ὁ Ἰ ῦ
π λθεν μετ’ α τ ς ε ς τ ν κ πον που ν τ  μνημε ον, κα  ε θ ς κούσθηἀ ῆ ὐ ῆ ἰ ὸ ῆ ὅ ἦ ὸ ῖ ὶ ὐ ὺ ἠ  
κ το  μνημείου φων  μεγάλη, κα  προσελθ ν  ησο ς π κύλισε τ ν ἐ ῦ ὴ ὶ ὼ ὁ Ἰ ῦ ἀ ἐ ὸ
λίθον π  τ ς θύρας το  μνημείου, κα  ε σελθ ν ε θ ς που ν  ἀ ὸ ῆ ῦ ὶ ἰ ὼ ὐ ὺ ὅ ἦ ὁ
νεανίσκος ξέτεινεν τ ν χε ρα κα  γειρεν α τ ν κρατήσας τ ς χειρός,  δ  ἐ ὴ ῖ ὶ ἤ ὐ ὸ ῆ ὁ ὲ
νεανίσκος μβλέψας α τ  γάπησεν α τ ν κα  ρξατο παρακαλε ν α τ ν ἐ ὐ ῷ ἠ ὐ ὸ ὶ ἤ ῖ ὐ ὸ
να μετ’ α το  . Κα  ξελθόντες κ το  μνημείου λθον ε ς τ ν ο κίαν το  ἵ ὐ ῦ ᾖ ὶ ἐ ἐ ῦ ἦ ἰ ὴ ἰ ῦ
νεανίσκου, ν γ ρ πλούσιος. Κα  μεθ’ μέρας ξ πέταξεν α τ   ησο ς, ἦ ὰ ὶ ἡ ἓ ἐ ὐ ῷ ὁ Ἰ ῦ
κα  ψίας γενομένης ρχεται  νεανίσκος πρ ς α τ ν περιβεβλημένος ὶ ὀ ἔ ὁ ὸ ὐ ὸ
σινδόνα π  γυμνο , κα  μεινε σ ν α τ  τ ν νύκτα κείνην. δίδασκε γ ρ ἐ ὶ ῦ ὶ ἔ ὺ ὐ ῷ ὴ ἐ Ἐ ὰ
α τ ν  ησο ς τ  μυστήριον τ ς βασιλείας το  Θεο . κε θεν δ  ναστ ς ὐ ὸ ὁ Ἰ ῦ ὸ ῆ ῦ ῦ Ἐ ῖ ὲ ἀ ὰ
πέστρεψεν ε ς τ  πέραν το  ορδάνουἐ ἰ ὸ ῦ Ἰ
(And they come to Bethany. And there was there a certain woman whose brother 
of hers had died. And coming, she prostrated before Jesus and says to him, “Son 
of David have mercy on me.” But the disciples rebuked her. And having become 
angry Jesus went away with her into the garden where the tomb was. And 
immediately was heard from the tomb a great cry. And approaching, Jesus rolled 
the stone from the door of the tomb, and going in immediately where the young 
man was, he stretched out the hand and raised him, having grasped the hand. But 
the young man, having looked upon him, loved him and began to beg him that he 
might be with him. And going out from the tomb they went into the house of the 
young man; for he was rich. And after six days Jesus gave charge to him; and 
when it was evening the young man comes to him donning a linen sheet upon his 
naked body, and he remained with him that night; for Jesus was teaching him the 
mystery of the kingdom of God. Now rising, he returned from there to the other 
side of the Jordan). (Theod. II.23–III.11)
κα  σαν κε   δελφ  το  νεανίσκου, ν γάπα α τ ν  ησο ς, κα   ὶ ἦ ἐ ῖ ἡ ἀ ὴ ῦ ὃ ἠ ὐ ὸ ὁ Ἰ ῦ ὶ ἡ
μήτηρ α το  κα  Σαλώμη, κα  ο κ πεδέξατο α τ ς  ησο ςὐ ῦ ὶ ὶ ὐ ἀ ὐ ὰ ὁ Ἰ ῦ
(And there were there the sister of the young man whom Jesus loved him and his 
mother and Salome, and Jesus did not receive them). (Theod. III.14–16)
Against the conventional discovery story Smith reports, however, some scholars have 
implied the following alternative, a distinctly different narrative as part of their case that 
the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore was forged by its putative discoverer, Smith 
himself.62
61 Translation by Brown, “intended to preserve the idiosyncrasies of their Markan phraseology”; Brown, 
Mark’s Other Gospel, xiii, xxiii.
62 A similar counter-narrative was composed in Charles W. Hedrick, “Evaluating Morton Smith: Hoaxer 
Outed or Colleague Slandered,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 37 (2010) 283–294 of the contents of 
Carlson, Gospel Hoax. Hedrick judged the monograph to be a “slick presentation of what is clearly less 
than circumstantial evidence”; Hedrick, “Evaluating Morton Smith,” 285.
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1.2 The Alternative Narrative: The Manuscript of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore as a Fake
According to this alternative narrative, Smith read James Hogg Hunter’s novel The 
Mystery of Mar Saba at some point between its publication in 1940 and his own journey to 
the monastery of Mar Saba in the summer of 1958. Hunter’s novel depicts, within a larger 
plotline of spy intrigue, a forgery of an early Christian text (Shred of Nicodemus) planted in 
Mar Saba by Nazis for the British archaeologist, Sir William Bracebridge, to find.63 Smith 
thus became inspired by this novel to create a literary forgery of his own,64 though he 
would also draw inspiration from a number of other literary works, as explicated below. 
Two notable facts should be included here.65 First, Hunter’s novel contained an 
illustration of the forged Shred of Nicodemus.66 Second, Smith’s given name, Morton, was 
similar to the name of one of the minor characters in Hunter’s novel, that of Lord 
Moreton.67
Smith began his work by acquiring a copy of Isaac Voss’s 1646 edition of the letters of 
Ignatius of Antioch,68 a book that suited his purposes for two reasons. First, it was 
originally published as part of the seventeenth-century debate on the authenticity of 
certain Ignatian letters, including interpolations made to the authentic ones; the 
resulting contrast between this notion of inserting inauthentic interpolations into 
authentic texts and the forged epistle of Clement (that could be said to contain 
interpolations to the Gospel of Mark) was, to quote one recent scholar, “brilliant irony”.69 
Second, facing the first blank end paper Smith intended to use for the beginning of his 
63 James H. Hunter, The Mystery of Mar Saba (New York: Evangelical Publishers, 1940).
64 Philip Jenkins, Hidden Gospels: How the Search for Jesus Lost Its Way (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
101–102; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 19; Francis Watson, “Beyond Suspicion: On the Authorship of the Mar 
Saba Letter and the Secret Gospel of Mark,” Journal of Theological Studies 61 (2010) 128–170, at 163; Evans, 
“Grounds for Doubt,” 81.
65 The two facts listed here are intentionally obscure, the strangeness of which derives from their status 
as non sequuntur, as discussed in subsection 2.5.2.
66 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 19; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 167.
67 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81. Anthony Le Donne refines this point by pointing out their 
indistinguishable phonetic character; Anthony Le Donne, The Wife of Jesus: Ancient Texts and Modern 
Scandals (London: Oneworld Publications, 2013) 88.
68 Voss, Epistulae genuinae. Omitted from the narrative is the preparatory period during which Smith 
acquired the skills necessary to produce a forgery of the magnitude of Clement’s Letter to Theodore. That 
no such period could have existed is established in Allan J. Pantuck, “A Question of Ability: What Did He 
Know and When Did He Know It? Further Excavations from the Morton Smith Archives,” in Ancient 
Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 
York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 184–211.
69 Bart D. Ehrman, Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 87. See also Bart D. Ehrman, “Response to Charles Hedrick’s Stalemate,” Journal 
of Early Christian Studies 11 (2003) 155–163, at 162. This point is also deemed remarkable by Carlson, 
Gospel Hoax, 20; Chilton, “Provenience,” 73.
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forged composition, Voss, in his closing remarks to his work, reprehended 
“impudentissimus iste nebulo” (that most shameless scamp) that had forged the fake 
Ignatian letters, another “humorous, almost poetic touch” from Smith’s part.70
The composing of the Greek gospel extracts would also have been inspired by Hunter’s 
novel. The fictional account of Shred of Nicodemus provided the idea that a short early 
Christian excerpt could be constructed as a pastiche with the themes of death and burial 
and subsequently interpreted sensationally.71 Other points of contact include the removal 
of a stone from a tomb in a garden, and the characters of Nicodemus—who λθεν πρ ς ἦ ὸ
α τ ν νυκτ ςὐ ὸ ὸ  (came to him [Jesus] at night); Jh 3.2—and the resurrected young man—
who, ψίας γενομένης ρχεται … πρ ς α τ νὀ ἔ ὸ ὐ ὸ  (when it was evening … comes to him 
[Jesus]); Theod. III.7–8.72 The Shred of Nicodemus also explains the empty tomb incident in 
naturalistic terms (i.e., Nicodemus stole the body of Jesus), which is also one of the 
proposed interpretations for the resurrection of the young man in Theod. II.25–III.5.73 
Many other details of the gospel story were composed in a laughable manner: μεινε σ ν ἔ ὺ
α τ  τ ν νύκτα κείνηνὐ ῷ ὴ ἐ  (Theod. III.9) rendered idiomatically as “spent the night with” 
implies a (homo)sexual encounter;74 προσκυνέω (prostrate; Theod. II.24) implies a sensual 
advance rather than a worshipful attitude towards Jesus when translated as “bent down 
to kiss”;75 ρχομαιἔ  (to come; Theod. II.24) could be understood in English as reaching 
sexual climax;76 χείρ (hand; Theod. III.3–4) could be read either as a euphemism for the 
penis, as referring to the starting position in ancient wrestling (in the nude), or as a sign 
70 Voss, Epistulae genuinae, 318; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 97. This point is also deemed remarkable by 
Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 87; Ehrman, “Response,” 162; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 20; Jeffery, Secret Gospel of 
Mark Unveiled, 237; Pierluigi Piovanelli, “Halfway between Sabbatai Tzevi and Aleister Crowley: Morton 
Smith’s ‘Own Concept of What Jesus “Must” Have Been’ and, Once Again, the Questions of Evidence and 
Motive,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; 
Proceedings from the 2011 York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade 
Books, 2013) 157–183, at 161 n. 15, though he finds this detail only “troubling,” not a “clearly 
identifiable ‘joke’”; see also Piovanelli, “Halfway between,” 169.
71 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 91–92; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 139–142, 166; Evans, “Grounds 
for Doubt,” 81, 91. On the methodological difficulties of interpreting Clement’s Letter to Theodore as a 
pastiche, see Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel, 92–97; Hedrick, “Moving on from Stalemate,” 45–51.
72 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 167–169.
73 First suggested in Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh, and Henry Lincoln, The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail 
(Revised and Updated edition; London: Arrow Books, 2006 [1982]) 348; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 19, 83. A 
more plausible interpretation, however, is that the young man was dead, and the “great cry” 
demonstrates demonic disturbance upon Jesus’s arrival, as happens elsewhere in the Gospel of Mark 
(e.g., Mark 1:23–24; 5:6–7); Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel, 153.
74 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 65–69. For a more plausible interpretation of the Greek, see Brown, “Factualizing 
the Folklore,” 313–322; Brown, “Twelve Enduring Misconceptions,” 311–313.
75 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 92–93.
76 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 93.
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of mutual love between Jesus and the young man.77 In short, this first gospel passage 
could readily be a story of “Jesus rejecting a woman in order to help an anguished young 
man ‘come out of the closet’ for his first (homo)sexual experience.”78 The gospel passage 
would thus make an alluding “coupling” of the themes of the mystery of the kingdom of 
God, the motive of secrecy, and the sexual acts forbidden in Jewish law into a “linkage” 
transmutating into Smith’s personal sphragis, a seal of (in)authenticity.79
The composing of the Clementine letter began by borrowing the English equivalent 
(Theodore) of the recipient’s Greek name (Θεόδωρος) from Angus Wilson’s novel Anglo-
Saxon Attitudes (1956); another novel Smith would have read prior to his journey to Mar 
Saba in 1958.80 Hunter’s novel inspired other details of the letter: just as the discovery of 
the fictional Shred of Nicodemus amidst other early Christian texts lent credence to the 
forgery, so Smith wrote the Clementine letter to frame the gospel extracts for the same 
purpose.81 The eloquent Greek of the epistle, which indeed follows Clement’s style, was 
produced by favouring words that were “found in Clement but not in other Patristic 
writers,” while omitting those “not found in Clement but present in other Patristic 
writers.”82 Finally, along the lines of his literary sphragis described above, Smith inserted a 
number of “deliberately embedded clues” to the text.83 Theod. I.13–15 (“For the true things 
being mixed with inventions, are falsified, so that, as the saying goes, even the salt loses 
its savor”) was a crucial piece of the puzzle, as its use of salt imagery could be construed 
as foreign to the real Clement of Alexandria, and its notion of the adulteration of salt an 
anachronism.84 Smith would have composed the sentence in this way to draw attention to 
the fact that one of the well-known table salt producer in the twentieth century was the 
Morton Salt Company.85 Furthermore, the word λαςἅ  (salt) in the letter is immediately 
followed by μωραίνω, in the context of salt losing its savour. Smith chose to use this 
77 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 93–95.
78 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 92. For another perspective on such jokes, see Brown, “Review of 
The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled”.
79 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 69–72, 81; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81–89. For counterpoint, see Brown, 
“Factualizing the Folklore,” 322–326.
80 Philip Jenkins, “Alexandrian Attitudes: A New Source for the ‘Secret Gospel of Mark’,” Books & Culture 20 
(2014) 8–9.
81 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 167; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 90–91.
82 Andrew H. Criddle, “On the Mar Saba Letter Attributed to Clement of Alexandria,” Journal of Early 
Christian Studies 3 (1995) 215–220, at 218. Smith’s source of data would have been Otto Stählin’s four-
volume critical edition of Clement; Clemens Alexandrinus (vols. 4; ed. Otto Stählin; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 
1905–1936). For critique, see Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel, 54–57; Brown, “Review of The Secret Gospel of 
Mark Unveiled,” 41–42.
83 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 61.
84 Both constructions have been persuasively challenged in Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 306–311.
85 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 58–62.
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word in its infinitive form (as opposed to the other forms used in the canonized gospels) 
because of the letter nu, which could then conceal his first name Morton as 
μωρανθ ναιῆ .86 That is, an ingenious reader would have been able to pick up on the 
author’s first name87 by making the connection between λαςἅ  and the Morton Salt 
Company and that three of the six letters of the name Morton were reproduced in the 
Greek word referring to salt losing its savour.88
For his surname, Smith used the Greek word παραχαράσσω (here: falsify) to conceal it 
by the following chain of inferences: literally speaking παραχαράσσω refers to “re-
stamping” (thus also of falsifying), which could be translated as “forging,” a word that 
originates from French forger, which in turn originates from Latin fabricare, a verb that 
describes actions that might result in a forged product, literary or metallurgical; in 
English, a forger (as in one who produces metalwork at a forge) could also be called a 
smith, and such derivation from παραχαράσσω to smith would have been plausible for a 
person whose name happened to be Smith.89 Other features evidencing Smith’s sense of 
humour include the sign of the cross placed at the beginning of the text, similar in 
appearance to the modern text critical sign for spurious text,90 the ending of the 
manuscript in mid-sentence (or a “cliffhanger ending,” as one critic puts it),91 and 
perhaps even Smith’s dedication of The Secret Gospel “For The One Who Knows”.92
86 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 154–155.
87 Note, however, that Morton was Smith’s second name. Born as Rubert Morton, Smith changed his first 
name to Robert. Before settling for “Morton Smith” he had also used “R. Morton Smith” in his early 
scholarly publications. I wish to thank Allan J. Pantuck, the foremost expert on the Smith Archive, for 
this information.
88 Assuming, of course, a rough one-to-one correspondence between the English and the Greek alphabets.
89 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 152–154. Here I am indebted to the manner Brown has broken down this 
argument in Brown, “Twelve Enduring Misconceptions,” 319.
90 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 33.
91 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 79. See also Ehrman, “Response,” 162; Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 86.
92 The significance of this dedication was first questioned by Quentin Quesnell, “The Mar Saba Clementine: 
A Question of Evidence,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 37 (1975) 48–67, at 66; mentioned in passing by 
Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 17; considered still “ein ungelöstes Rätsel” by Eckhard Rau, “Weder gefälscht noch 
authentisch? Überlegungen zum Status des geheimen Markusevangeliums als Quelle des antiken 
Christentums,” in Jesus in apokryphen Evangelienüberlieferungen: Beiträge zu außerkanonischen 
Jesusüberlieferungen aus verschiedenen Sprach- und Kulturtraditionen (ed. Jörg Frey and Jens Schröter; 
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 254; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 139–186, 
at 151. Specifically, Quesnell contrasted this dedication to that in Smith’s Clement of Alexandria, 
dedicated to Arthur Darby Nock, who himself suspected the authenticity of Theod. As noted in sub-
subsection 2.5.1.2, such jokes lack the necessary pertinence to securely identify the supposed punch 
line as an authorial revelation. Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 242–243 notes the rather 
obvious Gnostic connection, but ends up wondering, “whether Smith’s unnamed dedicatee was actually 
himself, congratulating his own creative brilliance in a narcissistic mental mirror, trumpeting through 
the fog: Behold the One Who Knows.” In itself, however, it is hardly surprising that Smith would have 
dedicated a popular book called The Secret Gospel to “One Who Knows,” i.e., a Knower (Gnostic). Smith 
was never sympathetic to conservative scholarship: he coined the term “pseudorthodox” (starting with 
Morton Smith, “The Present State of Old Testament Studies,” Journal of Biblical Literature 88 (1969) 19–
24
Smith’s intentio auctoris for the epistle was always to have it read crooked. That is, it was 
not to be read straight(forwardly), as Clement simply condemning the Carpocratians for 
their heterodox beliefs but as an implied Carpocratian coming to the realization of the 
extent of Clement’s hypocrisy—after all, Clement emphatically denies that the words 
γυμν ς γυμνὸ ῷ belong to the gospel extracts, even though a crooked reading of the 
passage construes that it is about the young man’s first (homo)sexual encounter.93 
Consequently, Smith composed Clement’s Letter to Theodore as an extended double entendre. 
The Greek word πόρρητοςἀ  (here: ineffable; Theod. I.22) should thus be understood as 
referring to the tradition “among Christians [that homosexuality] is not to be named,”94 
while προφύλακτοςἀ  (unforeseen) and ποθνήσκωἀ  (to die) in Theod. I.27–28 are to be 
interpreted, respectively, as “without a condom” (as in “unguarded”; similarly, in English 
“prophylactic” can be used as a synonym for “condom”) and “climaxing” (dying is a 
common euphemism for an orgasm in many languages, including Latin).95
As an extended double entendre, Clement’s Letter to Theodore is, furthermore, literarily 
dependent on Oscar Wilde’s play Salomé (1891). This inference derives from a number of 
details of similarities between the two literary works (including paratextual96 material), 
35), to describe, in the explanation of Stanley Isser, “Studies of Ancient Jewish Messianism: Scholarship 
and Apologetics,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 25 (1988) 56–73, at 67, “those academicians who claim to 
be critical scholars but whose conclusions, consciously or unconsciously, always appear to support the 
religious positions of groups to which they belong.” This scholarly bias has not necessarily changed 
much in the 21st century; cf. Tony Burke, “Heresy Hunting in the New Millennium,” Studies in Religion / 
Sciences Religieuses 39 (2010) 405–420. The reverse of such an attitude would be to express support for 
those that conservative scholars most despised. Even so, Smith’s dedication to “One Who Knows” does 
not in itself have to entail anything more than, e.g., Smith’s quip about his advancing “along the left 
hand path,” a comment he makes in a letter to Gershom Scholem, dated August 1, 1955—a reference to 
a magical approach that within Western magical tradition, according to Kennet Granholm, Embracing 
the Dark: The Magic Order of Dragon Rouge—Its Practice in Dark Magic and Meaning Making (Åbo: Åbo 
Akademi University Press, 2005) 28, “is usually used for the occultists whose goal is self-deification with 
a maintained individuality, whereas the Right Hand Path is used for the occultists striving for a union 
with the divine with a resulting resolution of the magician’s individuality”; Morton Smith and Gershom 
Scholem, Correspondence 1945–1982 (ed. Guy G. Stroumsa; Leiden: Brill, 2008) 81. That Smith had a special 
interest in subversive religious and magical practices both ancient and modern is well-known in his 
biography; cf. Pierluigi Piovanelli, “‘Une certaine “Keckheit, Kühnheit und Grandiosität”…’: La 
correspondance entre Morton Smith et Gershom Scholem (1945–1982). Notes critiques,” Revue de 
l’histoire des religions 228 (2011) 403–29; Piovanelli, “Halfway between”.
93 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 206–211, 238.
94 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 238; Peter Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries and Morton Smith’s 
Magic,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; 
Proceedings from the 2011 York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade 
Books, 2013) 212–246, at 242.
95 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 242–243.
96 Paratext, as defined in Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (trans. Jane E. Lewin; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 1, refers to all the “accompanying productions” a text 
happens to be surrounded with—nowadays, in the case of a simple book, at least the author’s name and 
the title of the work are always included. Furthermore, Genette, Paratexts, 344 notes that paratext can 
be further distinguished as peritext and epitext, so that epitext refers to “any paratextual element not 
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such as the crooked reading of the aforementioned Greek word πόρρητοςἀ  with Lord 
Alfred Douglas’s poem “Two Loves” (1894), passages from which—including “love that 
dare not speak its name”—were read aloud at Wilde’s indecency trial in 1895,97 and τ ς ῆ
πτάκις κεκαλυμμένης ληθείαςἑ ἀ  (of that truth hidden by seven veils; Theod. I.26), which 
seems to echo Wilde’s stage direction “Salome dances the dance of the seven veils” (in its 
1894 English translation from Wilde’s original French).98
Having thus prepared both the gospel extracts and the Clementine letter that frames 
them, Smith transferred these texts to the end papers of Voss’s book either in advance or 
during his 1958 stay at the monastery of Mar Saba99—the site of discovery deliberately 
chosen because of Hunter’s novel.100 While on site, Smith left behind yet another 
humorous clue of his deed on a separate Mar Saban manuscript, inserting a Greek name 
with his own hand that could be construed as a cryptonym,101 deriving from a Greek verb 
that can be translated both as “to swindle” and as “to lose one’s hair”—as one critic has 
observed,  Smith “was substantially bald well before 1960.”102
Following the successful planting of the forged manuscript, Smith prepared a scholarly 
commentary on the Clementine letter of 462 pages between 1958 and 1966, afterwards 
composing an elaborate account of his journey for his popular treatise on the manuscript, 
materially appended to the text within the same volume but circulating, as it were, freely”—such as 
interviews of the author, reviews of the book, and so on. Here, the concept of paratext(ual material) is 
used to refer generally to all such instances of intertextuality.
97 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 238–239; Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 242–243.
98 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 228–231; Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 242. For a hefty criticism 
of this strategy of interpreting Theod. as an extended double entendre—namely, as a “hermeneutics of 
desperation”—see Brown, “Review of The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled,” 23–30.
99 Ehrman, “Response,” 159 n. 8 suggests the latter. Hüller and Gullotta, “Quentin Quesnell,” 376 report, 
however, that Quesnell thought it “‘impossible’ that Smith could have smuggled a book from outside of 
the monastery into the library owing to the tight scrutiny of his overseers.” Hüller and Gullotta, 
“Quentin Quesnell,” 376 n. 106 also refer to Agamemnon Tselikas, “Agamemnon Tselikas’ Handwriting 
Analysis Report,” Biblical Archaeology Review 37 (2011) i–xv, at vi; 
http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-topics/bible-interpretation/agamemnon-tselikas-
handwriting-analysis-report: “I think [it] is impossible for someone to write this text inside the 
monastery since 1923. It was not allowed to anyone to have access to the books and, if he had, he was 
under the constant supervision (as now). Noone could easily use an old book to write on white leaves 
such a text.”
100 Jenkins, Hidden Gospels, 102; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 19; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 163; Evans, “Grounds 
for Doubt,” 81.
101 Fictitious names that, according to Jeandillou, Esthétique, 84–85, are “caractérisent par leur relation 
avec ce qu’ils cachent. … On s’autorisera donc à tenir pour cryptonymes tous les noms dont le caractère 
supposé se laisse deviner, avec un plus ou moins haut degré d’évidence selon que le masque—en soi 
comme dans son rapport au texte qu’il accompagne—est totalement ou partiellement opaque.” Order 
reversed.
102 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 42–44. This argument is, however, based on flawed data, as established in Pantuck 
and Brown, “Morton Smith as M. Madiotes”.
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publishing both were in 1973.103 On one hand, the complexity of the commentary was 
meant to misdirect scholars into debating internal issues in the text rather than focusing 
on the manuscript itself.104 On the other hand, Smith’s intimidating level of detail ensured 
that few scholars would take the trouble to critically process all of his arguments.105 
Consequently, Smith was able to insert one final deliberate clue in his commentary on the 
passage about salt discussed above (Theod. I.13–15), in which his proposed allusion of Matt 
5:13 to Jer 10:14 LXX could also be made on the basis of translating ξω βάλλωἔ  (cast out) 
in the former and χοανεύω (cast metal) in the latter with their English homonym “cast”. 
This Smith would have done to draw attention—following his preceding attempt to allude 
to Morton Salt—to the words omitted in his quote from Jeremiah, one of which happens 
to be χρυσοχόος (goldsmith).106
The reminiscences of Smith’s journey were modeled on Hunter’s novel. Smith uses 
“reconcile” to describe his experience as a manuscript hunter—that of going into a 
monastery unsure of whether there is anything worthwhile to find, thus in need of 
“reconciling” himself to this fact—as the fictional Sir William does.107 The word “cell” 
(referring to monastic lodging) is also used in both works.108 One recent critic has 
described these similarities as “amazing, both in substance and in language.”109
In addition, Smith likewise employs his literary strategy of extended double entendre in 
his commentary. In his discussion of the “mystery of the kingdom of God,” for instance, 
Smith referred to Col 2:18 as potentially “the first reference to practice of a technique for 
ascent to the heavens”—namely, that μηδε ς μ ς καταβραβευέτω θέλων ν ὶ ὑ ᾶ ἐ
ταπεινοφροσύν  κα  θρησκεί  τ ν γγέλων,  όρακεν μβατεύωνῃ ὶ ᾳ ῶ ἀ ἃ ἑ ἐ  (nobody is to give a 
judgment against you, who is willing to practice humility and worshipping of angels, 
whom he saw as he entered [into heavens?]).110 However, in his lengthy commentary 
103 Smith, The Secret Gospel, 76 notes that first draft of Clement of Alexandria was completed in 1963, revised 
and accepted for publication by the Harvard University Press in 1964, then revised a second time in 
1966, subsequently “going through the press” until its publication in 1973.
104 Quesnell, “Evidence,” 48, 60–61; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 19, 81, 87–90; Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 
13, 237, 247; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 155 n. 74. On Smith’s role in controlling access to the 
manuscript—namely, that he did all and more than was characteristically expected of an academic 
manuscript hunter to ensure other scholars would have adequate access to the artefact—see Paananen 
and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 269–271.
105 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 13, 111.
106 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 62–64. For a second opinion, see Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 311–313.
107 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 165–166; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 89–91.
108 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 90.
109 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 90.
110 Smith, Clement of Alexandria, 180–181.
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Smith also refers to “the potential climax of the consequences of Christian baptism” (Col 
3:1–17), “the spiritual union effected by physical intercourse in marriage” (Eph 5:32), and 
“Christ’s descent in disguise” (Ascension of Isaiah 10–11), which he contrasts with the 
description of Christ “stripping off” the powers and authorities in Col 2:15.111 As such, all 
these instances are intended to “hint of sexual double meaning,” while at the same time 
preserving “faux deniability” allowing Smith to claim that such an implication does not 
exist, “an essential feature of Smith’s brand of humor” according to one recent critic.112 A 
careful reading of Smith’s writings indicates, furthermore, that he was suffering from 
severe psychological issues.113 Based on Jeffery’s description of these issues and citations 
from Smith that Jeffery uses to validate them, Donald Capps proposed that Smith must 
have suffered from narcissistic personality disorder.114
What then was Smith’s motive for forging Clement’s Letter to Theodore? According to his 
critics, they were numerous, including challenging himself,115 challenging his peers,116 
taking revenge on his peers,117 mocking his peers,118 proving himself,119 propagating his 
ideas about early Christianity,120 opposing fundamentalist ideas about early 
Christianity,121 acting out on his alleged character as an archetypal trickster,122 providing 
a respectable history to homosexuality,123 and general crankiness following alleged 
psychological issues.124 Smith is also perceived too complex a character to establish one 
simple motive,125 even to the extent that Smith himself did not know “clearly what he was 
111 Smith, Clement of Alexandria, 178–181.
112 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 234–235.
113 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 5–13, 123–131, 242.
114 Donald Capps, “The Diagnostic Question,” a conference paper for “The Secret Gospel of Mark, Sex, 
Death, and Madness: The Psychodynamics of Morton Smith’s Proposal,” at the annual meeting of the 
Society of Biblical Literature in New Orleans, November 21, 2009.
115 Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 88.
116 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 79.
117 Piovanelli, “Halfway between,” 166–169.
118 Jenkins, “Alexandrian Attitudes,” 8–9.
119 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 79–80.
120 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 80–86; Piovanelli, “Halfway between,” 181, citing Per Beskow, Strange Tales about 
Jesus: A Survey of Unfamiliar Gospels (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 103. Although neither Evans nor 
Watson discuss Smith’s motives, their arguments on continuity between their interpretations of 
Smith’s scholarly ideas and their interpretations of the contents of Clement’s Letter to Theodore seem to 
imply that Smith created the document for perpetuating his own agenda; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 
155–161; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81–89.
121 Jacob Neusner, Are There Really Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels? A Refutation of Morton Smith (South 
Florida Studies in the History of Judaism 80; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993) 10.
122 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 84–86; Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 92, 121.
123 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 239.
124 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 242.
125 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 85–86; Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 242–243.
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actually communicating” in his act of deception.126
For the remainder of this dissertation, I will refer to this account of Morton Smith having 
constructed a highly sophisticated forgery of Clement’s Letter to Theodore as the alternative 
narrative. As will be discussed in section 3.1, this narrative functions as the fons et origo for 
developing constrained criteria for the acceptability of alleged concealed indicators of 
authority, a literary technique within the tradition of mystification that has been 
inexplicably used to construe many of the individual claims enumerated above.
1.3 Some Preliminary (and Pre-emptive) Considerations
Scholars are likely to elicit divergent responses to the alternative narrative described in the 
previous section. To use the reception of Carlson’s The Gospel Hoax (2005) as our guide, 
these will range from whole-hearted acceptance to incredulity about the “bizarre” 
aspects of many of the claims.127 Based on this, I can envision two general objections to 
emerge. Those opposed to the conclusion of the alternative narrative might claim that 
the whole narrative is obviously so weird that it is not worth the trouble to figure out the 
reasons behind its strange character. On the other hand, those in favour of (at least) the 
conclusion that Smith did forge the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore might object 
to my form of presentation of the alternative narrative. In their eyes, this alternative 
narrative is weird only in appearance, because I have omitted a number of other 
arguments that would have lent credence to the narrative’s presentation of Smith’s 
intentional efforts in creating a forged Clementine letter. Thus, a holistic assessment of 
scholarship on Theod. would present the details within the alternative narrative in a 
better light. That is, as an artificial construct, the alternative narrative would not be 
acceptable (as a reasonable description of the actions that led to the alleged 
manufacturing of Theod.) to any scholar in favour of Smith’s culpability. I would thus have 
been better not to have attempted to craft the alternative narrative in the first place.
126 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 243. Following the list of possible motives described above, it 
might be safe to conclude that neither does anyone else. It is worth noting, at any rate, that the 
question of motive in the study of literary fakes is often a complicated one. Cf. Grafton, Forgers and 
Critics, 40–41. Similarly Ehrman, Forgery and Counterforgery, 4–5, 97. On more detailed considerations of 
the alleged motives behind Clement’s Letter to Theodore, see especially Brown, “Question of Motive,” 351–
383; Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 108–110.
127 Of the works cited in the alternative narrative, The Gospel Hoax is perhaps the most representative, as it 
was the first presentation of many of the more unique and imaginative details. For a more in-depth 
treatment of the reception of The Gospel Hoax, see Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 95–96.
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In response to the first objection I would argue that the alternative narrative has been so 
carefully constructed that the following sentence could not be challenged: each statement 
in the alternative narrative has been made in a scholarly publication. As such, there is no detail 
in the alternative narrative so obvious that it could be dismissed without first presenting 
precise, clearly articulated reasons. As Michael Barkun has noted,
the fact that the beliefs … are bizarre ought not to imply that they are necessarily 
innocuous or unworthy of careful scrutiny. Bizarre beliefs have broken into the 
open before. Indeed, new orthodoxies can emerge out of just such ideological 
undergrowth, sometimes with devastating effects.128
As noted in chapter 1, forgeries in the late twentieth century have become construed 
such that they are the keys to their own puzzles, and the lack of constrained criteria in 
the study of forgeries has led, in extreme cases, to the likes of the alternative narrative.129 
“Weird” claims are themselves worthy of scrutiny when they, as in Barkun’s case, occur 
in the margins of society—and all the more so when academics themselves are found 
propagating them.130
On the other hand, the objection to the framing—in this case a “weirdness effect”—that 
my presentation of the alternative narrative has produced is entirely justified. It does, 
however, underline the point I intend to make. First of all, these arguments were taken 
very seriously at the time of their publication, and even though some of them—especially 
those about Smith having embedded a host of deliberate clues pointing to his own 
authorship—may have been the first to become suspect since the publication of The Gospel  
Hoax (2005), my thesis is that every statement made in the alternative narrative leans on 
the same basic framework.131 My framing of the alternative narrative—that is, my 
omission of other arguments scholars have made to justify their conclusion that Theod. is 
128 Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (2nd edition; 
Comparative Studies in Religion and Society 15; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) 239.
129 For a less extreme example, consider some of the arguments used to construe the Gospel of Jesus’ Wife as 
inauthentic—arguments that are not, in practice, able to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic 
text passages, as established in Timo S. Paananen, “Another ‘Fake’ Or Just a Problem of Method: What 
Francis Watson’s Analysis Does to Papyrus Köln 255” (2012); 
http://blue.butler.edu/~jfmcgrat/GJW/Another%20Fake%20Or%20Just%20a%20Problem%20of
%20Method%20by%20Timo%20S.%20Paananen.pdf.
130 Cf. Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry, “Why the Demarcation Problem Matters,” in Philosophy of 
Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem (ed. Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013) 1–6, at 3: “The lack of interest for pseudoscience in some 
philosophical quarters derives from the tacit assumption that some ideas and theories are so obviously 
wrong that they are not even worth arguing about. Pseudoscience is still too often considered a 
harmless pastime indulged in by a relatively small number of people with an unusual penchant for 
mystery worship. This is far from the truth.” Emphasis original.
131 As elaborated in sub-subsection 3.1.4.1, I have decided to treat the alternative narrative as a rational 
construct that is only inadmissible due to reasons of consistency in academic history writing.
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a work of forgery—does not create so much as accentuate the nature of the arguments 
claiming that Smith deliberately chose a particular old book, and sprinkled amusing 
details in its pages. Whether or not these arguments are ultimately deemed acceptable 
has little to do with my decision to highlight them in this manner. It seems clear to me 
that the alternative narrative itself cannot sustain the weight of the whole case for 
forgery. This should not, however, lead us to shield these claims from criticism 
altogether, nor do they prevent us from using them for other, more constructive 
purposes than the simple assessment of the plausibility of the claims themselves. 
Narratives within the academic study of history are, in any case, “constructions,” as 
Stephen Turner observes, “which include only that which is relevant to the point of the 
narrative … [which] is at least in part to make some historical outcome intelligible.”132 
The alternative narrative serves a purpose, at the very least for the following: to provide 
a baseline to a comparative analysis in subsection 2.5.3; after an in-depth study in 
subsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
That is to say, historians might be accidentally reading the alternative narrative as a 
standard, judicious academic history writing of the production of the manuscript of Clement’s  
Letter to Theodore, though it is not. In other words, the “historical outcome” I aim to make 
“intelligible” with the alternative narrative is not the production of the manuscript of 
Theod. but rather the structure of the methodological free-form (or lack of constrained 
criteria) in contemporary discourses on forgeries. The alternative narrative provides raw 
material for the study of the latter phenomenon. Here, the narrative form is construed 
merely as a chronicle of factual statements from scholarly literature, allowing, inter alia, a 
fruitful collation of information—such as observing “that most shameless scamp” to be 
the most widely cited detail among the scholars whose work comprises the alternative 
narrative. The alternative narrative is never studied as a holistic composition but only 
through its details, most often as a single factual statement corresponding to a single 
sentence of the narrative. The alternative narrative can thus be viewed simply as a series 
of claims that happen to be presented in the form of a historical narrative—or, as one 
might wish to ascertain, just a minor idiosyncrasy of its author.
132 Stephen Turner, “What Do Narratives Explain? Roth, Mink and Weber,” in Towards a Revival of Analytical 
Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth’s Vision of Historical Sciences (ed. Krzysztof Brzechczyn; Poznań 
Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 110; Leiden: Brill, 2018) 130–147, at 143.
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2 Methods and Materials
The four articles that comprise the bulk of this dissertation were consciously constructed 
to apply different methodological approaches to the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore. As such, each methodology needs to be discussed separately. The study of the 
alternative narrative is likewise divided into separate parts: the classification of the 
material (subsection 2.5.1), the analysis of the material (subsection 2.5.2), and the 
comparative study of the material (subsection 2.5.3).
2.1 “Stalemate to Deadlock”: A Discourse Analysis by Any Other Name
The first of the published articles, as explicated in the abstract, “reviews the literature 
pertaining to the recent debate over the question of authenticity of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore (including the so-called Secret Gospel of Mark) and argues that the academy has 
tied itself into a secure deadlock.”133 Due to the limitations of article length, the 
theoretical basis of the article had to be excised from the article text; beneath the thin 
veneer of a literature review thus lies a straightforward discourse analysis,134 one that 
nevertheless amount to double the length of a regular article within the discipline. Briefly 
stated, as “the odd demeanour of the discourse” was already obvious between the years 
1973 and 2005,135 the most recent development of the two streams of foul play accusations
—the hoax hypothesis, and the double entendre hypothesis136—and their counter-cases were 
analysed with the presupposition that it is most important to “work with what has 
actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and 
identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality.”137 Thus 
my attention centred foremost on how participants engaged one another in the larger 
authenticity discourse,138 enabling me to map out the figurative road “From Stalemate to 
133 Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 87. Title italicization added.
134 Although the analysis itself was perhaps straightforward, the concept of discourse analysis never is. 
This particular approach to language, as observed in Deborah Schiffrin, Approaches to Discourse (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994) 5, is “widely recognized as one of the most vast, but also one of the least defined, areas 
in linguistics.” The sentiment is captured most cogently in the preface to Barbara Johnstone, Discourse 
Analysis (3rd edition; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018) xi, where the reader is urged “not to think of 
discourse analysis as a collection of facts or canonical studies or as a body of theory” but as “an open-
ended heuristic” that is practiced “by paying close and systematic attention to particular situations and 
particular utterances or sets of utterances.” 
135 That is, immediately after the publication of Smith’s The Secret Gospel (1973), and up until the 
publication of Carlson’s The Gospel Hoax (2005).
136 Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 88.
137 Marianne W. Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage 
Publications, 2002) 21. Emphasis mine.
138 Cf. Norman Fairclough, Media Discourse (London: Bloomsbury, 1995) 125–128.
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Deadlock,” as discussed in further detail in chapter 3.
2.2. “Distortion of the Scribal Hand”: A Rankean Trip to the Archive
The phenomenon my co-author, Roger Viklund, and I label line screen distortion in the first 
documented occurrence of an erroneous reading due to manuscript digitization 
process,139 resulted from a return to the basics in the study of history. That is, a (mostly 
figurative) trip to (private) archives, in the footsteps of the nineteenth-century German 
historian Leopold von Ranke, whose appreciation of the private archival material was 
summarized by Lord Acton as follows: “By going from book to manuscript and from 
library to archives, we exchange doubt for certainty, and become our own masters.”140 
Invaluable in providing their assistance were Charles W. Hedrick and Allan J. Pantuck, the 
first of whom secured scholarly rights of access to high-quality scans of the colour 
photographs taken of the manuscript of Theod. in 1983,141 having, together with Nikolaos 
Olympiou, tracked down the retired librarian of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem, who had the photographs in his possession at the turn of the millennium.142 
Similarly, Pantuck assisted us in securing high-quality scans of Smith’s black-and-white 
photographs taken in 1958 from the Smith Archive, now housed in the Jewish Theological 
Seminary in New York.143 When all the logistics had been sorted out, a comparison of the 
high-quality material with the earlier textual descriptions of the quality of the scribal 
hand in the manuscript, informed by the standards of forensic studies, revealed a 
disparity that could not be explained by mere differences in scholarly perceptions.144
139 See 3, below.
140 John Dalberg-Acton, “Notes on Archival Research, 1864–1868,” in Lord Acton: The Decisive Decade 1864–
1874: Essays and Documents (ed. Damian McElrath; Bibliothèque de la Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 51; 
Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1970) 121–140, at 140.
141 Hüller and Gullotta, “Quentin Quesnell,” 376–377.
142 Charles W. Hedrick and Nikolaos Olympiou, “Secret Mark: New Photographs, New Witnesses,” The 
Fourth R 13 (2000) 3–16.
143 Albert I. Baumgarten, who accessed the Smith Archive when conducting research for Elias Bickerman as 
a Historian of the Jews (Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism 131; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), reports 
that “talking with the staff I got the impression that every crank and crackpot in creation wanted to see 
[the Smith Archive] in order to find something in the papers to support their view of [Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore]”; https://salainenevankelista.blogspot.com/2010/08/how-many-books-published-in-last-
five.html?showComment=1282769991117#c3496412440699494800. I myself have never personally visited 
the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York.
144 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 28–31.
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2.3. “Control of the Scribal Hand”: Palaeography and Forensic Studies in the 
Qualitative and Quantitative Abstract
On the one hand, “Control of the Scribal Hand” is another return to the basics in the 
study of history akin to “Distortion of the Scribal Hand” with another trip to an archive, 
augmented by a return to the fundamental approaches and research questions of two 
closely connected text-centred disciplines of palaeography and forensic document 
examination. As Tom Davis has observed, these are two disciplines that “do not 
communicate with each other”—yet they must, in this study, be reconciled.145 On the 
other hand, this article employs two layers of materials to justify its argument for 
similarity as the defining constrained criterion in the study of alleged forgeries. The first 
such layer involves the known biographical details of Smith, including his own accounts 
of his manuscript-hunting journeys and his related correspondences,146 both of which can 
be contrasted with earlier manuscript-hunting accounts in the Mediterranean region.147 
The other layer of evidence comprises expert opinions of the two Greek-speaking 
professionals—one palaeographer, the other a forensic document examiner—that have 
disagreed with one another in their analyses of the handwriting in the manuscript of 
Theod.148 This impasse is ultimately resolved by considering other eighteenth-century 
Greek manuscripts—specifically, two specimens from the manuscript collection of The 
British Library.149 Thus a qualitative analysis of Smith’s biographical details is followed by 
a quantitative analysis of palaeographic details (ones that Colette Shirat has labelled 
“hints of control”) in the three Greek manuscripts.150
145 Tom Davis, “The Practice of Handwriting Identification,” The Library: The Transactions of the 
Bibliographical Society 8 (2007) 251–276, at 251.
146 The most up-to-date summary of these sources is still the lengthy footnote in Paananen and Viklund, 
“Control of the Scribal Hand,” 263–264 n. 10.
147 E.g., Henry Octavius Coxe, Report to Her Majesty’s Government on the Greek Manuscripts Yet Remaining in 
Libraries of the Levant (London, 1858). On contemporary scholarly accounts on the beginnings of 
manuscript hunting, see Jocelyn Hunt, The Renaissance: Questions and Analysis in History (London: 
Routledge, 1999); for a scholarly classic and entertainingly written history of manuscript hunting, see 
Leo Deuel, Testaments of Time: The Search for Lost Manuscripts and Records (New York: Knopf, 1965).
148 Venetia Anastasopoulou, “Experts Report Handwriting Examination,” Biblical Archaeology Review 36 
(2010) 1–39; http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/wp-content/uploads/secret-mark-analysis.pdf; 
Tselikas, “Handwriting Analysis”.
149 Add MS 8240, fol. 92–109v Gregory of Nazianzus, Contra Julianum imperatorem 1; Add MS 8237, fol. 2–2v 
Letter by Konstantinos Dapontes to an anonymous correspondent dated Piperi, 10 February 1754. An 
excellent overview of these manuscripts is given in The British Library’s Digitised Manuscripts website 
at http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Default.aspx.
150 Colette Shirat, “Handwriting and the Writing Hand,” in Writing Systems and Cognition: Perspectives from 
Psychology, Physiology, Linguistics and Semitics (ed. William C. Watt; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1994) 375–446, at 439; Colette Shirat, Writing as Handwork: A History of Handwriting in 
Mediterranean and Western Culture (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006) 430.
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2.4 “WWFD”: An Analytic Study of Method
The last of the articles, and the one most removed from the direct physicality of the 
manuscript of Theod., follows the conventions of the analytic tradition in the philosophy 
of history. That is to say, the analysis most concerns clear conceptual distinctions and the 
correct framing of historical explanations—or, as Chris Lorenz has stated, “If historians 
explain in the form of narrative … then they better make sure that they frame their 
questions carefully and that they get their facts under their description right.”151 There is 
no doubt that the phenomenon I have labeled WWFD (What Would a Forger Do?),152 and 
documented in its three varieties (unconcealed, concealed, and hyperactive) from 
contemporary debates on forgeries, indeed makes for great narratives, inas much as the 
alternative narrative does, along with all the other excellent examples cited in this 
article. As such, it is again the qualitative aspect of such scholarly writing that this article 
challenges.
2.5 Methods for Studying the Alternative Narrative
The claim in this section is that the alternative narrative of the origins of the manuscript 
of Clement’s Letter to Theodore, as explicated in section 1.2, offers the building blocks—
naturally, together with related paratextual material, including previous scholarly work 
on the topics—for the construction of a robust framework for the admissibility of alleged 
acts of deliberation from the part of the (alleged) forger. Although I have already 
addressed some objections to this mode of analysis in section 1.3 and although I 
nevertheless insist on the importance of such an approach for the task at hand, it is 
nonetheless impossible to deny that the techniques employed in subsections 2.5.2 and 
2.5.3 are experimental. Specifically, while the analysis is, again, mostly informed by the 
conventions of the analytic tradition within the philosophy of history, and especially by 
insight made in recent developments following the so-called “ontological turn” in 
contemporary epistemology,153 it is difficult to find analogous approaches elsewhere in 
151 Chris Lorenz, “Philosophy of History and Analytical Philosophy in Germany: A Special Relationship,” in 
Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth’s Vision of Historical Sciences (ed. 
Krzysztof Brzechczyn; Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 110; Leiden: 
Brill, 2018) 55–72, at 56.
152 As I note in Paananen, “WWFD,” 7 n. 32, “Reviewers were unanimously against a technical term I had 
concocted in Latin to refer to this method (imitatio imitatoris imaginandi) as either too pretentious, or 
sounding too much like a Hogwarts spell, so”—no doubt to my eternal regret, I might add—“I have 
opted not to use it.”
153 E.g., Maurizio Ferraris, Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013). As Maiju Paananen, “Imaginaries of Early Childhood Education: Societal Roles of Early 
Childhood Education in a Transnational Era of Accountability” (Kasvatustieteellisiä tutkimuksia / 
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academic study. As such, much of the following argumentation may exhibit a somewhat 
novel character for the field. This is only fitting, as my overall aim is to call for a 
paradigm change in the study of forgeries. This approach of combining distinct academic 
disciplines to deal with complex questions has often been referred to as transdisciplinary 
in contemporary research. Maiju Paananen has argued at length that this approach is not 
about “arbitrarily combining information here and there” but that
there is a need to take the different ontological entities of reality seriously by 
using proper methodologies to examine these different aspects and by using a 
sufficient framework which includes these different ontological entities, to discuss 
the results rigorously.154
Consequently, three distinct categorical approaches are used in this study: an attempt at 
a taxonomy of the alternative narrative (2.5.1), an attempt at a qualitative analysis of the 
alternative narrative (2.5.2), and an attempt at a comparative analysis of the alternative 
narrative (2.5.3).
2.5.1 Classifying the Arguments within the Alternative Narrative
The arguments that form the alternative narrative can be classified into three distinct 
groups.155 First are the claims that posit a literary, derivative relationship (hoax) between 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore and some other distinct work (especially Hunter’s The Mystery 
of Mar Saba). Second are the claims that posit certain features of the text and related 
paratextual material as concealed indicators of authority; these provide evidence of firm 
deliberation from the author’s part to reveal their true identity to the careful reader (e.g., 
Morton in μωρανθ ναιῆ ; Smith as the “baldy swindler”). Third are the claims that posit 
certain features of the text and related paratextual material as jokes; deliberately 
composed as jokes by the author that furthermore divulge the author as a twentieth-
century individual (e.g., double meanings; amusing juxtaposition of material such as 
Voss’s scorn for “that most shameless scamp”).
Helsinki Studies in Education 3; Ph.D. dissertation, University of Helsinki; Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 
2017) 21 has noted, Ferraris’s “theory of ontology is a good surface for interdisciplinary discussion since 
it categorizes the entities in the world in a way that allows us to discuss both things that are socially 
constructed, being dependent of place and time, and things that are not dependent on place and time.”
154 Paananen, Imaginaries, 30.
155 As summarized by Rodion Ebbighausen and Dieter Korn, “Paleontology as a Circumstantial Evidence 
Lawsuit,” Historical Biology 25 (2013) 283–295, at 289, “The purpose of all taxonomy is classification, in 
short to bring order. To be able to do so, taxonomy relies on a taxonomic schema that is a logical 
construct or a set of rules, which guide the process of classification … The concept of a taxonomic 
schema could be chosen freely, even though it is obvious that some schemas are more applicable than 
others. … Hence, the taxonomic schema that is preferred is the one that expresses the theoretical point 
of view the best.”
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2.5.1.1 The Literary, Derivative Relationship (hoax)
At the conceptual level, the first group, the notion of a literary, derivative relationship 
(hoax), is widely used by scholars, especially in its more benign application—i.e., in 
suggesting ordinary literary relationships. Each academic discipline has its own set(s) of 
criteria for determining how a literary relationship can be legitimately established. As 
explicated below, all authors behind the alternative narrative have used the concept of 
the literary relationship in their other writings, as such judgment calls are often needed 
in the study of history.
More specifically, in the alternative narrative, Clement’s Letter to Theodore is found to be 
literarily dependent on the following works:
• Gospels (canonized) of the Christian Bible
• Otto Stählin (ed.), Clemens Alexandrinus (1905–1936)
• Oscar Wilde, Salomé (1891)
• James H. Hunter, The Mystery of Mar Saba (1940)
• Angus Wilson, Anglo-Saxon Attitudes (1956)
The relationship of Clement’s Letter to Theodore to the New Testament gospels and Stählin’s 
critical editions will not be discussed here, as this relates to the technical composition of 
the Greek text of the gospel extracts and the Clementine epistle and because the 
assessment of their relationship has already been found by other scholars in the field to 
flaunt standard procedures.156 As for Hunter’s novel, although Philip Jenkins’s original 
observation of the connection to Theod. was more one of an intriguing oddity than a bona 
fide argument of derivation,157 more sustained efforts have recently been made by Craig 
A. Evans and Francis Watson, the latter of whom establishes Smith’s dependence on 
156 Specifically, Brown and Hedrick have noted that the manner with which scholars have assessed 
Clement’s gospel extracts pastiches of the canonized gospels follows a reverse logic compared to usual 
scholarly practice. Thus Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel, 110: “The criterion scholars use to isolate Mark’s 
handiwork in the canonical gospel … is the same criterion used to isolate an imitator’s handiwork in 
[Clement’s Letter to Theodore]”; Hedrick, “Moving on from Stalemate,” 51: “In the case of [Clement’s Letter 
to Theodore], however, the appeal to prove forgery is to excessive consistency, which is a methodological 
reversal of how we usually argue in the guild.” On Criddle’s study, apart from the critiques cited in n. 
82, above, see Andrew R. Solow and Woollcott K. Smith, “A Statistical Problem Concerning the Mar Saba 
Letter,” American Statistical Association 63 (2009) 254–257, especially on the mismatch of Criddle’s source 
of Clementine data and his statistical model.
157 Jenkins, Hidden Gospels, 102: “The fact that [Clement’s Letter to Theodore] came from Mar Saba is either 
strong proof of the text’s authenticity, in that nobody would have dared invent such a thing in the 
1950s, or else it is a tribute to the unabashed chutzpah of a forger.”
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Hunter’s novel in the following manner:158
Table 1: Smith’s Dependence on Hunter, According to Watson
Parallelism Hunter’s novel Theod. & Smith’s 
writings
Notes
Lexical parallel; 
similar sentiment
“I was prepared to 
leave Mar Saba, 
reconciled to the 
negative results of my 
search” (Hunter, 
Mystery of Mar Saba, 
293.)
“I was gradually 
reconciling myself to 
my worst 
expectations” (Smith, 
The Secret Gospel, 
12.)
“similar 
circumstances 
narrated in similar 
language” (Watson, 
“Beyond Suspicion,” 
166.)
Similar sentiment “But I have always 
had the feeling that 
some might have 
been overlooked” 
(Hunter, Mystery of 
Mar Saba, 279.)
“But there was 
always the chance 
that something had 
been missed” (Smith, 
The Secret Gospel, 
11.)
“strikingly similar 
terms” (Watson, 
“Beyond Suspicion,” 
165.)
Similar episode Discovery in the
monastery of Mar 
Saba
of a short,
sensational
I CE text,
together with second-
century (CE) texts to 
give credence to its 
authenticity 
(according to their 
discoverer)
Discovery in the 
monastery of Mar 
Saba
of a short,
sensational (?)
I CE (?) text,
embedded in a 
second-century (CE) 
(?) text to give 
credence to its 
authenticity 
(according to their 
discoverer)
“similar in content” 
(Watson, “Beyond 
Suspicion,” 166.)
158 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 161–170.
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Parallelism Hunter’s novel Theod. & Smith’s 
writings
Notes
Similarities between 
Shred of Nicodemus 
and the gospel 
extracts in Clement’s 
Letter to Theodore
Greek text included 
as an illustration,
composed in Greek as 
a pastiche of Mark, 
John, and the Hebrew 
Bible,
totalling 71 words, 
“of which 28 occur in 
five phrases of three 
or more words,”
translated into 
English,
containing themes of 
death and burial,
and motifs of a stone 
removed from the 
tomb, a garden, and
the character of 
Nicodemus who 
“came to him [Jesus] 
at night”
Greek text included 
as photographs,
composed in Greek as 
a pastiche of Mark, 
John, and LXX (?),
totalling 157 words, 
“of which 66 occur in 
thirteen phrases of 
three or more words,”
translated into 
English,
containing themes of 
death and burial,
and motifs of a stone 
removed from the 
tomb, a garden, and
the character of 
young man who 
“when it was evening 
… comes to him 
[Jesus]”
“parallelism between 
the two Mar Saba 
discoveries” (Watson, 
“Beyond Suspicion,” 
167.)
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Evans, who acknowledges his dependence on Watson’s “stimulating contribution”159 adds 
the following:160
Table 2: Smith’s Dependence on Hunter, According to Evans
Parallelism Hunter’s novel Theod. & Smith’s 
writings
Notes
Lexical parallel; 
similar sentiment
“This monastery … at 
one time housed 
many manuscripts. 
Most of these were 
removed, but I have 
always had the 
feeling that some 
might have been 
overlooked and 
hidden away” 
(Hunter, Mystery of 
Mar Saba, 279.)
“I had not expected 
much from the Mar 
Saba manuscripts, 
since I knew that 
almost all of them 
had been carried off 
… But there was 
always the chance 
that something had 
been missed” (Smith, 
The Secret Gospel, 
11.)
“The parallel is 
amazing, both in 
substance and in 
language” (Evans, 
“Grounds for Doubt,” 
90.)
Lexical parallel; 
similar sentiment
“I was prepared to 
leave Mar Saba, 
reconciled to the 
negative results of my 
research, when a 
monk told me he had 
certain manuscripts in 
his cell” (Hunter, 
Mystery of Mar Saba, 
293.)
“I was gradually 
reconciling myself to 
my worst 
expectations and 
repeating every day 
that I should discover 
nothing of 
importance. Then … I 
found myself in my 
cell, staring 
incredulously at a 
text” (Smith, The 
Secret Gospel, 12.)
This “lexical parallel; 
similar sentiment” 
adds to Watson’s 
comparison of the 
same passages the 
occurrence of “cell” 
in both accounts.
Similar episode Discovery in a
religious 
establishment of a 
Greek text
amongst rare books,
containing an 
embarrassing detail 
about Jesus not 
having been 
resurrected
Discovery in a
religious 
establishment of a 
Greek text
embedded in a rare 
book,
amongst rare books,
containing an 
embarrassing detail 
about Jesus’s 
homosexuality (?)
“interesting … 
parallels” (Evans, 
“Grounds for Doubt,” 
81.)
159 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 89.
160 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81, 89–91.
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Parallelism Hunter’s novel Theod. & Smith’s 
writings
Notes
Similar phonetic 
character
Lord Moreton Morton Smith See subsection 2.5.2, 
below.
The dependence of Clement’s Letter to Theodore on Wilson’s Anglo-Saxon Attitudes is justified 
on account of the following literary parallels. First, Wilson’s novel contains a forged 
artefact that is planted on an early Christian site in England—specifically, a grave of a 
seventh-century bishop named Eorpwald, who is described as “One … of the great 
disciples of Theodore.”161 Second, the forgery leads to the accusations that Eorpwald was a 
sorcerer whose heterodox practices included sexually explicit aspects. Jenkins juxtaposes 
these facts first with the allegedly forged manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore, 
alleged to have been planted on an early Christian site in Israel, addressed to Θεόδωρος 
(usually anglicised as “Theodore”), and, second, with Smith’s depiction of Jesus as a 
“magician” in his 1977 monograph Jesus the Magician. According to Jenkins, together with 
the contents of the Clementine letter, Smith’s monograph constituted a rewriting of early 
Christian history with “a strong sexual content”—just like the forged artefact in Wilson’s 
novel, a parallelism that Jenkins finds “striking”.162
Finally, the dependence of Clement’s Letter to Theodore on Wilde’s Salomé rests on one 
lexical parallel between Smith’s translation of τ ς πτάκις κεκαλυμμένης ληθείαςῆ ἑ ἀ  in 
Theod. I.26 (“of that truth hidden by seven veils”) and one of Wilde’s stage directions in 
the play, the English translation in 1894 of which reads “Salome dances the dance of the 
seven veils.”163 Other links between the two are alleged to be more interpretative, 
including such associative connections between characters as the personified “Wisdom of 
God,” who speaks “through Solomon” in Theod. II.13, both of which are connected to 
Salome, the first by noting Smith’s suggestion that “in the Manichaean Psalm book … 
Salome appears as the equivalent of … [personified] Wisdom,”164 the latter by noting that 
Salome is simply the feminine equivalent to Solomon—a “pun [that] is even more 
161 Angus Wilson, Anglo-Saxon Attitudes: A Novel (London: Secker & Warburg, 1956) 402.
162 Jenkins, “Alexandrian Attitudes,” 8–9. Jenkins’s suggestion that “a strong sexual content” characterizes 
the religiosity described in Jesus the Magician—just as in Wilson’s novel, following the discovery of the 
forged artefact—is a common misrepresentation of Smith’s argument, on which see Brown, “Question 
of Motive,” 354–365.
163 Jeffery, Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 228–231. Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 242. For a concise history 
and critical interpretation of the dance of the seven veils, see Toni Bentley, Sisters of Salome (Lincoln, 
Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 27–32.
164 Smith, Clement of Alexandria, 191.
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delightful in Hebrew.”165 Many scholars would already consider these examples to be far-
fetched, but this would be a premature conclusion, as even further links have been 
alleged between the Clementine letter and the various biographical details connected to 
Wilde’s post-mortem influence. These include “the ‘Clement’ figure in [Theod.],” who 
“represents … a type of ‘holier-than-thou’ moralist” similar to Noel Pemberton Billing, 
who invoked Wilde’s name at his trial defending against libel charges in 1918, when 
Wilde’s Salomé had just had its first public performance in England.166 These and similar 
details are argued by Jeffery to “demonstrate dependence”.167
2.5.1.2 Concealed Indicators of Authority and Jokes
The second (concealed indicators of authority) and third group (deliberately composed jokes) 
of arguments made in the alternative narrative seem foreign compared to the more 
familiar arguments of literary dependence. In themselves, these are serious 
considerations to be made in the study of forgeries and fraud, and the reality of neither is 
open to questioning. For a contemporary, unambiguous example, we can cite the case of 
the English novelist Ian McEwan, who came up with one “shocking attempted fraud” (in 
his own words) surrounding his 1997 novel Enduring Love.168 McEwan purported the novel 
to have been based on a real case study published in the British Review of Psychiatry by 
Robert Wenn and Antonio Camia. No such journal exists, however, and the surnames of 
the fictional scholars Wenn and Camia are simply an anagram of “Ian McEwan”.169
As some scholars of the alternative narrative have observed, the roots of such practices 
stretch back to the ancient concept of sphragis (seal), intended to secure the authenticity 
of given document as having derived from the purported author.170 For ancient epistles, 
the sphragis could be a physical, clay seal, a trusted individual able to supplement the 
delivery of the letter with an oral message, or a subtler reference in the text of the 
165 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 228–231.
166 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 231–234.
167 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 225.
168 Ian McEwan, Enduring Love (London: Jonathan Cape, 1997); Ian McEwan, “Shocking Attempted Fraud,” 
Psychiatric Bulletin 23 (1999) 508.
169 Noted as such by Robin G. McCreadie, [No Title], Psychiatric Bulletin 23 (1999) 243. For a discussion of 
McEwan’s attempt, see Ruthven, Faking Literature, 175–176.
170 Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 88; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 16. Specifically, Dionysius the Renegade is cited as an 
ancient author who composed a play that his rival, Heraclides, was fooled into attributing to Sophocles, 
only to be put to shame when Dionysius pointed out various acrostics he had concealed within the play. 
One of these spelled out ρακλείδης γράμματα ο κ πίσταται ο δ  σχύνθηἩ ὐ ἐ ὐ ᾿ ᾐ  (Heraclides does not 
know his letters, nor is he ashamed); Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers V.93. 
The acrostic was translated from Greek as “Heraclides is ignorant of letters and is not ashamed of his 
ignorance” in Robert D. Hicks (trans.), Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume I: Books 1–5 
(Loeb Classical Library 184; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925) 547.
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document common to both the sender and the receiver—for instance, to their previous 
correspondence.171 Furthermore, in ancient poetry, the author could embed his name 
within the poem as an acrostic.172 For example, such signature acrostic could, as in the 
case of Ilias Latina, spell out ITALICVS SCRIPSIT (Italicus wrote this), for a poem whose 
author would be otherwise unknown.173 As Valentina Garulli explains, apart from ancient 
ideas about literary immortality,
an acrostic poem cannot be reused or plagiarized, since the acrostic functions as a 
strong connexion between that text and only one name, which cannot be replaced 
by any other name without modifying the whole text.174
On the contrary, the practice of literary mystification has not been discussed in the 
scholarship on Clement’s Letter to Theodore, apart from citing Love for his observation that 
“fakers rarely resist a concealed joke or two, just to rub home how supremely clever they 
are.”175 The term “mystification” or “mystifier” is itself traced back by Julia Abramson to 
the mid-eighteenth century, used to describe practical jokes played out in literary form. 
Works of such a form would employ “ironic clues” to disclose the embedded joke to the 
readers, should they pay sufficient attention to the text.176 Jean-François Jeandillou, who 
171 John L. White, Light from Ancient Letters (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 214–217; Paola Ceccarelli, Ancient 
Greek Letter Writing: A Cultural History (600 BC–150 BC) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 33–34. For 
the many forms sphragides could take, see Loreto Nuñez, “Liminal Games: Fluidity of the Sphragis of a 
Novelist,” in The Ancient Novel and Early Christian and Jewish Narrative: Fictional Intersections (Ancient 
Narrative: Supplementum 16; Havertown, Penn.: Casemate, 2013) 143–168. For a contrary view—namely, 
that the literary sphragis was not used as a sign of authenticity but as a sign of the author’s literary 
erudition—see Lowell Edmunds, “The Seal of Theognis,” in Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece 
(ed. Lowell Edmunds and Robert W. Wallace; Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 29–
48, at 30–40.
172 Jacqueline Klooster, Poetry as Window and Mirror: Positioning the Poet in Hellenistic Poetry (Leiden: Brill, 
2011) 177 n. 8. For a recent monograph on these and related literary features, see Christine Luz, 
Technopaignia: Formspiele in der griechischen Dichtung (Leiden: Brill, 2010). A separate but related topic is 
the use of acrostics by early Christians, such as the letters ΙΧΘΥΣ and the symbol of fish. A classic study 
of this practice is Franz Joseph Dölger, ICHTHYS: der heilige Fisch in den antiken Religionen und im 
Christentum (vols. 5; Münster: Aschendorff, 1922–1943). The modern classic on this topic is undoubtedly 
Laurence Harold Kant, “The Interpretation of Religious Symbols in the Graeco-Roman World: A Case 
Study of Early Christian Fish Symbolism” (vols. 3; Ph.D. dissertation; Yale University, 1993).
173 Marco Scaffai, ed., Baebii Italici Ilias Latina: introduzione, edizione critica, traduzione italiana e commento 
(Edizioni e saggi universitari di filologia classica 28; Bologna: Pàtron, 1982) suggests that Publius 
Baebius Italicus, a first-century Roman senator, was the author of this work.
174 Valentina Garulli, “Greek Acrostic Verse Inscriptions,” in The Muse at Play: Riddles and Wordplay in Greek 
and Latin Poetry (ed. Jan Kwapisz, David Petrain, and Mikolaj Szymanski; Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 
305; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012) 246–278, at 272.
175 Love, Attributing Authorship, 185. Cited in Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 79.
176 Abramson, Learning from Lying, 12–13. The phenomenon is particularly strong both among actors and 
scholars in the French language; from early authors such as Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and Louis-
Sébastien Mercier (1740–1814), to the practiced insolence within OuLiPo (post-1960), up to the recent 
republication and extensive study of the fake Arthur Rimbaud poem “La chasse spirituelle” in Jean-
Jacques Lefrère, Arthur Rimbaud: la chasse spirituelle (Paris: Editions Leo Scheer, 2012). As observed in 
Nyqvist and Oja, Kirjalliset väärennökset, 102, “Lefrèren perusteellisen La Chasse spirituelle-tutkielman 
takakanteen oli painettu runo ensimmäistä kertaa Rimbaud’n käsialalla kirjoitettuna. Siitäkään ei 
43
defines mystification as a “strategy” applicable in any literary genre, maintains the use of 
authorial “formes d’aveu tacite” (forms of hidden confessions) as an essential feature, as 
they offer for the victim “une chance de sauver la face” (an opportunity to save face).177
Although we might be consequently tempted to ascribe the alternative narrative as an 
example of mystification, with Smith as the chief mystificateur, such an attribution would 
run to at least one overarching problem—namely, the lack of a willing disclosure of the 
narrative’s secrets by its putative author. As Anthony Grafton observes, mystification is 
“the production of literary works meant to deceive for a short time only, as practical 
jokes.”178 That is, one of the defining features of mystification is missing: without “the 
author’s willing public revelation of [their] identity” none of the things an authentic 
mystification pretends to teach—commensurate with the Enlightenment values “to reveal 
hidden causes, communicate knowledge, and promote critical reasoning”—are 
transmitted.179
At any rate, the following concealed indicators of authority are suggested to exist, 
according to the alternative narrative:
Table 3: Concealed Authorial Indicators within the Alternative Narrative
Primer Technique of 
decipherment
Plain-text solution Notes
Reference to “salt” 
(Theod. I.13–15) is 
allegedly
a) unlike Clement,
b) a technological 
anachronism
Association of an 
alleged technological 
anachronism to a 
twentieth-century 
provider of the 
technology
Morton Salt 
Company 
→ Morton
“more likely a 
deliberately 
embedded clue” 
(Carlson, Gospel 
Hoax, 61.)
tietysti ole ollut saatavilla alkuperäistä paperikappaletta, vaan pelkästään autenttiselta näyttävä 
faksimilejäljennös … Ranskalaisten mieltymys mystifikaatioon ulottuu toisinaan myös tutkimuksen 
puolelle” (The poem is printed on the back cover of Lefrère’s in-depth study of La chasse spirituelle in 
Rimbaud’s own handwriting. The original autograph, however, has not been made available, only an 
authentic-looking facsimile … The French penchant for mystification is occasionally felt within the 
academy as well).
177 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 23–25.
178 Grafton, Forgers and Critics, 5. Emphasis mine.
179 Abramson, Learning from Lying, 12, 16. Similarly, the chief difference between ancient sphragides and 
their alleged descendants within the alternative narrative lies in their respective manner and purpose. 
While the ancient practice used a specific literary technique (e.g., acrostic) to indicate the author of the 
work (at least, in the specific cases of signature-acrostics), that in the alternative narrative has been 
tied to a multitude of literary techniques—without any clear idea of the motive behind them.
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Primer Technique of 
decipherment
Plain-text solution Notes
The reference to 
“salt” (Theod. I.13–
15) is supposedly a 
technological 
anachronism, and the 
word λαςἅ  (salt) is 
followed by the word 
μωραίνω (pass, of 
salt, lose its savour)
Unkeyed 
transposition cipher 
(anagram) / cryptic 
crossword
μωρ[αν]θ ν[αι]ῆ
→ Morton
“In the nature of the 
case, it is impossible 
to be sure of this” 
(Watson, “Beyond 
Suspicion,” 154.)
The reference to 
“salt” (Theod. I.13–
15) is supposedly a 
technological 
anachronism, and the 
word 
παραχαράσσω 
(falsify) used in the 
passage carries 
different layers of 
meaning, also in 
translation
Etymological 
explanation
παραχαράσσω
→ to forge
→ to smith
→ Smith
“In itself, its value as 
evidence for Smith’s 
forgery of the letter is 
minimal. Yet the 
forgery metaphor 
occurs not in isolation 
but in conjunction 
with [μωρανθ ναιῆ ]” 
(Watson, “Beyond 
Suspicion,” 153–154.
Smith’s assertion in 
his commentary on 
Theod. I.13–15 that 
Matt 5:13 alludes to 
Jer 10:14 LXX 
(Smith, Clement of 
Alexandria, 18–19), 
is supposedly faulty
Reading the words 
omitted from a direct 
quotation (of Jer 
10:14 LXX)
κατ σχύνθη π ς ῃ ᾶ
χρυσοχόος π  ἀ ὸ
τ ν γλυπτ ν α τοῶ ῶ ὐ ῦ
→ goldsmith
→ Smith
“Either clue is clever 
by itself—but their 
combination is 
ingenious” (Carlson, 
Gospel Hoax, 63.)
Handwriting 
supposed being the 
same as in another 
Mar Saban 
manuscript, which 
contains a supposedly 
fictional personal 
name
Association of the 
spelling of a name 
and personal 
characteristics to an 
etymological 
explanation
Μ. Μαδιότης
→ M. “baldy 
swindler”
→ Morton Smith
“cleverly disguised 
confession” (Carlson, 
Gospel Hoax, 44.)
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Primer Technique of 
decipherment
Plain-text solution Notes
Alleged 
anachronisms in 
Theod. portrayal of 
sexuality
Recognition of sexual 
innuendo
Sexual innuendo
→ Morton Smith’s 
literary sphragis
“The uncanny 
resonance of [Theod.] 
with mid-twentieth-
century notions of 
sexual identity and 
legal regimes is … a 
telling anachronism” 
(Carlson, Gospel 
Hoax, 71); “there are 
amusing elements 
that make sense from 
the perspective of a 
twentieth-century 
reader” (Jeffery, The 
Secret Gospel of 
Mark Unveiled, 93.)
As should be evident from the above table, there is much overlap between concealed 
indicators of authority and the supposed jokes and other amusing details. That is, the 
decipherment of the alleged fictional personal name of Μ. Μαδιότης as M[orton] the 
“baldy swindler” seems to function as a humorous wink as well as a clue to the identity of 
the real author, and even many of the less authorial jokes seem nevertheless to belong to 
Smith’s literary sphragis. Consequently, concealed indicators of authority can only be 
distinguished from deliberately composed jokes based on their pertinence, such that clear 
concealed indicators of authority must be as highly accurate in their disclosing of the 
author as a specific individual—for example, using details that refer to a personal name 
(Morton, Smith) or to other identifiable characteristics (lack of hair, particular sense of 
humour)—while details such as the supposed cliffhanger ending of the text, though in 
themselves arguably humorous in nature, are nevertheless presented as less accurate inas 
much as specific authorial attribution is concerned.
For a specific example of the effect of pertinence, consider Smith’s supposedly deliberate 
choice to write the Clementine letter on the end pages of Voss’s book. Within the 
alternative narrative, this feature is the one of the most commented upon,180 and comes 
down to two interrelated claims: that whoever wrote the text in Voss’s book made a 
deliberate choice to do so, first, to introduce (supposed) Markan interpolations to a book 
that called for the expunging of Ignatian interpolations is ironic, and, second, to insert 
180 See nn. 69 and 70, above, for a full list of references.
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(allegedly) forged ancient text on the opposite of a clear condemnation of the forging of 
ancient texts is even more ironic. As I argue below, there are methodological reasons for 
restricting the ascription of such claims to deliberate actions. The use of irony in itself, or 
virtually any particular sense of humour, is hardly grounds for identifying a specific 
individual—that is, the ironists of the world, both ancient and modern, can hardly be 
distinguished from one another in their use of irony alone. In the case of Voss’s book, it 
would be just as viable to posit that someone else of comparable sense of irony, such as an 
eighteenth-century monk or humanist, could have been the author on the same grounds 
as it has been argued for Smith’s authorship—any of them could appreciate the irony of 
reading about and practicing in the same book interpolation and forgery. Furthermore, 
an eighteenth-century monk could as well have been copying an authentic ancient text to 
Voss’s end papers, perceiving the irony of his decision to copy this particular text into 
this particular book, because he (sc., the monk) could have been the one to think “that 
most shameless scamp” an apt descriptor for the gospel fragments he was copying onto 
the page.
In short, not only does the above ascription of irony in the case of Voss’s book fail to 
distinguish between Smith and a random eighteenth-century monk or humanist, it also 
fails to distinguish between the acts of forging and copying. That is not to say that the 
above discussion is a good example of academic history writing—it is, in fact a thought-
experiment—but that the case of Voss’s book in itself has virtually no bearing on the 
question of composition of Clement’s Letter to Theodore but only on the question of coming 
up with a useful classification for the statements made within the alternative narrative: 
that some of the features of the text and its related paratextual material are alleged to be 
highly pertinent to a specific individual (viz., concealed indicators of authority), while 
others are not (viz., deliberately composed jokes). For this reason, I argue that there is no 
need for an in-depth analysis of the latter.
2.5.2 Studying the Arguments within the Alternative Narrative
The arguments that form the alternative narrative were classified above into three 
distinct groups. Common to all three is the implied notion of firm deliberation at work.
Conceptually, a literary, derivative relationship (hoax)—i.e., the idea of deriving ideas, if not 
whole textual passages, from other works—is easy to comprehend. The act of the author, 
in the process of creating a citation of some other work, is often described as a deliberate 
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act,181 and, in the case of Smith of the alternative narrative, the deliberateness of his 
actions is both emphasised and required.182
The production of concealed indicators of authority constitutes, likewise, a deliberate act by 
the author. As I argue in section 3.1, a concealed indicator of authority is marked off by a 
primer, such as an anachronism (e.g., supposedly non-Clementine use of salt imagery or 
the anachronistic presence of free-flowing salt), that arouses the reader’s suspicions, 
causing them to search for (and discover) the concealed indicator of authority, such as an 
associative connection to a modern operator (e.g., Morton Salt Company) or an anagram 
or cryptogram of the real author’s name (μωρανθ ναιῆ   Morton). The primer, the →
method of decipherment, and the plain-text result are necessarily construed as deliberate 
actions by the author.183
For jokes, as well as concealed indicators of authority, to contain the explanatory power 
the alternative narrative gives them, they must be the result of deliberate action by the 
author. The need for such a criterion is evident when considering the bald non sequitur 
that scholars have resorted to in the alternative narrative: the similarity of the names 
Morton and Moreton.184 Upon scrutiny, this detail cannot have any bearing on the topic it 
allegedly illuminates. Smith’s given name was Rubert Morton, so the similarity between 
Morton and Moreton is entirely incidental to the logic of the alternative narrative—i.e., 
that Smith read Hunter’s novel and was then inspired to create a literary forgery.185 That 
is, if there is nothing deliberate about the similarity between Morton and Moreton (such 
as Smith changing his name to create the parallelism), Smith’s lack of agenticity can only 
mean that the Morton-Moreton similarity is an innocent coincidence, irrespective of 
181 In some classifications, such as Richard B. Hays’s distinctions between quotations, allusions, and echoes, 
it would be possible to view the faintest of literary parallels (“echoes”) as non-deliberate, though the 
authorial action itself would remain. Note that this is a different framing of the issue compared to how 
Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989) 
23 constructs the difference between the three “as points along a spectrum of intertextual reference.” 
Cf. Christopher A. Beetham, Echoes of Scripture in the Letter of Paul to the Colossians (Biblical Interpretation 
Series 96; Leiden: Brill, 2008) 13: “Even if [the author] only unconsciously echoed a text … we can still 
speak of [the author] ‘doing’ something as an author with and in the words he wrote.” For the 
alternative narrative, however, no claims of non-deliberate actions are made nor would they make 
sense within the narrative itself, as explicated below.
182 E.g., Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 88–89: “Smith understood the psychology of his peers well and was able to 
conceal some important information even in the non-scholarly, ‘popular’ edition, Secret Gospel”; Jeffery, 
Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 130: “Only when he began writing the second book, while looking for ways 
to construct his narrative of visiting Mar Saba, did Smith decide to shape his story so that it served the 
larger agenda.”
183 Cf. Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 58–62; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 154–155.
184 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81.
185 Cf. Brown and Pantuck, “Craig Evans,” 104–105.
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Smith’s supposed involvement in the composition of the Clementine letter and the role of 
Hunter’s novel therein. In other words, even if Smith did read Hunter’s novel and had 
crafted a fake manuscript and engineered the conditions of its discovery to follow this 
literary model, the similarity between his name and that of a fictional person in a novel—
of which he did nothing to foster—played no role in his supposed plan for the simple 
reason that it played no role in his supposed plan.186 Consequently, that the Morton-
Moreton similarity cannot function in the role it is assigned in the alternative narrative 
given the lack of deliberation by Smith implies that, for any of the jokes to have bearing 
on the question of authenticity, they would not only have to contain the possibility of 
Smith’s deliberate action but would have to require the performance of such an action as 
well.
186 The second non sequitur noted in section 1.2—viz., the observation of a parallel between Hunter’s 
inclusion of an illustration of the fictional forged document in his novel and Smith’s inclusion of 
photographs of the manuscript in his critical edition of Clement’s Letter to Theodore—was introduced by 
two different scholars, neither of whom suggested that any conclusion could be drawn from this 
connection. That is just as well, as there is nothing that could possibly follow from this observation, at least 
once the notion that Smith decided to include photographs of the manuscript because Hunter also had 
an illustration of his fictional forged document included is discarded. As such, what this argument 
becomes is a very rare form of non sequitur, a nihil sequitur (i.e., “nothing follows”); a sentence that 
merely masquerades as an argument to the casual reader.
49
Following these observations we can illustrate the logic of the alternative narrative with 
the above diagram. Consider the claim that Smith indicates his sense of humour (motive, 
as the author) by choosing to begin the Clementine letter with the sign of a cross (act of 
firm deliberation, as the author), because modern text critics use a similar device to 
indicate spurious text (joke, as per the above classification).187 This small narrative 
functions well within the internal logic of the alternative narrative, but calls into 
question how scholars construed such a detail in the first place. As far as the evidence 
goes, there is, after all, only the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore as a physical 
artefact. Inaccessible to us are the actions of the author, as well as the author themselves 
187 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 33.
50
and whatever motive the author might have had in their choice to begin the composition 
with the sign of a cross.188
Such questions are worth considering here, because they cut to the heart of the problem 
that pervades many works of academic history writing that, in the words of Simon Gunn, 
take “a form of documentary bric-à-brac held together by loose association … without 
enquiring in detail as to [the] breadth and depth.”189 In the case of the alternative 
narrative, the problem is evident in the narrative’s lack of interest in validating many of 
its claims concerning the act of firm deliberation, as the claims themselves are often left 
to stand on their own, as if they themselves provided the means for their own appraisal. 
Yet the question of criteria—of ensuring that enough “breadth and depth” exists—
remains the only means to reach beyond the mere physicality of the textual artefact 
itself. It is for this very purpose that we have developed criteria for assessing, for 
instance, questions of literary, derivative relationships. As Michael Oakeshott observed 
already in 1933, “The question in history is never what must, or what might have taken 
place, but solely what the evidence obliges us to conclude did take place”;190 a sentiment 
echoed by Roger Chartier in 1997 in his pursuit after “the criteria by which a historical 
discourse—always a knowledge based on traces and signs—can be held to be a valid and 
explicative reconstruction … of the past reality it has defined as its object.”191 It is only 
188 The emphasis I place upon the physicality of the document here and elsewhere is instructed by the so-
called “ontological turn” within contemporary epistemology, termed “new materialism(s)” in Diana 
Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, 
and Politics (ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost; Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010) 1–44. For 
the most prominent recent example of such material realism, see Ferraris, Documentality. Note that our 
access to the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore is mediated by reproductions of photographs of 
the manuscript, but this use of such a medium has no bearing on the discussion that follows.
189 Simon Gunn, History and Cultural Theory (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2006) 153.
190 Michael Joseph Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Moscow: Рипол Классик, 1978) 139. Furthermore, 
as Oakeshott describes, “All that history has is ‘the evidence’; outside this lies nothing at all. And this is 
not a mere methodological scepticism; history is not merely obliged to postulate nothing beyond the 
evidence. What is beyond the evidence is actually unknowable, a nonentity”; Oakeshott, Experience, 107–
108. Emphasis original. Cf. Hayden White, “Response to Arthur Marwick,” Journal of Contemporary History 
30 (1995) 233–246, at 239–240, who, defining how “events” (that “have to be taken as given”—i.e., “the 
past”) differ from “facts” (i.e., following Arthur Danto, “events under a description”), observes that 
“historiographical consensus … is very difficult to achieve, is always open to revision from another 
perspective, and never lasts for ever. The relation between facts and events is always open to 
negotiation and reconceptualization, not because the events change with time, but because we change 
our ways of conceptualizing them. And if this is true of events, it is even more true of facts. We not only 
change our ideas of what the facts are of a given matter but our notions of what a fact might be, how 
facts are constructed, and what criteria should be used to assess the adequacy of a given array of facts 
to the events of which they purport to be descriptive.”
191 Roger Chartier, On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices (Parallax; Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997) 9. Cf. Arthur Danto, “Narrative Sentences,” History and Theory 2 (1962) 
146–179, at 167: “Not to have a criterion for picking out some happenings as relevant and others as 
irrelevant is simply not to be in a position to write history at all.”
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through consideration by the criteria we have established that enables us to decide 
whether or not a particular action was taken by a particular author.192
How do such considerations bear on the argument that the author of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore chose to begin with a sign of the cross to showcase his sense of humour? First, 
such a claim (implicitly) states that the author would have acted with firm deliberation, 
on the basis that the similarity between sign of the cross and crux critica is perceived as 
humorous in this manner only if it came about deliberately (i.e., not by accident). This, 
and any other claim we might wish to make regarding the author and his actions, is 
legitimized (in principle) by some set of criteria we have deemed robust enough to justify 
our claims. All such criteria would be necessarily grounded on the physicality of the 
textual artefact, the only instance of “evidence” (as Oakeshott understood it) in our 
possession.193 That is not to say that the use of evidence according to some set of criteria 
would be a simple affair. On the contrary, there will always be room for debate 
concerning any set of criteria, from their constituent arguments to their application. 
Crucially, however, without some idea as to how to decide, in this instance, whether the 
similarities between the sign of a cross and a crux critica are indicative of the authorship 
of the text, there remain only vague notions that the potential for such coincidences or 
relationship indeed exist but without a means to sustain discussion about them.
In other words, we can come up with historical scenarios at will: simply by imagining 
different motives, behind different authors that culminate in different actions, all of 
which results in different overall assessments. To wit, an eighteenth-century monk might 
have chosen to demonstrate his sense of piety (motive, as the author) by choosing to begin 
the Clementine letter with a sign of the cross (act of firm deliberation, as the author), 
following customary forms, before copying a letter from one of the fathers of the 
church.194
192 Further on the role of criteria in historiographical study, see 3.1, below.
193 Cf. George Kane, Piers Plowman: The Evidence for Authorship (London: Athlone Press, 1965) 5: “The 
character of external evidence is that it exists absolutely, in some determinable way independent of the 
text which it concerns. It may be bad; its accuracy can be questioned, but its existence cannot. It is a 
kind of physical fact. Internal evidence, by contrast, is a critical postulate. It has a contingent character, 
depending for its existence on being identified as such by someone, and for its validity upon, first, the 
correctness of the identification, and second, the quality of the reasoning applied to it.”
194 For the use of the sign of the cross in Late Antiquity and onwards, see Ildar Garipzanov, Graphic Signs of 
Authority in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, 300–900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 81–
105, 223–234, 292–302.
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It should be noted here that to imagine various historical scenarios is not identical to 
practicing academic history writing. To qualify for the latter, one would need to justify 
one’s conceivable possibilities to the satisfaction of one’s peers, a process that would 
require us to begin with what we have (the textual artefact) and argue that some set of 
criteria allows the privileging of one authorial action over another.195 This, then, would be 
to step outside the conception of representation within the study of history: to cease to 
argue whether a given historical description corresponds to an event in the past, since, as 
Leon J. Goldstein has noted, correspondence as a criterion “can have no application in the 
practice.”196 The key element in the historian’s toolbox is the academic community and 
the practices that have become established within it (see further 3.1.4.1, below).
Which community-sanctioned criteria, then, have scholars in support of the alternative 
narrative applied to justify their claims of firm deliberate action by Smith? For the 
straightforward cases of scenarios of literary dependence, the implied justifications—
occasionally explicated by assurances of the strength of the parallels—are best assessed in 
relation to existing criteria for literary dependencies (see 2.5.3.1, below).
195 These ideas reflect mostly Richard Rorty’s understanding of epistemic warranty as a matter of 
sociology; see especially Richard Rorty, “Putnam and the Relativist Menace,” The Journal of Philosophy 90 
(1993) 443–461. Two objections can be raised to my methodological considerations. First, 
philosophically inclined readers might object to this model’s loose, pragmatic character, as it simplifies 
the process of writing history into an abstract loop between ideas of criteria and their applicability, 
discarding other possibilities such as the unconscious (regarding motives) and non-actions (regarding 
deliberateness), and I would concur with such an assessment. The purpose of this model, however, is 
not to become a universal yardstick for every conceivable historical question but to function as a 
pragmatic guideline for the issue at hand: the recognition of primers, elaboration on methods of 
decipherment, and assessment of the validity of plain-text solutions—not only for the manuscript of 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore but for all instances of concealed indicators of authority taken into study. 
Furthermore, even this loose description suffices to expose the problems of the alternative narrative. 
Not only are many of the claims of deliberateness in the alternative narrative explicated as if the claims 
themselves would be able to provide the necessary criteria for their own assessment, but—as I will 
argue below—even in the cases in which some sort of criteria is present, they might yet remain an 
inadequate basis from which to draw conclusions about the authorship of Clement’s Letter to Theodore. As 
Paul A. Roth, “Philosophy of History,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science (ed. Lee 
McIntyre and Alex Rosenberg; London: Routledge, 2017) 397–407, at 398 observes, “what analytic 
philosophers desire” are, after all, “normative benchmarks for goodness of explanation.” Second, this 
scheme can be criticized for the opposite reason—namely, that it is unnecessarily complicated for the 
simple task of assessing the scholarly merits of the alternative narrative. This challenge misses the 
point for two reasons. First, as already stated above, it is not my intention to discuss the alternative 
narrative per se but to use it as an exemplary instance of a contemporary debate on fakes and forgeries 
and their various shortcomings. Second, the importance of adhering to a relatively robust philosophical 
framework for the academic writing of history should become clear in this section. That is, some 
(relatively robust) philosophical understanding of the methodology of the academic writing of history 
is required to avoid the pitfalls that have led contemporary scholars to apply a hodgepodge of non-
constrained criteria that offer little help for assessing the likes of the alternative narrative (2.5.3).
196 Leon J. Goldstein, The What and the Why of History: Philosophical Essays (Leiden: Brill, 1996) 332.
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As I establish in sub-subsection 2.5.3.2, concealed indicators of authority and jokes cannot 
be assessed in relation to existing criteria, as there are none. We can, however, try to 
assess the internal logic of a concealed indicator of authority or a joke within the 
alternative narrative by considering the alleged genre of Clement’s Letter to Theodore.197 If 
Theod. is classified as a hoax rather than a forgery, then the motivation for its production 
would be murkier and more playful than the more straightforward explanation of fame or 
money as a motivation behind the production of a forgery.198 Different motive-dependent 
classifications have been developed in literary studies for such cases.199 Nevertheless, it is 
the decision itself—even the mere suspicion—by which a scholar happens to sit before a 
skilful object of concealment, one whose faker-auteur has construed a mystification that 
beckons the scholar to decode its mysteries and reveal its secrets, that becomes the 
driving force to embrace the post-structuralist thrill of deconstruction. Then and there, 
the battle arena is set for a personal battle of the wits, one based on the notion, following 
Love, that “fakers rarely resist a concealed joke or two, just to rub home how supremely 
clever they are.”200
Such considerations have allowed considerable leeway for scholars to hunt for instances 
of concealment. Yet, as Love explicates on the page following his above observation on 
concealed jokes, “the urge to deattribute [i.e., uncover a forgery] can easily get out of 
hand.”201 Love provides two examples of this: Jean Hardouin and his conclusion that most 
197 The following unravelling of the strategies that enable the construction of the alternative narrative 
represents only one of the possible approach to evaluating the issue. Due to the circular nature of the 
reasoning within the alternative narrative, any starting point could have been chosen.
198 Further on these differences regarding Clement’s Letter to Theodore, see Paananen, “Stalemate Deadlock,” 
92–99.
199 Cf., e.g., Groom, Forger’s Shadow, 61: “Hoaxes are intellectual exercises designed to show the mastery of 
the hoaxer over the hoaxed; the forged work, however, maintains its integrity and is not designed to 
implode.” Cf. Jeandillou, Esthétique, 21: “Contrairement au faussaire, le mystificateur fabrique de 
l’authentique pour en jouer, plus que pour le monnayer.” Emphasis original. In Brian McHale, 
“Archaeologies of Knowledge: Hill’s Middens, Heaney’s Bogs, Schwerner’s Tablets,” New Literary History 30 
(1999) 239–262, at 261 n. 35, in which three categories are posited: “genuine hoaxes” correspond to 
Groom’s depiction of forged works and “entrapments” to Groom’s depiction of hoaxes, both of which 
are distinguished from “mock-hoaxes,” which are not meant to deceive readers but are produced “to be 
recognized as hoaxes (almost) immediately,” examples of which include Armand Schwerner’s The 
Tablets. Emphasis original. An alternative scheme is provided in Lenain, Art Forgery, 315: the 
mystification “offers clues to be deciphered … allowing the clever ones to guess the true nature of the 
message,” the forgery is a “total and permanent concealment of the identity of its maker,” while the 
hoax aims to promote an idea or harm persons.
200 Love, Attributing Authorship, 185. Within the alternative narrative this statement of Love has been 
quoted by Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 79. Love’s notion follows the established tactics of literary mystification, 
as discussed, e.g., by Jeandillou, Esthétique, 22–23: “La mystification littéraire participe avant tout de la 
moquerie; si elle cherche à tourner en ridicule le mystifié, elle lui laisse en même temps une chance de 
sauver la face.” Similarly in Lenain, Art Forgery, 281: “Wit constitutes a basic ingredient of the stories of 
deceptive doubles.”
201 Love, Attributing Authorship, 186. Cf. Jeandillou, Esthétique, 215–216: “Le mystificateur fait naître chez son 
54
classical literature, including most of the early Christian writings, were, in fact, forged 
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,202 and C. L. Stainer’s conclusion203 that 
William Drummond’s account of his conversations with Ben Jonson in 1618–1619204 is, in 
fact, forged.205 But how does Love decide on the point at which “the rhetoric of suspicion” 
has taken “over a mind to the extent of making it incapable of accepting any proposition 
unsupported by an impossible degree of verification.”206 The short answer is that he does 
not: it is as if the sheer monumentality of Hardouin’s suggestion (called “the outstanding 
example”207) is enough to direct readers to the only sensible conclusion—discarding it. In 
Stainer’s case, Love assures us that “these arguments have never been taken seriously by 
Jonson scholars and must be assumed to rest on a misapprehension.”208 I do not intend to 
suggest that either of these assessments is wrong—on the contrary, I do not think 
Hardouin’s scenario contains any merit, nor do I believe the conversations between 
Jonson and Drummond were forged. I do, however, wish to draw attention to the fact that 
Love, even though he does acknowledge that it is possible to go too far in one’s “urge to 
deattribute” nevertheless fails to specify how far is too far. In other words, it is well 
enough to point to the extreme ends of a spectrum and claim that there is a difference 
between them, but this tells us nothing about the more common examples.
By the same token, we might inquire by which criteria scholars of the alternative 
narrative reasoned about the deliberateness of Smith in crafting a number of concealed 
indicators of authority and jokes. As with Love, here, too, a short answer is in order: they 
had none—inasmuch as the qualitative contents of the supposed deliberate actions are 
concerned. In other words, it is never explicated for what possible reasons we should 
consider the creative concealments of Smith’s name as serious instead of tortured 
interpretations. Just as Love’s use of Hardouin, the mere existence of an implied story 
told of Smith’s deliberate actions is left to stand on its own, seeming to provide its own 
lecteur attentif une sorte de doute hyperbolique.” Similarly Speyer, literarische Fälschung, 102: “Im 19. 
Jahrhundert … Dabei vermied man nicht immer die Gefahr, in Hyperkritik auch echte Schriften zu 
verwerfen.”
202 Esp. Jean Hardouin, Ad censuram scriptorum veterum prolegomena (London: P. Vaillant, 1766).
203 C. L. Stainer, Jonson and Drummond: Their Conversations – A Few Remarks on an 18th Century Forgery (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1925).
204 William Drummond, “Heads of a Conversation betwixt the Famous Poet Ben Johnson, and William 
Drummond of Hawthornden, January, 1619,” in The Works of William Drummond, of Hawthornden, (ed. John 
Sage and Thomas Ruddiman; Edinburgh: James Watson, 1711) 224–227, which was the first published, 
summary account of the conversations.
205 Love, Attributing Authorship, 186–193.
206 Love, Attributing Authorship, 189.
207 Love, Attributing Authorship, 186.
208 Love, Attributing Authorship, 190. Emphasis mine.
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justification. While some scholars do acknowledge that they might, as Love suggests, be 
going too far,209 such reflections are discarded in the end for two circumstantial reasons, 
assertions regarding Smith’s alleged motive, especially regarding his (alleged) sense of 
humour, and the sheer volume of concealed indicators of authority and jokes 
(voluminousness).210
First, upon identifying Clement’s Letter to Theodore as a hoax wherein “the hoaxer [has 
planted] deliberate mistakes or jokes as clues to the fake’s true nature,”211 most scholars 
have held Smith’s sense of humour as the chief motive behind his alleged actions of 
mystification. That is, to assert that Smith planted the jests and quips scholars have 
claimed to find requires that Smith’s faculty of witticisms was up to the task. Thus, Jeffery 
209 Thus Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 93: “Or am I, a product of mid-twentieth-century 
American schoolyard culture, misreading an ancient text through prurient eyes.” Similar sentiments 
can also be found from Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 87: “Is this a craftily placed fingerprint or an 
intriguing coincidence”; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion” 154: “In the nature of the case, it is impossible to 
be sure of this”; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt” 96: “Let me assure readers that I do recognize that 
innocent coincidences sometimes occur.”
210 Although some concealed indicators of authority and jokes within the alternative narrative could be 
construed to stem from a different motive—e.g., that of Smith’s (alleged) propagating of his ideas about 
early Christianity—the sense of humour remains the only explicitly argued motive for Smith’s alleged 
constructions of concealed indicators of authority and jokes. Watson, for instance, never explicates the 
reason Smith would have wanted to leave behind a “forger’s signature” in the form of a concealed 
indicator of authority but simply follows Carlson’s cue in postulating that certain details of Clement’s 
Letter to Theodore might indicate “a deliberately embedded clue”; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 152. The 
core problem here is the difficulty of determining a clear motive for the forging of Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore: although the alternative narrative is ripe with deliberate actions ascribed to Smith with a 
plethora of alleged motives recorded on pp. 28–29, above, many of its claims still return to Smith’s 
sense of humour as the implied motive required by the narrative logic of the alternative narrative, even 
in cases where an explicit reference to Smith’s sense of humour is lacking. Consider the most 
prominent example: the alleged link between Hunter’s novel The Mystery of Mar Saba and Smith’s story 
of the discovery of Clement’s Letter to Theodore. Here, scholars of the alternative narrative are effectively 
claiming that, because Smith forged his alleged discovery at Mar Saba in 1958, he needed to copy the 
experience of manuscript hunting from the available literature. But why would Smith, who had hunted 
manuscripts for decades, have needed to resort to literature to describe something he could as well 
have drawn from real experience? In other words, what would have prevented him from using some of 
his earlier trips to monastic libraries to draw inspiration? And, crucially, what would have prompted 
him to borrow this experience from Hunter’s novel of all places? To make sense of the logic of citing 
Hunter, we would have to view it as an act of mystification—that Smith, having made a deliberate 
choice to cite Hunter’s novel in his own story of discovery, wanted to record the truth of his authorship, 
to be perhaps found out at some point, and thus communicated this to the observant reader. This would 
have to be the case, since neither the claim that Smith cited Hunter accidentally nor the claim that he 
echoed him unconsciously (both non-deliberate actions) could justify the claim that Smith forged 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore, since such a claim would fit adequately with any scenario that imagined 
Smith to have created a composition of a discovery story, and would not be able to differentiate 
between Smith forging the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore and him simply finding it at Mar 
Saba. In other words, for these claims to have any bearing on the question of authorship, Smith’s 
decision to cite Hunter in this instance has to function as yet another example of a concealed indicator 
of authority, one that is dependent on his role as the mystificator, and requires him to possess that 
particular sense of humour suitable for the task. Cf. Jenkins, Hidden Gospels, 101, that an “unabashed 
chutzpah of a forger” would have been needed.
211 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 16.
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posits “faux deniability” as “an essential feature of Smith’s brand of humor,”212 with other 
scholars having presented similar ideas.213
Second, volume is seen as an important criterion as follows:214
Table 4: The Importance of Voluminousness within the Alternative Narrative
Observation on volume Source
“several others that are hard not to find 
amusing”
Ehrman, “Response,” 159.
“Either clue is clever by itself—but their 
combination is ingenious”
Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 63.
“All its perplexing details … cohere into an 
intelligible message, all its characters have 
meaningful roles to play, every mystery is 
ultimately revealed”
Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 
226.
“In itself, its value as evidence for Smith’s 
forgery of the letter is minimal. Yet the 
forgery metaphor occurs not in isolation but 
in conjunction with [μωρανθ ναιῆ ]”
Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 153–154.
“the cumulative amount of circumstantial 
evidence”
Piovanelli, “Halfway between,” 182.
“outrageous series of coincidences” Jenkins, “Alexandrian Attitudes,” 9.
That is to say, none of the alleged concealed indicators of authority or jokes is assessed 
based on qualitative criteria. The first circumstantial justification refers to the alleged 
motive—sense of humour—of the alleged author that, following genre conventions of the 
212 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 235.
213 E.g., Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 88: “mystification for the sake of mystification”; Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 
xviii: “I had read enough of Smith’s writings to suspect that … his sense of humor was such that he 
could have salted [Clement’s Letter to Theodore] with clues, revealing its true nature”; Carlson, Gospel 
Hoax, 128 n. 4: “Murgia’s statement about Smith’s sense of humor … betrays his unfamiliarity with 
Smith”; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 155: “The author of this wordplay will have appreciated the fact 
that μωρανθ ναιῆ  usually means ‘to be made foolish,’ ‘to be made a fool of’—a concealed reference to 
those who are fooled (Mortonized, we might say) by this forged (Smithed) letter.” Emphasis original. Cf. 
Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 129–130: “If Smith can tell such a joke in church … he can do it 
anywhere. The hints of sexual humor in [Clement’s Letter to Theodore], therefore, will also have to be 
taken seriously”; Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 243: “It quickly fell afoul of Smith’s nasty 
sense of humor, which in turn became the transparent mask of his considerable rage.”
214 Other textual scholars have also emphasised the value of voluminousness in other contexts—e.g., 
Arthur Sherbo, “The Uses and Abuses of Internal Evidence,” in Evidence of Authorship: Essays on Problems 
of Attribution (ed. David V. Erdman and Ephim G. Fogel; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966) 6–24, 
at 11: “A series of commonplaces (to substitute a more specific term than minor agreements) when it 
arrives to a sufficiently great number becomes, in its totality, something other than the mere sum of 
those commonplaces. Or, what may make things clearer, substitute ‘coincidences’ for ‘commonplaces’ 
and it should be obvious that a series of coincidences results in something more startling and rare than 
any one coincidence, however extreme it may be and however weak the individual coincidences may 
be.”
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hoax, allows the overriding interpretation of various literary details to be that of the 
expression of humour. The second is a reference to the voluminousness of these details, 
as if the mere number of instances where a scholar can construe a “joke” somehow helps 
us to decide whether to attribute a manuscript to one author or another.
Consequently, instead of providing clear justifications for their assertions, scholars have 
entered an insidious circle of question-begging, in which each turn of the wheel of 
motive, author, action, and result—that is, noting that Smith, as the alleged author, 
possessed a particular sense of humour, leading to the uncovering of a deliberately 
crafted joke or similar antic—produces yet another discovery of literary parallelism or 
amusing detail, which is in turn taken as further evidence that the initial judgment of the 
motive or ascription of authorship was correct. As such, it only takes a few turns of the 
wheel to accumulate sufficient evidence, though we would only have succeeded in 
begging the question. Besides the collective effort of scholars whose works have 
contributed to the alternative narrative,215 we can observe this phenomenon in the 
writings of Jeffery: the more he keeps reading Smith’s scholarly works, the more 
instances of Smith’s alleged deceptiveness and alleged coarse sense of humour he keeps 
uncovering—to the point that he now sees such examples “in almost every paragraph of 
Smith’s writings.”216
By way of summing up the above discussion, I return to the founding claim: that Clement’s  
Letter to Theodore is a forgery created by Smith.217 This is a startling claim, even more 
surprising considering scholars have not shied away from implying themselves that their 
own arguments in support of this claim do, in fact, beg the question. The preface to The 
Gospel Hoax is quite clear in this. As I have observed elsewhere,
It is curious to note that the starting point of Carlson’s inquiry had less to do with 
the question of forgery—that is, whether [Clement’s Letter to Theodore] is a 
forgery per se—and more with the question of the identity of the forger. In other 
words, according to Carlson, the study of Criddle [in 1995] had already shown 
that the letter is not from the real Clement of Alexandria and, consequently, the 
real question pertains only to the identity of the forger. In his own words: ‘Was 
215 Note especially that the one sentence in Theod. I.13–15 contains (at least) two different instances of 
concealment of the name Morton.
216 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 232. Emphasis mine. Cf. Jovan Byford, Conspiracy Theories: A Critical 
Introduction (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 75: “Descriptions of the pathological 
characteristics of the conspirators often include references to illicit sexual behaviour, debauchery and 
hedonism … one also finds regular accusations of homosexual practices.”
217 Cf. Hedrick, “Moving on from Stalemate,” 32–33: “They [two examples of concealed indicators of 
authority] are not actually ‘clues,’ however, unless one assumes a priori that Smith forged the text. What 
I mean is this: the prior assumption leads to seeing the datum as a ‘clue.’”
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[Clement’s Letter to Theodore] the eighteenth-century idle musings of a bored 
Greek Orthodox monk or a Dutch humanist … Was Morton Smith a victim of a 
malicious forgery, or did he himself have something to do with it?’218
The problem that follows is the poor conceptual separation between the notions of 
whether Clement’s Letter to Theodore is a forgery and whether Smith forged it—even more 
so, while the claims within the alternative narrative are meant to prove the former, they 
(at best) pertain only to the latter. One might, of course, point out that, to establish 
Smith’s deliberateness in creating the letter is to establish the question of forgery as well. 
This I do not deny, but such a conclusion would require that the arguments presented for 
Smith’s deliberateness be robust enough to actually distinguish Smith’s deliberateness 
from the deliberateness of the scholars themselves in construing instances of literary 
dependency, concealed indicators of authority, and jokes.219
That having been said, I wish to reiterate here that my point in the above section is 
simply this: scholars have failed to adequately address the requirements for justifying 
their claims about concealed indicators of authority and deliberately crafted jokes in 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore. In lieu of providing clear reasons for the many decisions of 
judgment they have had to make, scholars have foregone qualitative reasoning, referring 
only to the volume of amusing details they have construed, coupled with vague notions 
concerning Smith’s motive(s) and his sense of humour. As I will argue later, there is 
nothing to differentiate these claims from any number of equally bizarre claims regularly 
encountered in pseudo-scholarly sources, tantamount to the claims of justification made 
by Ignatius Donnelly, the nineteenth-century champion of the notion that Francis Bacon 
was the true author of Shakespearean poems and plays: “The proofs are cumulative. I have 
shown a thousand of them.”220
218 Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 93; citing Carlson, Gospel Hoax, xv–xvi.
219 Cf. Paananen, “WWFD,” 8: “In other words, there is a poor conceptual separation between the notions of 
whether a given artefact is forged and whether a given forger was responsible for its fabrication. 
Oftentimes WWFD is used to argue for the first, when it pertains (at best) only to the latter. One might, 
of course, point out that to establish the latter as deliberate is to establish the question of forgery at the 
same time. This I do not deny (to a degree), but such conclusion would require that the arguments 
presented for the ‘means, motive, and opportunity’ were robust enough to actually distinguish the 
deliberateness of the forger from the deliberateness of the scholars themselves in construing their 
instances of plausible ‘means, motive, and opportunity’ of the forger. If such methodological robustness 
has been established somewhere in scholarly debates on fakes and forgeries, I have yet to encounter it.”
220 Ignatius Donnelly, The Great Cryptogram: Francis Bacon’s Cipher in the So-called Shakespeare Plays (vols. 2; 
London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1888) 2:890. Emphasis original.
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2.5.3 Contrasting the Arguments within the Alternative Narrative
In the previous sections (2.5.1–2.5.2), the arguments within the alternative narrative were 
classified into three distinct groups and their implied claims of firm deliberation on the 
part of Smith, the alleged author of Clement’s Letter to Theodore, assessed. Furthermore, the 
claims of literary, derivative relationships (hoax) were noted to be standard arguments in 
the academic study of history and were thus considered viable to be tested against 
established criteria on such issues, while the claims of concealed indicators of authority 
and jokes were observed to be foreign to the usual standards for academic history 
writing.
2.5.3.1 Contrasting Literary, Derivative Relationships (Hoax)
As discussed in sub-subsection 2.5.1.1, in the alternative narrative Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore is thought to be literarily dependent on a number of works. Three of these works 
are of interest here—Wilde’s Salomé (1891), Hunter’s The Mystery of Mar Saba (1940), and 
Wilson’s Anglo-Saxon Attitudes (1956). Of these three, the strongest (in relative terms) case 
has certainly been made regarding the second title on that list. As discussed above in 
further detail, Watson cites a single lexical parallel (reconcile to), two instances of similar 
sentiments (bracing for failure; expectations of a chance discovery), a similar episode of 
discovery (Mar Saba; the presence of other texts), and general parallels between the Shred  
of Nicodemus and the gospel extracts as support for his conclusion about literary 
dependence:
Had The Mystery of Mar Saba been first published c. 1975, the analysis presented 
here would show it to be heavily dependent on The Secret Gospel (1973) … There 
is no alternative but to conclude that Smith is dependent on the novel.221
Evans adds to Watson’s list of parallelisms two further lexical parallels (manuscripts; cell), 
the alleged similarity of an embarrassing detail, and the non sequitur of Moreton/Morton, 
concluding that “Smith’s dependence on Hunter appears to be the unavoidable 
221 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 170. Watson’s point regarding the hypothetical chronology of Hunter’s 
novel following the publication of Smith’s discovery story has three issues. First, it equates the writing 
of a novel with the manufacturing of a manuscript forgery, the latter of which requires considerably 
more skills. Second, it fails to distinguish between the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore and 
Smith’s writings concerning the manuscript (Clement of Alexandria; The Secret Gospel), including the story 
of its discovery, opting to merge together all of these different physical products of writing. Third, it 
takes the hypothetical date of publishing of The Mystery of Mar Saba (“c. 1975”) as a premise for its 
hypothetical literary dependence on The Secret Gospel (1973), a move that—especially concerning the 
writing of the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore—would beg the question (i.e., the date of 
publication is itself the contested issue, and thus cannot be used as a premise).
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conclusion.”222
What are the justifications for the notion that such parallelism constitutes a strong 
literary relationship between The Mystery of Mar Saba and Clement’s Letter to Theodore? 
Watson and Evans offer faint assertions about “strikingly similar terms,” whose parallels 
are “amazing, both in substance and in language” but no attempts to qualify these 
terms.223 It is as if, somehow, these parallels are expected to be so unquestionably clear 
that no further justification need be given. Since there are no explicated criteria within 
the alternative narrative and scholars have formulated questions of literary dependence 
within their respective fields of inquiry in various ways, the most instructive point of 
comparison for the present study exists between how scholars like Evans and Watson 
assess the question of literary dependence between Clement’s Letter to Theodore and The 
Mystery of Mar Saba and in how they assess literary dependencies in other contexts.
Evans, in his earlier writings, considered whether literary relationship could be 
established between Josephus’s The Jewish War (6.5.3) and the passion tradition preserved 
in the canonized gospels of the New Testament. He first lists the parallels:
There are several important parallels between the temple-related experiences of 
Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus son of Ananias. Both entered the precincts of the 
temple (το ιερόν: Mark 11:11, 15, 27; 12:35; 13:1; 14:49; J.W. 6.5.3 §301) at the 
time of a religious festival (εορτή: Mark 14:2; 15:6; John 2:23; J.W. 6.5.3 §300). 
Both spoke of the doom of Jerusalem (Luke 19:41-44; 21:20-24; J.W. 6.5.3 §301), 
the sanctuary (ναός: Mark 13:2; 14:58; J.W. 6.5.3 §301), and the people (λαός: 
Mark 13:17; Luke 19:44; 23:28-31; J.W. 6.5.3 §301). Both apparently alluded to 
Jeremiah 7, where the prophet condemned the temple establishment of his day 
(“cave of robbers”: Jer 7:11 in Mark 11:17; “the voice against the bridegroom and 
the bride”: Jer 7:34 in J.W. 6.5.3 §301). Both were “arrested” by the authority of 
Jewish—not Roman—leaders (συλλαμβάνειν: Mark 14:48; John 18:12; J.W. 
6.5.3 §302). Both were beaten by the Jewish authorities (παίειν: Matt 26:68; 
Mark 14:65; J.W. 6.5.3 §302). Both were handed over to the Roman governor 
(ήγαγον αυτόν έπι τον Πιλατον: Luke 23:1; άνάγουσιν … έπι τον … 
επαρχον: J.W. 6.5.3 §303). Both were interrogated by the Roman governor 
(έρωταν: Mark 15:4; J.W. 6.5.3 §305). Both refused to answer to the governor 
(ουδέν άποκρίνεσθαι: Mark 15:5; J.W. 6.5.3 §305). Both were scourged by the 
governor (μαστιγοΰν/μάστιξ: John 19:1; J.W. 6.5.3 §304). Governor Pilate may 
have offered to release Jesus of Nazareth, but did not; Governor Albinus did 
release Jesus son of Ananias (άπολύειν: Mark 15:9; J.W. 6.5.3 §305).224
222 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 91.
223 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 165; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 90.
224 Craig A. Evans, “Jesus and the ‘Cave of Robbers’: Toward a Jewish Context for the Temple Action,” 
Bulletin for Biblical Research 3 (1993) 93–110, at 106.
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Should such a list—comparable episodes about two individuals named Jesus entering the 
same temple in a passage that contains with eleven lexical parallels—be considered 
“amazing, both in substance and in language.” Not at all, as Evans rightly observes,
Literary relationships are suspected when there is a high concentration of 
common vocabulary, especially phrases and whole sentences. In short, I think that 
the common vocabulary adduced above indicates common judicial and penal 
process, but not literary relationship. There is no indication that the story of one 
Jesus influenced the telling of the story of the other Jesus.225
Here, Evans exemplifies the standard cautious approach to establishing literary 
relationships in the study of ancient history, including his own field of biblical studies—a 
notable difference from the arguments he makes within the alternative narrative. 
Watson, likewise, cites John S. Kloppenborg in arguing for the importance of “strong 
verbal agreements” and “striking agreements in the sequence” when providing literary 
explanations for early Christian texts.226 Jenkins is also worth adding to this discussion, 
citing his general assessment that parallels are “tenuous” when “passages cited as 
parallels are describing broadly similar ideas which were commonplaces”227 in comparison to 
his subsequent description of parallels between Clement’s Letter to Theodore and Wilson’s 
Anglo-Saxon Attitudes as “striking”. In the latter case, there is only a single lexical parallel 
(Theodore / Θεόδωρος) propped up of Jenkins’s interpretation that Smith’s academic 
work amounted to a sexually-laden rewriting of the early Christian history.228
If Evans, Watson, and Jenkins reduced the rigor of their criteria for determining literary 
dependence in the above instance, neither do we return to the traditional standards for 
establishing alleged literary dependence229 when discussing Wilde’s Salomé .230 Jeffery’s 
case for the latter is a colourful rereading of the whole of Clement’s Letter to Theodore as a 
Carpocratian anti-Gospel that builds itself upon earlier interpretative choices, one 
(debatable) step after another. To understand this argument, we must first accept 
Jeffery’s reading of the letter as one that “ridicules the Christian ideal of monogamous 
225 Evans, “Cave of Robbers,” 106 n. 47. Emphasis mine.
226 Francis Watson, “Q as Hypothesis: A Study in Methodology,” New Testament Studies 55 (2009) 397–415, at 
399 n. 8, citing John S. Kloppenborg, Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000) 18. Emphasis mine.
227 Jenkins, Hidden Gospels, 97–98. Emphasis mine.
228 It is interesting to note here Jenkins’s own condemnation of “the Jesus Seminar school” for its tendency 
“to exaggerate the apparent similarities between the canonical gospels and later texts”; Jenkins, Hidden 
Gospels, 99. On Jenkins’s misrepresentation of Smith’s scholarship, see n. 162, above.
229 “Dependence” is used in Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 225. Alternatively, Jeffery claims 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore to be “based on … Salomé” in Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 239.
230 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 228–231; Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 242.
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heterosexuality and attempts to show that Jesus practiced a purer, homosexual love,”231 
and which depicts Clement as “a stereotypically bigoted heterosexual churchman, a 
hypocrite who advocates lying in the name of the church, who is shown trying 
unsuccessfully to hide and distort the embarrassing ‘truth’ that homosexuality was the 
religion of Jesus himself.”232 If we accept this reading of Clement’s Letter to Theodore, and 
note Jeffery’s suggestion that the Clementine corpus does not refer to “seven veils” in the 
exact manner as appears in Clement’s Letter to Theodore,233 we can then, perhaps, begin to 
appreciate the alleged literary connection to Wilde’s Salomé. It is on the basis of this 
supposed literary dependence that Jeffery reads Clement’s “the Wisdom of God, through 
Solomon” (Theod. II.13) in a subversive manner. That is, Jeffery first notes that Smith 
himself translated the Greek words τ ς πτάκις κεκαλυμμένης ληθείαςῆ ἑ ἀ  (Theod. I.26) as 
“of that truth hidden by seven veils” in Clement of Alexandria, a translation that “seems to 
point a little too boldly to Wilde’s Salomé,” leading Smith to bracket the word “veils” in 
The Secret Gospel in an attempt “to muffle this cue.”234 Subsequently, Jeffery feels justified 
to take the king’s name as “the masculine equivalent of Salome,” suggesting a play on 
words that is “even more delightful in Hebrew … since Shlomo and Shulamit are the 
paradigmatically heterosexual couple in the Song of Songs.” It is worth concluding this 
discussion with Jeffery’s modified quote of Song 8:10: “I am a wall, and my breasts are like 
towers; so in his eyes I am as one who brings Shalom[e].”235 In all, the link between 
Clement’s Letter to Theodore and Salomé comes about after much of the former is read as a 
contrarian document, following a long chain of (unqualified) parallels and witticisms with 
no explicit interest in controlling them with some set of criteria—quite removed from 
how early Christian writings are typically interpreted in biblical studies.236
231 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 239.
232 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 235.
233 Note that the words τ ς πτάκις κεκαλυμμένης ληθείαςῆ ἑ ἀ  (Theod. I.26) could be translated as “of the 
sevenfold veiled truth” (i.e., without an overt allusion to Wilde’s “dance of the seven veils”) and that 
Clement does elsewhere use the words ν τ  δύτ  τ ς ληθείαςἐ ῷ ἀ ῳ ῆ ἀ  (in the innermost sanctuary of the 
truth; Strom. V.4.19.3) and για γίων … ποκαλύψαντοςἅ ἁ ἀ  (unveiling the holy of holies; Strom. 
VI.8.68.1) and related interpretations of the number seven. For a convincing interpretation of the 
Clementine readings of these and other details in the contested manuscript, see Scott G. Brown, 
“Behind the Seven Veils, I: The Gnostic Life Setting of the Mystic Gospel of Mark,” in Ancient Gospel or 
Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 York 
University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 247–283. Translations 
from Strom. in this footnote are by Brown.
234 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 321 n. 20.
235 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 229.
236 For a different criticism on Jeffery’s literary method as “not rooted in exegesis but in his habit of 
associative reasoning,” see Brown, “Twelve Enduring Misconceptions,” 314.
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The point of this section is not to belabour literary relationships as such, for which 
adequate discussions exist elsewhere,237 nor to consider the question of literary 
relationships in the particular case of Clement’s Letter to Theodore in any further detail, as 
this has also been done elsewhere.238 Rather, the point is to draw attention to how 
scholars have opted to assert literary dependence in this case either without referring to 
any of the established criteria in the field, or (as in Evans, Watson, and Jenkins) ignoring 
those they have previously (and, I would argue, more persuasively) employed in assessing 
the question of literary dependency in other contexts. The standard attitude in biblical 
studies, as we saw in the citation of Evans above, is to study literary dependence “under 
the watchful eye of a strict methodology, rigorously and consistently carried out.”239 
Contrary to this attitude, the criteria the alternative narrative implies are sufficiently 
loose to allow for establishment of literary dependence in almost any imaginable 
connection. Thus, as was the case for Hunter’s The Mystery of Mar Saba, if the observation 
of a single verbal parallel, two instances of similar sentiments, and one episode of rough 
similarity (as within Watson’s case)—even when increased to three verbal similarities of 
common words and three instances of roughly similar sentiments (as in Evans’s case—
were enough to establish literary dependence, this would be enough to establish every 
extant early Christian text as dependent on every other early Christian text.240
The obvious counterpoint to these grievances is to point to the peculiar nature of the case 
at hand: if Clement’s Letter to Theodore is indeed a forgery manufactured by Smith, it is 
hardly sustainable to refer to the usual procedures of argumentation within literary 
studies for the contrary. I would concur: existing models of literary dependence are 
usually geared towards cases that are quite unlike a complicated forgery we might have 
237 For a generalist history of the practice, see Altick and Fenstermaker, Literary Research; on general 
terminology, see Ziva Ben-Porat, “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics 
and Theory of Literature 1 (1976) 105–128. In the context of biblical studies, see especially Terence L. 
Donaldson, “Parallels: Use, Misuse, and Limitations,” Evangelical Quarterly 55 (1983) 193–210; Hays, 
Echoes of Scripture; Richard B. Hays, The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006) 25–49; Beetham, Echoes of Scripture; Maarten J. J. Menken, 
“Allusions to the Minor Prophets in the Fourth Gospel,” Neotestamentica 44 (2010) 67–84. Hays, e.g., 
assembles no fewer than seven overlapping “tests” for controlling the extent of literary interpretation 
in Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 29–32. Another example of such criteria can be found in Donaldson, 
“Parallels”.
238 Such work has been done, e.g., by Scott G. Brown and Allan J. Pantuck, “Craig Evans”.
239 Beetham, Echoes of Scripture, 12. Similar notions are prominent esp. in doctoral theses that employ some 
form of literary criteria—e.g., Outi Lehtipuu, The Afterlife Imagery in Luke’s Story of the Rich Man and 
Lazarus (Supplements to Novum Testamentum 123; Leiden: Brill, 2006) 51: “The claim of direct 
dependency, especially of literary dependency, requires careful and methodologically sound scrutiny.”
240 Even if the themes of death, burial, and references to the passion story (garden, stone in front of a 
tomb) were added to these criteria, there would hardly be any clarity about the nature of 
interconnections between any of the early Christian gospels.
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in the case of the Clementine letter. Herein lies the problem that led in the first place to 
the insidious circle of question-begging discussed above in subsection 2.5.2, by which 
scholars have suddenly felt free to discard almost all standards they would otherwise 
normally employ in their field of inquiry, all to attend to the merest suspicions of forgery. 
If scholars are to decide that special cases require special methodologies (as they 
inevitably do), these special considerations can hardly become less strict and to be 
applied with less rigour than their more commonplace counterparts. The lack of 
constrained criteria for the study of forgeries is sorely felt around questions of literary 
dependency—let alone those of concealed indicators of authority and jokes.
2.5.3.2 Contrasting Concealed Authorial Indicators and Jokes
The trouble with having a scholarly toolbox with only two pieces of methodological 
assurances—one that volume is a measure of certainty, the other that positing one 
particular sense of humour of an imagined author allows for constructing literary details 
as humorous—is that these two have repeatedly been used to argue for many divergent 
claims, from mere curiosities to outrageous revisions of world history.241
As described in chapter 1, the study of literary fakes is host to peculiar problems unique 
to the endeavour, of which I gave as the most persistent example the definition of 
historical fake according to its worst examples. Here, we have a somewhat lesser 
problem, albeit no less unique: how to take into consideration an example without 
accidentally validating it in the process. In other words, an attempt to compare the logic 
of any specific example to the logic of the alternative narrative always has the danger of 
backfiring: a reader might very well conclude that the comparison strengthens rather than 
diminishes the persuasiveness of the alternative narrative, given that its implied logic has 
been used successfully elsewhere. For this reason, the following two example texts used 
for comparison are chosen because they represent extremes in at least two manners, 
which necessarily renders them unfit to be used for support—first because of their 
general rejection by their (non-scholarly and pseudo-scholarly) peers and second because 
of their obscurity. Bluntly put, the logic of this exercise is the following: if even pseudo-
scholars reject the conclusions of the example texts and if these texts are furthermore so 
obscure that no one has ever tried to construct an argument on their basis, then these 
texts are strongly insulated from becoming arguments in their own right to support the 
241 Nevertheless, such notions are still common in academic literary studies—e.g., Altick and 
Fenstermaker, Literary Research, 103–104: “The certainty of an ascription is proportional to the 
cumulative weight of evidence, both internal and external.”
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claims within the alternative narrative.
The first of these extreme examples is The Treasure Maps of Rennes-le-Chateau [sic]242 (1984) 
by Stanley James—a work of considerable ingenuity that offers concealed clues and 
deciphered anagrams over the span of 350 pages that James had uncovered over the 
course of his research into the nature and whereabouts of the treasure of Rennes-le-
Château, allegedly discovered and subsequently hidden by Bérenger Saunière at the turn 
of the twentieth century.243
First, we might take note of the references to the alleged sense of humour of Saunière, a 
constant theme in James’s analysis that is necessitated by the humorous character of the 
subsequently uncovered clues:
Across the top is [written] “Domus mea domus orationis vocabitur” which is the 
first part of a saying … spoken by Christ in indignation when he turned the money 
changers out of the temple. But that is only half of what Christ said. And here is 
the great humour of Saunière, for the rest of the sentence, which Saunière did not 
have engraved, is … “but you have made it a den of thieves”. (!!!) [sic] Saunière 
is of course referring to himself, and also indirectly to anyone who comes to read 
his clues … But Saunière’s humour is even wider than his own shrug and wry grin 
and embarrassed half shame of comfortable and expedient guilt. Under the latin 
[sic] legend … are the heraldic devices of the Bishop of Carcassone [sic] … and 
of Pope Leo the Thirteenth … Saunière was naming his bishop and Pope both to 
be thieves.244
Second, we might consider an example of James’s etymological explanations, especially 
his emphasis on the placement of individual words and anagrams:
Across the top of the whole lintel in prominent capital letters are the words 
“TERRIBILIS EST” and directly underneath in smaller letters is “locus iste” … 
But since the four words were explicitly separated into two sets of two and 
TERRIBILIS EST was the more prominent I thought that the french [sic] might be 
indicated, e.g. “Terriblement est”. Then I split that as follows “terre – blé – mont – 
est” meaning “land-corn-mountain-east” … So “TERRIBILIS EST” means “land-
gold-mountain-in the east”. And “locus iste” being underneath the previous phrase 
might thus mean located underneath that land, i.e. buried … “Terribilis est locus 
iste” is a 22 letter anagram meaning: “blés lise ici – trésor Titus” which means: 
242 Stanley James, The Treasure Maps of Rennes-le-Chateau (Bow, UK: Seven Lights Publishing, 1984). The 
publication lacks accent marks—e.g., Rennes-le-Château in the title—which I have corrected in the 
following citations.
243 For the purposes of my argument here, the exact details of the various claims related to Saunière and 
his alleged treasure are irrelevant, as the object of inquiry is James’s method. For a comprehensive (and 
critical) look on the matter in Anglophone scholarship, see Bill Putnam and John Edwin Wood, The 
Treasure of Rennes-le-Château: A Mystery Solved (Stroud: Sutton, 2003). For a fascinating article about the 
claims about the treasure in French, see Christiane Amiel, “L’abîme au trésor, ou l’or fantôme de 
Rennes-le-Château,” in Imaginaires archéologiques (ed. Claudie Voisenat; Ethnologie de la France 22; 
Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2008) 61–86.
244 James, Treasure Maps, 33–34.
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“gold might be read here – the treasure of Titus” … The words are on a corbel – 
“corbeau” in French, which as we shall see means “au Berço”. “Terribilis est locus 
iste” contains its own clues. In latin [sic] “Terribilis” could be split “terri-bilis” – 
“Land of Gall”. There is no “est” in latin [sic], it is French for “is” or “east”. If 
“est” is French, then in French “Terri – bi – lis” would mean that “terri” could be 
read twice. But “locus” meaning “neighbourhood, region” also means “placed 
connected on with the other” i.e. two places connected by something joining them 
together. And “iste” means “that person or thing near to you” i.e. near to you as 
you stand here. “Terribilis” is Land of Gall – and “gall” in French is “bilaire” in 
the sense of bile, and “colère” in the sense of anger. Thus Terribilis is the land of 
bilaire and colère. And “locus iste” is a “place of two things connected near to 
you” i.e. near to the reader of the inscription over the church door. We can see 
“col” in “colère” – “col” meaning “a pass” between the two mountains, for 
example, that it thus connects by them being on either side of it. We also get “col” 
from “locus”. In “bilaire” and “colère” we get “Berço” … There are two Berços, 
Berques, the Berque Grande and the Berque Petite [sic]. They are near to the 
church door at Rennes-le-Château, and they are connected by a ridge which dips 
between them to form the “col” – “the pass”. For each Berço “to join the wing of 
the Berço” means the join of their closest edge, i.e. where they connect under the 
col.245
Let me reiterate here that this is all nonsense: we need to establish a baseline for 
comparison, and given the danger of validation by reference explicated above, we could 
not do better than to choose James, whose musings are so reaching that even some of his 
fellow clue hunters for the Rennes treasure discredit his method of reasoning.246 
Notwithstanding, James’s analysis is indistinguishable from the concealed indicators of 
authority asserted within the alternative narrative. Consider, for one example, how 
Watson construes one by referring to the etymologies of various words:
The underlying image in the statement about falsification is that of forgery, as the 
verb παραχαράσσεται indicates. This word means “to mark with a false stamp” 
(χάραγμα), and thus “to forge”. The παραχάραγμα is the counterfeit coin and 
the παραχαράκτης is the counterfeiter or forger. The mingling of truth and 
falsehood corresponds to the mixture of precious and base metal in the counterfeit 
coin. The Greek terminology can be used metaphorically to apply not only to 
coinage but to literary fabrications—as in the case of Clement’s letter, where the 
falsification or “forgery” in question is the Carpocratian version of the Secret 
Gospel. … While παραχαράσσω focuses on the act of imprinting a false image, 
the English equivalent, “forge” … derives from the French forger, which itself 
derives from the Latin fabricare, to “make” or “manufacture” … Originally, the 
“forger” is simply one who works at a “forge” and so practices the art of “forgery” 
… The forger is also a smith, the forge is also a smithy, and in forging a metal 
object one also smiths it. And so, when the forger becomes a counterfeiter, the 
worker in metal becomes a smith. Bearers of the family name “Smith” are perhaps 
245 James, Treasure Maps, 34–36.
246 E.g., Lionel and Patricia Fanthorpe, Rennes-le-Château: Its Mysteries and Secrets (Ashford: Bellevue Books, 
1991) 159–160.
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more likely than others to have noted its antecedents.247
Furthermore, examples of concealment of other words and the importance of their 
relative placement are presented in the following manner:
Yet the forgery metaphor occurs not in isolation but in conjunction with a second 
metaphor, concerned with the corruption of salt. The Carpocratian Gospel is a 
forged production in which truth is mingled with falsehood—“so that, as the 
saying goes, even the salt loses its savour [ στε … κα  τ  λας μωρανθ ναιὥ ὶ ὸ ἅ ῆ ]” 
(I.14–15).
If παραχαράσσω evokes the figure of the forger or “Smith”, does 
μωρ[αν]θ ν[αι]ῆ  suggest “Morton”? In this mixed metaphor, has the true author of 
Clement’s letter to Theodore concealed his own signature? In the nature of the 
case, it is impossible to be sure of this. Yet this hypothesis might explain several 
surprising features of the salt metaphor. … Why then the infinitive μωρανθ ναιῆ ? 
The answer may lie in the ending, -ναι, and specifically in the ν. That ν is 
essential if μωρ[αν]θ ν[αι]ῆ  is to mark the spot where the name “Morton” lies 
concealed. … If all this is correct, the author of this wordplay will have 
appreciated the fact that μωρανθ ναιῆ  usually means “to be made foolish”, “to be 
made a fool of”—a concealed reference to those who are fooled (Mortonized, we 
might say) by this forged (Smithed) letter.248
Should we place these arguments next to each other, the following parallels can be found:
Table 5: Assertions of the Author’s Sense of Humour to Justify the Interpretation of Certain 
Literary Details
James Watson
“‘Terribilis est locus iste’ contains its own 
clues”
“Perhaps this enigmatic text actually solicits 
its own exposure”249
“here is the great humour of Saunière” “the author of this wordplay will have 
appreciated the fact that μωρανθ ναιῆ  
usually means ‘to be made foolish’, ‘to be 
made a fool of’”
247 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 152–153. Emphasis original.
248 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 153–155. Here, Watson again insists on the importance of the placement 
of words in a footnote: “Since μωρανθ ναιῆ  is immediately preceded by the word ‘salt’, the Morton Salt 
connection may also be in play here”; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 155 n. 75. Watson’s remark is made 
in reference to Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 58–62, in which a different concealment of the word “Morton” 
within this same passage on salt is suggested.
249 Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 131. Emphasis original.
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Table 6: Assertions of the Techniques of Concealment, Their Loci and Volume to Justify Their 
Genuineness
James Watson Notes
“But since the four words 
were explicitly separated into 
two sets of two … the french 
[sic] might be indicated”
“The underlying image in the 
statement about falsification 
is that of forgery, as the verb 
παραχαράσσεται indicates”
The notion of concealment 
within the passage is drawn 
from the words themselves
“I split that as follows ‘terre – 
blé – mont – est’ meaning 
‘land-corn-mountain-east’ … 
So ‘TERRIBILIS EST’ 
means ‘land-gold-mountain-
in the east’”
“While παραχαράσσω 
focuses on the act of 
imprinting a false image, the 
English equivalent, “forge” 
… derives from the French 
forger, which itself derives 
from the Latin fabricare, to 
‘make’ or ‘manufacture’”
The first technique of 
concealment within the 
passage; literal translation
“‘locus’ meaning 
‘neighbourhood, region’ also 
means ‘placed connected on 
with the other’ i.e. two places 
connected by something 
joining them together … 
‘iste’ means ‘that person or 
thing near to you’ i.e. ‘near to 
you as you stand here’”
“The Greek terminology can 
be used metaphorically to 
apply not only to coinage but 
to literary fabrications”
The second technique of 
concealment within the 
passage; non-literal 
translation (i.e., metaphor)
“The [mass of] detail is seen 
and it is hard to believe it is 
all relevant and that some of 
it is not superfluous” (James, 
Treasure Maps, 33); “This 
might be thought contrived, 
were it not for the constant 
repetition of reference we 
find to the whole or parts” 
(James, Treasure Maps, 41.)
“the forgery metaphor occurs 
… in conjunction with a 
second metaphor”
The notion of volume 
deduced to be significant
“‘locus iste’ being underneath 
the previous phrase might 
thus mean located underneath 
that land, i.e. buried”
“since μωρανθ ναιῆ  is 
immediately preceded by the 
word ‘salt’”
The notion of placement of 
words deduced to be 
significant
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James Watson Notes
“In latin [sic] ‘Terribilis’ 
could be split ‘terri-bilis’ – 
‘Land of Gall’ … and ‘gall’ 
in French is ‘bilaire’ in the 
sense of bile, and ‘colère’ in 
the sense of anger … We can 
see ‘col’ in ‘colère’ – ‘col’ 
meaning ‘a pass’ between the 
two mountains, for example 
… We also get ‘col’ from 
‘locus’. In ‘bilaire’ and 
‘colère’ we get ‘Berço’ … 
They are near to the church 
door at Rennes-le-Château, 
and they are connected by a 
ridge which dips between 
them to form the ‘col’ – ‘the 
pass’”
“The forger is also a smith, 
the forge is also a smithy, and 
in forging a metal object one 
also smiths it … If 
παραχαράσσω evokes the 
figure of the forger or 
‘Smith’”
The first technique of 
decipherment within the 
passage; cryptic crossword / 
word associations
“‘Terribilis est locus iste’ is a 
22 letter anagram meaning: 
‘blés lise ici – trésor Titus’”
“does μωρ[αν]θ ν[αι]ῆ  
suggest ‘Morton’”
The second technique of 
decipherment within the 
passage; unkeyed 
transposition cipher 
(anagram) / cryptic 
crossword
The second of the extreme examples presented here comes from an obscure 1921 
monograph on Dante (1265–1321), in which the author Walter Arensberg claims to have 
found “acrostics, telestics, interior sequences, anagrams, irregular letter clusters, string 
ciphers, and cabalistic spelling devices” in the Commedia.250 As with James, Arensberg’s 
exercise offers an excellent baseline for comparison, as the argument itself has to my 
knowledge never been taken seriously by anybody, including Arensberg’s closest 
associates.251 A summary by John F. Moffitt of Arensberg’s cryptographic reading is worth 
quoting in full, as Arensberg claims that the Commedia
symbolically re-enacts various aspects of birth, reincarnation and the primitive 
Mother-Goddess Cult. … the three stages of Dante’s “Hell”, “Purgatory”, and 
“Paradise” were really representations of different physical aspects of the 
reproductive organs of the distinguished Tuscan poet’s mother, Bella—whom 
Arensberg also dramatically reveals to be Dante’s metaphorical lover, Beatrice. … 
250 Walter Arensberg, The Cryptography of Dante (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1921) 4.
251 In the assessment of Marcel Duchamp, the most well-known of Arensberg’s associates, “His system was 
to find in the text, in every three lines, allusions to all sort of things … Arensberg twisted words to make 
them say what he wanted, like every one who does that kind of work”; Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with 
Marcel Duchamp (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971) 52.
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Dante is first born through vaginal passage and then, by means of incestuous love-
making, Dante is again destined to be re-born—as Christ.252
A rare exception to the general rule, Arensberg is thoroughly candid with his own 
method of decipherment. The act of firm deliberation on the part of the author to conceal 
information within cryptograms is deducted per five distinct criteria:
First, hints in the text that something is being concealed; second, a 
correspondence between the meaning of the cryptogram and the meaning of the 
text; third, the appearance of cryptograms in salient and symmetrical positions, 
such as the beginnings and the ends of the various parts, chapters, cantos, or other 
units of text; fourth, a repetition of cryptic readings identical or similar in 
meaning; and fifth, a repetition, in various cryptograms, of an identical 
cryptographic “frame” or structure.253
In reality, however, Arensberg’s formulation of his own criteria is highly ambiguous, and 
he fails even to follow his own methodology, to the detriment of his proposed readings.254 
Additionally, he does not enumerate the necessary decisions he had to make to even 
begin to ascribe cryptographic readings to the Commedia—i.e., references to the author’s 
motive for hiding them in the first place. This is done by referring to Dante’s sense of 
humour in light of the occasionally amusing concealments. Arensberg, for example, holds 
that Dante’s use of the word “vele” “suggests a pun on the word … vel,” translated by 
Arensberg as “veil” and claimed to indicate the presence of concealment; another such 
word is “ingegno,” “a reference to wit or cunning.”255 The clearest example is found in the 
“hidden signature of Dante … one of a large number contained in the Divina Commedia”:256
252 John F. Moffitt, “Cryptography and Alchemy in the Work of Marcel Duchamp and Walter Arensberg,” 
Aries 1 (2001) 38–61, at 41.
253 Arensberg, Cryptography, 4. The actual use of these criteria is expanded on in Arensberg, Cryptography, 
395–464. Interestingly, Arensberg does note on occasion that his method has problems of its own; 
Arensberg, Cryptography, 4: “A decipherer is necessarily to some extent at the mercy of the very 
ingenuity which the act of deciphering requires”; Arensberg, Cryptography, 401: “In view of the 
incomplete guidance afforded by the anagrammatic acrostic structure … the probability of error in 
deciphering is great. … the reading, however it may be confirmed, cannot be absolutely proved as 
intentional.” Emphasis original.
254 Arensberg’s troubled readings follow first from problems within his stated methodology, as criteria 4 
and 5 are essentially about voluminousness. This is stated even more plainly in Arensberg, Cryptography, 
91: “The strongest evidence … will be the cumulative evidence.” On a methodological critique of this 
use of voluminousness, see 2.5.2, above; 2.5.3.3, below. Furthermore, criterion 2 raises the question of 
the purpose of enciphering information within cryptograms in the first place, as the plain meaning of 
the text is asserted to be the same as the concealed meaning within the text. Only criteria 1 and 3 are 
technically adequate, if only Arensberg would have tried to qualify his “hints in the text” to accompany 
the first criterion (and not to present himself with much too much leeway in describing all sorts of 
textual details as “hints”) and did not completely disregard the latter.
255 Arensberg, Cryptography, 35.
256 Arensberg, Cryptography, 56.
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Now the duplicities of Dante’s language are such that he repeats the mention of 
his name in the very words with which he excuses it. In his reference to his name, 
which, as he says, di necessità qui si registra, Dante may be understood to be 
saying that his name is “registered here” in the words: DI NECESSITA; that is, 
that the words: DI NECESSITA, are the form which he here uses for his 
signature.257
Arensberg’s work furthermore showcases a fascinating multilingual explanation for yet 
another signature of Dante within the Commedia. Having first posited that both “five 
hundred, ten, and five” and its presentation in Roman numerals as “DXV” are used to 
represent the poet, Arensberg concludes the following:
The words IO VIDI, considered as a cryptogram, are the equivalent of the cryptic 
number [i.e., five hundred, ten, and five, or DVX in Roman numerals] … The 
letters IO of IO VIDI are the equivalent, in the Arabic notation of numbers, of ten; 
the letters VI of VIDI are the Italian spelling of the letter V, which in the Roman 
notation of numbers is five; and the letters DI of VIDI are the Italian spelling for 
the letter D; which in the Roman notation is five hundred.
The IO, as a ten, of IO VIDI is transmutable … to any ten-letter spelling of the 
name in so far as it designates the number of letters of the name.258
VI = V, or five, = first, the number of letters in DANTE; and second, the letter 
with which DANTE ends, or E, which, as the fifth letter of the alphabet, has the 
numerical value of five.
DI = D, the initial letter of DANTE.
IO VIDI is, therefore, “the universal form” which appears, by transmutation, in 
the name of Dante, and in his guise as a “five hundred, ten, and five” and in 
DVX.259
Arensberg continues his argument with yet another reference to Dante’s supposed sense 
of humour deciphering “vel” as (yet another) guise of the poet:
It is not inconceivable, moreover, that in the identification which he makes in the 
poem of his own nature with the divine nature, Dante may have intended a 
punning: IO, VI DI, as “I, there God.”
This VEL is another of the cryptographic guises of DANTE. It may be transmuted 
either into the “universal form” of his name or into his name itself by the method 
already described of transmuting the letters involved into numerical equivalents 
that have for their integers, the zeroes being disregarded, a five, a one, and a five. 
257 Arensberg, Cryptography, 55. The details of the process by which Arensberg journeys from “DI 
NECESSITA” to “Dante” are not relevant to his notion that the hidden signature exhibits Dante’s 
“duplicities”. On the decipherment technique, see Arensberg, Cryptography, 55–56.
258 According to Arensberg the form of the poet’s name being deciphered here is Dante Aldighiero, the latter 
of which contains ten letters when spelled with an extra “d”.
259 Arensberg, Cryptography, 131–132.
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The transmutation of VEL into these integers is made as follows:
V, in Roman notation = 5
E, as fifth letter of the alphabet = 5
L, as tenth letter of the alphabet = 10
L is the tenth letter of the Italian alphabet, as the Italian alphabet has neither J nor 
K … I conjecture, moreover, that Dante was not insensible to the punning value of 
the word VEL, which in Latin means either and or. In his identification of himself 
with the divine nature Dante is either God or man.260
I reiterate, once again, that the above argumentation is nonsense, used to provide a 
baseline for comparison. In the alternative narrative Smith is said to employ the same 
manner of guises not only to exhibit his alleged sense of humour but also to refer to the 
constituents of his personal name and to some of his personal characteristics, the 
decipherment of which requires translations from one language to another. Carlson 
presents his case for one of the hidden signatures of Smith he claims to have uncovered 
as follows:
Smith published photographs of two other manuscripts [of Mar Saba] in a 1960 
article … The same photograph of manuscript no. 22 was reproduced on page 37 
of Smith’s Secret Gospel … Three different handwriting styles are found on the 
page facing the pasted end-papers … whoever wrote [the manuscript of Clement’s  
Letter to Theodore] was also the first hand of manuscript no. 22. … For the first 
hand, even though it resembles an eighteenth-century style, Smith confidently 
dated it to the twentieth century and attributed it to a certain M. Madiotes (Μ. 
Μαδιότης). This person lacks a religious title and for that reason appears to be a 
visitor to Mar Saba. While the name superficially appears Greek with the -ότης 
suffix of many Greek surnames, such a surname cannot be found at all in the 
current Greek telephone directory available online. Rather, the name is a 
pseudonym built on the root μαδ-. Few modern Greek words begin with μαδ-, but 
one of them is the verb μαδώ, which literally means “to lose hair” and has a 
figurative meaning of “to swindle”.
Smith has thus preserved a lot more information about the person who penned 
[Clement’s Letter to Theodore] than previously realized. This person belongs to 
the twentieth century, this person is not a Greek orthodox monk, this person had a 
given name beginning with the letter M, and this person bore a pseudonymous 
surname that means either “baldy” or “swindler” This person bears an uncanny 
resemblance to Morton Smith himself. After all, Smith belonged to the twentieth 
century, Smith was not a Greek orthodox monk, Smith’s given name starts with 
the letter M, and Smith was substantially bald well before 1960.261
260 Arensberg, Cryptography, 133, 160–161.
261 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 42–44.
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Who would have employed such “a cleverly disguised confession”262 but one who “must 
have had a good sense of humor.”263 For if Clement’s Letter to Theodore “abounds in jokes,”264 
it necessitates that its author must have possessed humour and wit in equal measures—
just like Smith, whose sense of humour, Carlson assures us, “was such that he could have 
salted [Clement’s Letter to Theodore] with clues, revealing its true nature.”265
Unfortunately for Carlson the above presentation on M. Madiotes (Μ. Μαδιότης) contains 
a number of errors that were explored in detail in an article by Pantuck and Brown.266 Let 
us suppose, however, for the sake of the argument, that Carlson’s reading holds true 
(even though it does not): namely, that there are three hands on manuscript no. 22 (there 
are, in fact, five), that the first hand is written by the author of Clement’s Letter to Theodore 
(the amount of writing is categorically inadequate for such a conclusion), that Smith 
dated the first hand to the twentieth century (he dated it to the eighteenth century), that 
Smith attributed a personal name to the first hand (he attributed it to the second hand), 
that the personal name attributed was Μ. Μαδιότης (Smith had corrected this name in 
the offprint to Μαδεότας, though Pantuck and Brown read this name as Μοδέστος), that 
the personal name is not a real surname (Μοδέστος is a very common one), that the 
personal name is a pseudonym, that the personal name is formed from the modern Greek 
verb μαδώ (“to lose one’s hair”; “to swindle”), and that the spelling of the name Morton 
beginning with the letter M and the association of Smith’s personal characteristics (i.e., 
lack of hair) to the etymological explanation of the alleged pseudonym, along with the 
notion of a particular sense of humour, forms a “cleverly disguised confession” on the 
part of Smith.
262 This descriptor is used of M. Madiotes (Μ. Μαδιότης) in Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 44.
263 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 20.
264 This characterization is used in Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 79.
265 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, xviii.
266 Pantuck and Brown, “Morton Smith as M. Madiotes”.
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As such, Carlson’s argument follows the logic of Arensberg’s, which can be put together as 
follows:
Table 7: Assertions of the Author’s Sense of Humour to Justify the Interpretation of Certain 
Literary Details
Arensberg Carlson
“Dante was not insensible to the punning 
value of the word”
“Smith’s] sense of humor was such that he 
could have salted [Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore] with clues, revealing its true 
nature”
“the duplicities of Dante’s language” “[Clement’s Letter to Theodore] abounds in 
jokes”
Table 8: Assertions of the Techniques of Concealment, Their Punning Character, and Their 
Correspondence with Personal Characteristics and Spelling to Justify Their Genuineness
Arensberg Carlson Notes
“in the identification which 
he makes in the poem of his 
own nature with the divine 
nature, Dante may have 
intended a punning: IO, VI 
DI, as ‘I, there God’”
“a cleverly disguised 
confession … Smith 
identified with a pseudonym 
that means ‘baldy’ or 
‘swindler’”
The notion of concealment; 
hidden signature in the form 
of a pun
“The letters IO of IO VIDI 
are the equivalent, in the 
Arabic notation of numbers, 
of ten; the letters VI of VIDI 
are the Italian spelling of the 
letter V, which in the Roman 
notation of numbers is five; 
and the letters DI of VIDI are 
the Italian spelling for the 
letter D; which in the Roman 
notation is five hundred”
“attributed … to a certain M. 
Madiotes (Μ. Μαδιότης). … 
the name is a pseudonym 
built on the root μαδ-. Few 
modern Greek words begin 
with μαδ-, but one of them is 
the verb μαδώ, which 
literally means ‘to lose hair’ 
and has a figurative meaning 
of ‘to swindle’”
The technique of 
concealment of the personal 
name of the author; 
translation to another 
symbolic system
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Arensberg Carlson Notes
“The IO, as a ten, of IO VIDI 
is transmutable … to any ten-
letter spelling of the name in 
so far as it designates the 
number of letters of the name 
… VI = V, or five, = first, the 
number of letters in DANTE; 
and second, the letter with 
which DANTE ends, or E, 
which, as the fifth letter of 
the alphabet, has the 
numerical value of five.
DI = D, the initial letter of 
DANTE”
“Smith’s given name starts 
with the letter M, and Smith 
was substantially bald well 
before 1960”
The plain-text construction of 
correspondence between the 
literary detail and the letters 
that spell the author’s name / 
the personal characteristics of 
the alleged author
Finally, Arensberg uses the notion of double entendre to construct a creative reimagining 
of Dante’s journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise as an incestuous journey 
through the genitalia of the poet’s own mother. First, Arensberg persuades his reader 
that the poet was not above the use of common ribaldry:
Those who regard Dante as too serious to descend to verbal tricks will note that 
salse in line 51 has long been recognized as a pun on the proper name of the 
ravine where the bodies of criminals were thrown and the word for “pickle”.267
This having been established, Arensberg’s reading of double meanings follows:
That Dante is indeed to be considered as in the womb of Beatrice in his ascent to 
Paradise is frequently implied by double entente. A striking instance of such a 
double meaning is to be seen in the words of Beatrice to Dante, Par. i. 88–89:
Tu stesso ti fai grosso
Col falso immaginar.
These words occur just a few lines before Beatrice … is likened to a mother 
turning toward her delirious child Dante. The word grosso has, of course two 
meanings in Italian; it means, first, “dull” or “stupid” and, second, it means 
“pregnant”. The double meaning of the whole passage may be developed, 
therefore, as follows: Beatrice and Dante are ascending together to Paradise, and 
Dante, who imagines that he is still on earth, is confused by the novel experiences 
which the ascent produces. When Beatrice, therefore, says in effect to Dante that 
in his false conjecture he is making himself pregnant, she is virtually implying that 
what he is really doing is making her pregnant.268
267 Arensberg, Cryptography, 279.
268 Arensberg, Cryptography, 352–353. Emphasis original.
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Whatever doubts Arensberg’s readings may arouse, they are to be consoled by the sheer 
number of such readings, for “All these possible double meanings, slight or farfetched as 
they may seem in themselves taken separately, have a cumulative value.”269 Each double 
entendre is consequently said to be further proof of every other double entendre, and risqué 
readings of Dante are supplied with further reminders of the importance of volume—for 
example,
the seven P’s which the angel cuts on the forehead of Dante and directs him to 
wash off. The letter P is generally supposed to stand for the Italian word for sin: 
peccato; and the seven P’s to stand, thus, for the seven so-called mortal sins … 
Considering the sex symbolism of the poem, I suggest that Dante intends the letter 
P as the phallic symbol which it was recognized to be.
The seven P’s as phallus suggest the seven acts of creation, which are recorded in 
the seven days of creation and symbolized in the phallic seven branched 
candlestick. The words with which the angel directs Dante to wash the “wounds” 
of the seven P’s have a double meaning. He says, Purg. ix. 113–114:
Fa che lavi,
Quando sei dentro, queste piaghe.
In the double meaning of these words, there is a reference to the sexual act which 
Dante is to perform when he is dentro, the sexual act, seven times repeated, as in 
the creation of the world, whereby he is to recreate himself.270
The same strategy is employed in the alternative narrative to portray Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore as a contrarian text that contains vast multitudes of double meanings. First, the 
punning character of the alleged author is emphasized. Jeffery does this by highlighting 
Smith’s choice of words—namely, that Smith had “felt increasingly disoriented by the 
hypnotic Byzantine hymns at Mar Saba,” at which point “he could quip, ‘I knew what was 
happening, but I relaxed and enjoyed it.’”271
Now the phrase “relax and enjoy it” is the punch line of an obscene joke … “If 
rape is inevitable, relax and enjoy it.”
Although that fact does not establish by itself that Smith had actually heard the 
joke, it does rule out more innocuous interpretations of “I knew what was 
happening, but I relaxed and enjoyed it,” given the thesis of the book in which this 
statement appears [i.e., in one of Jeffery’s interpretations, Smith intended to 
establish homosexuality as the original religious message of Jesus] … if Smith 
can tell such a joke in church—in one of the most renowned Christian 
269 Arensberg, Cryptography, 123.
270 Arensberg, Cryptography, 251–252.
271 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 128; citing from Smith, Secret Gospel, 6.
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monasteries!—he can do it anywhere. The hints of sexual humor in [Clement’s 
Letter to Theodore], therefore, will also have to be taken seriously.272
Moreover, in the words of Jeffery, when “the possibility” of such “amusing elements” is 
brought forth, “we begin to notice more of them.”273 A good example of the results 
achieved is the following reading of the gospel extracts, in which a double entendre is said 
not merely to be a collection of individual details but to function like a genre—a genre of 
extended double entendre—“in which double meanings are present at plot level.”274
We can read the entire story as an account of Jesus rejecting a woman in order to 
help an anguished young man “come out of the closet” for his first (homo)sexual 
experience.
In the mid-twentieth century it was thought that the word [προσκυνέω] was 
related etymologically to the notion of kissing, as one might kiss an idol. 
Retranslating this one word as “bent down to kiss” has the advantage of making a 
coherent narrative out of what had been a sequence of perplexing events: why did 
the disciples rebuke the woman, why and at whom was Jesus angry, and why was 
there a cry from the tomb before the youth had been restored to life? All these 
details make sense if they show Jesus rejecting a woman’s sexual advance in favor 
of freeing a young man … In effect, my retranslation proposes that this word be 
read as a humorous double entendre … the anger of Jesus and the rebukes of the 
disciples would be particularly understandable if the [alleged author] was an 
English-speaker who wanted to imply that, while “coming, she bent down to kiss 
Jesus,” the woman was “coming” in the slang English sense—that is, 
“experiencing sexual orgasm.” The quote “And after six days” … could suggest a 
transfiguration of sorts: arriving in the dark of night, minimally clothed, the young 
man finds out who Jesus really is.275
Readers of the more sceptical persuasion are reassured that in many cases “the sexual 
aspect is only hinted at; its presence can therefore be denied and attributed to the 
reader’s own prurience,” a troubling characteristic from the perspective of the 
interpreter that is, nevertheless, “an essential feature of Smith’s brand of humor.”276 
Support for this is drawn from their voluminousness and from such instances where the 
innuendo is assessed to be more frankly displayed:
[Smith] was always implying or asserting that unsophisticated people would 
mistakenly perceive a sexual reference in one text or another, while he himself 
knew better—even though it was Smith himself who kept coming up with these 
highly inventive misinterpretations. This element of faux deniability can be seen, 
for example, in every published mention of his most infamous joke, “Holy man 
272 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 128–130.
273 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 93.
274 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 237.
275 Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 92–93.
276 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 235.
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arrested … naked youth escapes” as a newspaper headline for Jesus’ arrest at 
Gethsemane in Mark 14:46–52. But there are countless other examples. … Smith 
was not always satisfied with hinting, however, and at times he frankly stated 
what he meant in passages that also illustrate his cavalier syncretism of disparate 
traditions, if not a penchant for outright fabrication.
In the very next sentence of the epistle: “Thus, in sum, [Mark] prepared matters, 
neither grudgingly nor incautiously, in my opinion, and, dying, he left his 
composition to the church in Alexandria” (I.26–II.1). What is communicated by 
the phrase “neither grudgingly (φθονερ ςῶ ) nor incautiously ( προφυλάκτωςἀ )”? 
… if the epistle were read as an extended double entendre by Smith, it would be 
saying that, immediately after the exegesis leading mystagogically to the seven-
veiled truth, “he prepared in advance, neither jealously (φθονερ ςῶ ) nor without a 
condom ( προφυλάκτωςἀ ), as I suppose, and, climaxing, he left his written 
composition to the church in Alexandria.” Those who hope this is only an illusion 
on my part will find no reassurance in Smith’s commentary, where the only 
citation … is Plato’s Phaedrus: “… lovers … are jealously (φθονερ ςῶ ) disposed 
…” (243c). There’s just no getting away from this topic [in Smith’s writings].277
Placed together the similarity between the strategies of Arensberg and Jeffery is obvious:
Table 9: Double Entendre Readings Supported by References to Their Alleged Author’s Sense 
of Humour and to their Voluminousness
Arensberg Jeffery Notes
“salse in line 51 has long 
been recognized as a pun”
“Smith can tell such a joke … 
anywhere”
The presupposition of the 
brand of humour of the 
alleged author
“possible double meanings 
… have a cumulative value”
“Once we allow the 
possibility … we begin to 
notice more of them”; “there 
are countless other examples”
The voluminousness of 
double meanings used as 
evidence of the presence of 
double meanings
“These words occur just a 
few lines before Beatrice … 
is likened to a mother turning 
toward her delirious child 
Dante. The word grosso has, 
of course two meanings in 
Italian; it means, first, ‘dull’ 
or ‘stupid;’ and, second, it 
means ‘pregnant.’ The double 
meaning of the whole 
passage … what he is really 
doing is making her 
pregnant”
“we can read the entire story 
as an account of Jesus 
rejecting a woman in order to 
help an anguished young man 
‘come out of the closet’ for 
his first (homo)sexual 
experience. … an English-
speaker who wanted to imply 
that, while ‘coming, she bent 
down to kiss Jesus,’ the 
woman was ‘coming’ in the 
slang English sense …  ‘And 
after six days’ … the young 
man finds out who Jesus 
really is”
Individual words and whole 
passages read as risqué 
innuendo
277 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 235–236, 242–243.
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Arensberg Jeffery Notes
“Considering the sex 
symbolism of the poem, I 
suggest that Dante intends the 
letter P as the phallic symbol 
which it was recognized to 
be. … In the double meaning 
… there is a reference to the 
sexual act which Dante is to 
perform”
“as an extended double 
entendre … it would be 
saying that, immediately after 
… ‘he prepared in advance, 
neither jealously 
(φθονερ ςῶ ) nor without a 
condom ( προφυλάκτωςἀ ), 
as I suppose, and, climaxing, 
he left his written 
composition to the church’”
Individual signs / symbols / 
words read in a sexually 
explicit manner following the 
notion of the voluminousness 
of such “symbolism” either 
within the work itself or 
within a “genre” of its own 
(viz., extended double 
entendre)
2.5.3.3 Summary and Further Discussion
After this comparison of authors whose claims failed to become accepted even by their 
(non-academic) associates (left side of tables) with authors whose claims have passed at 
least some level of academic peer review and been published in university presses and 
respected academic journals (right side of tables), it is worth returning to the purpose of 
this section (2.5) as a whole.
First, in subsection 2.5.1 I argued that the arguments within the alternative narrative 
were most conveniently classified into three distinct groups: literary, derivative 
relationships (hoax), concealed indicators of authority, and jokes.
Second, in subsection 2.5.2 I argued that each of these three groups implied that a firm, 
deliberate authorial act had been performed, though the scholars who argued that such 
firm, deliberate acts had been performed provided no qualitative criteria for making this 
claim. Sufficient for these scholars was the voluminousness of these supposed actions, 
together with references to the supposed motive of the supposed author, in effect 
creating a self-sustaining strategy of question-begging, in which every further instance of 
such examples validated every other instance of such examples.
Third, in the present subsection (2.5.3) I have argued, about literary derivation, that the 
authors within the alternative narrative have refrained from applying all existing criteria 
to their case for establishing literary, derivative relationships in their arguments, even 
when they had applied stringent criteria in other contexts. Furthermore, I have argued, 
about concealed indicators of authority and jokes, that the strategies of relying on 
voluminousness and references to the supposed author’s supposed sense of humour have 
been used to sustain completely bizarre beliefs of a pseudo-historical variety, of which 
two examples were provided. Additionally, the chosen examples were so extreme that 
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even fellow pseudo-historians of these pseudo-historical authors rejected them.
This strongly implies that the supposed concealed indicators of authority and jokes 
within the alternative narrative cannot be qualitatively differentiated from similar claims 
made in the extreme pseudo-historical examples cited above. Consequently, the 
circumstantial assurances of voluminousness and motive (even if they were asserted as 
constrained criteria) cannot be accepted as robust enough or as admissible for arguments 
about authorship.
It is worth pondering just why these two assurances have been irresistible to both 
scholars and non-scholars alike, despite their inadequacy at the task of reliably 
uncovering concealed indicators of authority and jokes. I suggest two main reasons for 
their failure. First, neither of them contains a qualitative element and although assertions 
of motive could be constructed with one (though, within the alternative narrative, this is 
not done), the matter of volume in itself remains always deficient in this regard, for, in 
the words of Samuel Schoenbaum, sans qualitative controls “it is difficult to see why a 
great heap of rubbish should possess any more value than a small pile of the same 
rubbish.”278 Consequently, the likes of the old text critical adage of “weighing, not 
counting” manuscripts has bearing on deciding whether a concealed indicator of 
authority or a joke is simply a figment of one’s imagination. To take this matter to task, a 
robust set of constrained criteria that, at minimum, would allow us to discard the 
methodologies of James and Arensberg, is necessary.
I suspect that there is a certain allure to the act of placing oneself in the imagined shoes 
of a forger and of conjuring up a small narrative to justify a particular feature of the 
supposed forgery. Such an approach, however, rests on the asynchronous relationship 
between the conceivable and the justifiable. An argument that employs conceivability as 
its sole criterion must merely avoid logical impossibilities, but an argument that seeks to 
justify such a possibility requires that the criteria for its justification be met. In other 
words, without a clearly articulated methodology for controlling the creation of 
concealed indicators of authority and jokes, the likes of the notions of voluminousness 
and the references to the supposed author’s supposed sense of humour will be used as a 
278 Samuel Schoenbaum, Internal Evidence and Elizabethan Dramatic Authorship: An Essay in Literary History and 
Method (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966) 197; for a more moderate assessment, 
consider Matthew Scott, The Hermeneutics of Christological Psalmody in Paul: An Intertextual Enquiry (Society 
for New Testament Studies 158; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 4, that “a cumulative 
approach to evidence runs the risk of circularity.”
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basis for constructing anecdotal narratives that proceed from conclusion backwards to its 
premises—a methodological choice I have labelled WWFD in “WWFD” and further 
described as “fit to construct a forgery out of anything.”279 As this technique requires only 
a small first-person narrative in which the conceivable functions as its own justification, 
it is little wonder that it fails to distinguish between the real and the faked in an 
academically rigorous manner—as evidenced by its equally justified use by James, 
Arensberg, and the scholars within the alternative narrative.
WWFD is the ideal technique for constructing a forgery out of details that in other 
circumstances—or, at least in less (hyper)sensitive times—might otherwise have been 
deemed indicative of authenticity. Thus unqualified, voluminousness and assertions 
about an author’s sense of humour—thinly veiled “guises” of WWFD—are such tools as 
can “transmutate” a stone lintel into a treasure map (like James), a narrative poem into a 
series of cryptograms (like Arensberg), or an eighteenth-century manuscript into a hoax 
manufactured for a purpose no scholar can agree on (like the scholars within the 
alternative narrative).
Yet we are far from done with the topic. Nothing in the material existence of a stone 
lintel categorically prevents one to be a treasure map, nor a narrative poem to be 
composed of a series of cryptograms, nor an eighteenth-century manuscript to be a hoax. 
As we had already established in sub-subsection 2.5.1.2, mystification remains an option 
that is as much available to our contemporaries as it was available to earlier generations
—perhaps even more so at present, given the contemporary voices that have sought to 
transform forgery into a quasi-legitimate form of art in its own right, and the 
“fashionable conspiracism” of our post-truth political environment, as discussed in 
chapter 1.
Consequently, given that mystification is a genuine phenomenon engaged in by authors it 
becomes necessary to inquire according to what criteria should the post hoc construction 
of literary, derivative relationships (hoax), concealed indicators of authority, and jokes be 
made admissible as evidence of authorship.
279 Paananen, “WWFD,” 17.
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3 Results and Discussion
The four articles that comprise the bulk of this dissertation each offer two types of 
results: ones generally applicable to the study of forgeries, and ones specifically 
applicable to the study of the authenticity of Clement’s Letter to Theodore. On the latter 
point, it was concluded that, in the latter half of the 2000s, the academic discourse on the 
topic had moved from Hedrick’s “stalemate”280 to a secure deadlock. This shift followed 
from various scholarly malpractices281 that were codified in discourse analysis as practices 
of non-engagement, vitriolic language, and mischaracterizations of opinions.282 For my own part, 
I expressed a wish that future scholarly engagement might address two of the lesser 
understood aspects of the forgery claims—namely, “the notion that Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore is full of obscure ‘hidden clues,’ illuminating the path to the solution of an 
ingenious textual puzzle,” and the argument that “a queer reading of the text [of Theod.] 
discloses the modern origin of the composition … [which] cannot but beg the question, 
supposing as it does the very thing it is trying to prove.”283 As no such engagement has 
been undertaken elsewhere, I suppose this dissertation has risen to the challenge.
The two articles I then co-authored with Roger Viklund illuminated the physicality of the 
manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore. We observed that the halftone reproduction of 
the images of the manuscript—one that had been used to point out myriad signs of 
forgery284 based on the handwriting—had introduced artefacts to the offset reproductions 
(plates) due to the phenomenon of line screen distortion. That is, a printing technique 
involving a line screen placed over a continuous tone image to convert it into a halftone 
image had created an illusion of simulated handwriting.285 As summarized in the article, 
“all the signs of forgery … disappear once we replace the printed images … with the 
original photographs.”286 Subsequent studies enshrined Smith’s manuscript hunting 
practices as twentieth-century ideals, as Smith—unlike his nineteenth-century 
280 Per the title of Charles W. Hedrick, “The Secret Gospel of Mark: Stalemate in the Academy,” Journal of 
Early Christian Studies 11 (2003) 133–145.
281 One early commenter of this dissertation noted to me that this word represents one example of the 
general “intemperate language” of this thesis. I have, however, retained its usage here, as it was the 
term of choice already in Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock” to refer to wilful ignorance or 
misstatement of arguments, and vitriolic language within scholarly debates.
282 Per the title of Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock”; summarised in Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 
114–118.
283 Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 119–120.
284 Scholars have cited, e.g., blunt ends at the beginnings and ends of the lines, pen lifts, retakes, 
retouching, and tremors; Viklund and Paananen, “Distortion of the Scribal Hand,” 8–12.
285 Viklund and Paananen, “Distortion of the Scribal Hand,” 5–7.
286 Viklund and Paananen, “Distortion of the Scribal Hand,” 12.
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predecessors—did not remove the manuscripts from the institutions that housed them, 
being instead “content making catalogues and photographing the manuscripts for the 
purpose of further study.”287 The manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore was deemed 
“indistinguishable from an authentic eighteenth-century manuscript,” as palaeographic 
standards were found to be inadequate in cases of suspected deceptions compared to 
standards in forensic studies.288 Finally, the “poor argument” explicated in “WWFD” is that 
described in detail in sub-subsection 2.5.3.3; the final cautionary remarks of this article 
are applicable to any narratives similar to the alternative narrative:
The contemporary debate culture on fakes and forgeries has filled to the brim with 
suspiciousness and hypercriticality … [culminating] in the all-powerful WWFD, 
an explanatory tool with a scope too broad to be used sensibly … [as it is] fit to 
construct a forgery out of anything.289
Moving on to the results that are generally applicable, I begin by citing my concluding 
statement at the end of “Stalemate to Deadlock”:
It will be beneficial to everyone involved to recognize how this specific debate 
has never been an exemplary one, and how the sins of the fathers, so to speak, 
continue to haunt the most recent debate as strong as they have ever been. Such 
recognition of the extraordinary character of the debate could be one step for 
scholars to feel more at ease in changing their opinion on the subject, one way or 
the other. Ultimately, the difficulties in arguing over any scholarly topic are 
common all over the academy and cannot be solved here. A less oppressive 
atmosphere will be, however, one step towards a more ideal environment in which 
to have a discourse.290
Such sentiments might seem to exhibit youthful naïvety more than a pragmatic solution 
for making progress on a divisive issue; yet the simple, almost banal wisdom of avoiding 
an “oppressive atmosphere” constitutes a crucial aspect of structured discussions—e.g., 
the IDI (International Dialogue Initiative)—that aim to defuse complex societal issues.291 
While the above point was made towards the end of 2010, the following year saw the 
inaugural session of the York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium Series, which 
concentrated wholly on Clement’s Letter to Theodore, the proceedings of which were 
published in 2013 in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in 
Debate.292 The organizer of the symposium and editor of the volume of its proceedings, 
287 Paananen and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 265.
288 Paananen and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 295–296.
289 Paananen, “WWFD,” 17.
290 Paananen, “Stalemate to Deadlock,” 119.
291 See, e.g., the IDI website, http://www.internationaldialogueinitiative.com/about-us/.
292 Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Eugene, Ore.: 
Cascade Books, 2013).
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Tony Burke, noted in his introduction that the symposium was designed to “break this 
impasse”—that is, because of “how poorly the principle voices in the debate were 
communicating with each other.”293 Practicing what I had only preached in the abstract, 
the result of this mission was still one of mixed success.294 Despite the open-hearted 
attitude with which all participants295 of the symposium no doubt entered, the tensions 
that remained afterwards are evident in the papers published in the conference 
proceedings. This is especially notable in remarks directed to Stephen C. Carlson and 
Agamemnon Tselikas, the two scholars who were the most prominently featured during 
the symposium but who did not attend.296 To clarify, I am not suggesting here that at least 
some of the antipathy, frustration, and disappointment were not justified, as both Carlson 
and Tselikas have—the first by his silence,297 the latter by the explicit signalling of his 
intention in writing298—indicated their disinclination for pursuing further scholarly 
inquiry into Clement’s Letter to Theodore.
The decision to disengage has proven to be a problem, for, as Hershel Shanks has noted, 
“no matter how many arguments for forgery … you refute, you can never prove that the 
letter is authentic.”299 That is to say, there is a disproportionate, asynchronous 
relationship between arguing for and arguing against the fakeness of literary documents: 
sowing doubt has proven to be an epistemologically simple task in the case of Theod. (e.g., 
293 Tony Burke, “Introduction,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. 
Tony Burke; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 1–29, at 16.
294 Note, however, that the illustration on p. 84, above, seems to suggest a bleaker conclusion: that Burke 
unwittingly killed communication between the two sides of the debate, as the only scholars emboldened 
by the conference to pursue new research on Theod. were those in support of its authenticity.
295 Scholars, whose papers were published in Ancient Gospel, were (in the order their papers were 
published): Charles W. Hedrick, Bruce Chilton, Craig A. Evans, Scott G. Brown, Allan J. Pantuck, Hershel 
Shanks, Marvin Meyer, Pierluigi Piovanelli, Peter Jeffery, and Stephen C. Carlson (whose 2008 SBL 
presentation was included as an appendix).
296 These are most pronounced in Burke’s and Hedrick’s contributions, the first of whom notes how 
Carlson “misrepresented the support of professional document examiner Julie C. Edison” and the latter 
of whom points out how “Carlson has never replied in any detail to these criticisms of his position—not 
even when given the opportunity in a paper”; Burke, “Introduction,” 17; Hedrick, “Moving on from 
Stalemate,” 32.
297 It is noteworthy that, effectively, the last word from Carlson, as reported by Burke, “Introduction,” 16, 
is that he “shrugged his shoulders” in response to a question posed to him after his 2008 SBL 
presentation on whether or not continue to participate in the ongoing scholarly discussion after he had 
completed his doctoral studies at Duke University.
298 Personal communication.
299 Hershel Shanks, “Was Morton Smith the Bernie Madoff of the Academy,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern 
Forgery? The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 York University 
Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 135–144, at 138. Similarly in art 
history, as Elkins, Pictorial Complexity, 172, 178 observes, “simple claims, such as the sighting of a single 
hidden figure, can engender complex counterarguments, it can be very difficult to argue against even 
the simplest sighting of a cryptomorph. … Most cryptomorphs, in short, are effectively impervious to 
falsification.” On the distinction between cryptomorphs and aleamorphs, see n. 29, above.
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noting supposedly concealed jokes), while proving the negative involves all kinds of 
philosophical hardships, in much the same way that performing a handwriting analysis 
without addressing important theoretical considerations is easier to do than to come up 
with an adequate response that does address them. What all this suggests for the larger 
matter of effective interaction between scholars of differing views is that a delicate 
balance must be struck between challenging individual scholars to maintain robust 
methodological foundations and accusing them of personal failures in having neglected 
to do so. None of the categories of scholarly malpractices explicated in “Stalemate to 
Deadlock”— non-engagement, vitriolic language, and mischaracterizations of opinions—are as 
effective on their own, but function best (or worst, as the case may be) when they interact 
with each other, one feeding and leading to the other in a vicious circle. And, as with any 
illness, the first step towards a cure is to have a correct diagnosis of the malady ready at 
hand.
The more widely applicable results from the other articles that comprise the bulk of this 
dissertation were something completely different. First, in 2010, Melissa M. Terras 
theorised that,
Relying on computational systems … can insert further uncertainty into the 
representation of the text created … distortion caused by lens shape, difficulties in 
colour management and reproduction, and the unintentional introduction of 
‘artefacts’ into images.300
“Distortion of the Scribal Hand” presents the first incidence of such an “unintentional 
introduction”—specifically, of a scholar having “published documentary material that has 
been read erroneously (and published, and refuted) due to faults in the digitization 
process,” though not quite in the manner Terras had envisioned.301 At this point, it was 
foremost the professional understanding of my co-author, Viklund, on the techniques of 
image production and manipulation that brought us to accurately describe and explain 
the crucial distinction previous scholars had missed: that looking at a picture of a 
manuscript in a printed book—specifically, the black-and-white images in Smith’s Clement  
of Alexandria and a Secret Gospel of Mark,302 and the colour images in Hedrick and Olympiou’s 
300 Melissa M. Terras, “Artefacts and Errors: Acknowledging Issues of Representation in the Digital Imaging 
of Ancient Texts,” in Kodikologie und Paläographie im digitalen Zeitalter 2 / Codicology and Palaeography in the  
Digital Age 2 (ed. Franz Fischer, Christiane Fritze, and Georg Vogeler; Schriften des Instituts für 
Dokumentologie und Editorik 3; Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2010) 43–61, at 45.
301 Terras, “Artefacts and Errors,” 56.
302 Smith, Clement of Alexandria, 449, 451, 453.
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“New Witnesses”303—is not the same as looking at the photographs themselves (or even 
high-quality scans made directly from the photographs themselves). That is to say, the 
original photograph is never identical even to its reproductions and whether this should be 
a cause for concern for scholars working with digital reproductions of images of 
manuscripts depends on the intended purpose of these digital reproductions. Even poor 
reproductions are probably sufficient, if one is only interested in making correct 
identifications of individual glyphs—i.e., of reading the text. The more minute details one 
aims to observe—including, I would presume, most of the commonly studied 
palaeographic details—the more accurate the reproductions must be. Ideally, perhaps, 
one should even access the original documents themselves.
“Control of the Scribal Hand,” for its part, noted the dangers of the unwitting adaptation 
of one disciplinary standards to another field of study. That is, an expert in one particular 
area is by default a non-expert in some other area of knowledge and whether an expertise 
in one particular area offers expertise in some other—even if related—area, can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. The worst situation in this context is arguably one in 
which an expert expects to be able to adapt their expertise to a (seemingly) related study 
area—but, in reality, they cannot.
As discussed further in the article,
Much of palaeographers’ work is dedicated to the decipherment of writing in 
manuscripts and where there is seldom reason to suspect forgery. Forensic 
document examiners often deal with cases in which deception of some sort is 
suspected. Palaeographers are keen to obtain as much external evidence about the 
writer, period, and origin of the manuscript as possible to augment their 
assessment of the (distant) past, about which there is often much to learn. Forensic 
document examiners do not shun such external evidence, but usually their purpose 
is to rely on the internal evidence of the manuscript in order to test others’ 
assertions about these matters. It is common for them to request known samples 
(standards) of the handwriting of the suspect and attempt to establish the 
idiographic characteristics of the internalized model hand of both writers (or one 
and the same writer, as the case may be). Palaeographers do not usually shy away 
from “generalizations about the characteristics of a hand,” nor would much 
history be written without a healthy amount of speculation and conjecture thrown 
in. Forensic document examiners would be laughed out of the court should they 
be caught making conjectures without firm evidence to back them up.304
303 Hedrick and Olympiou, “New Witnesses,” 3–16.
304 Paananen and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 285. As noted in Paananen and Viklund, “Control 
of the Scribal Hand,” 285 n. 107, these observations are based on Davis, “Handwriting Identification,” 
251–252, 260, 267–273; Sirat, Writing as Handwork, 491–497.
88
A palaeographer might understandably be wont to try to draw “common-sense” 
inferences based on their knowledge in the field of palaeography, when discussing a 
manuscript of suspected provenance. As documented in “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 
however, such inferences often turn out to be wrong when assessed according to the 
standards employed in forensic studies. In fact, one of the key authors we relied on for 
much of our understanding of palaeographic practices, Shirat, draws the straightforward 
distinction between “style elements” and “execution elements,” ascribing the former to 
“the palaeographers’ tools for placing documents into time and space” and the latter to 
“the document examiners’ field.”305 One of the examples cited in “Control of the Scribal 
Hand” is illuminating in this respect, as the conclusions on line terminations by a 
palaeographer and a forensic document examiner were, in fact, found respectively to be 
descriptions of line connections (i.e., part of style elements) and line continuity (i.e., part 
of execution elements).306 That is, despite the similar language used in both analyses, the 
phenomenon studied, in fact, differed: the use of the language of palaeography for the 
study of forgeries resulted in conclusions that were non sequuntur—at least according to 
the standards in forensic studies. If anything, such unfortunate mistakes should 
encourage interdisciplinary research activity pertaining to complex, interdisciplinary 
topics to combine disciplinary expertise.
On this matter, “WWFD” offers an even more wide-ranging conclusion:
The contemporary debate culture on fakes and forgeries has filled to the brim with 
suspiciousness and hypercriticality. This has culminated in the all-powerful 
WWFD, an explanatory tool with a scope too broad to be used sensibly. The 
solution, consequently, is one of demarcation: to decide which features are 
acceptable as evidence either for or against ascribing the status of forgery to an 
historical artefact. Implied here is the notion of constraint—i.e., the control of 
method in the specific sense … a constrained criterion is one that cannot be 
employed to back up both an argument and its counter-argument. A 
methodological free-form deriving from suspiciousness and hypercriticality lacks 
this quality.307
Many of the commentators at this point lamented that I do not here suggest some 
constrained criteria. This would be no simple task: in fact, the reason I have spent so 
much time in establishing the inadequacy of current endeavours in subsection 2.5.3 (after 
having laid down the necessary analyses in subsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 of the material 
305 Sirat, Writing as Handwork, 495. This is the standard classification in Roy A. Huber and A. M. Headrick, 
Handwriting Identification: Facts and Fundamentals (Boca Raton, Flo.: CRC Press, 1999) 105–146.
306 Paananen and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 285–286.
307 Paananen, “WWFD,” 17.
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presented in section 1.2) is to finally get to the point of suggesting examples of such 
criteria that are not only theoretically well justified but that can also be put to use. As I 
wrote in the last footnote in “WWFD,”
One stepping stone on this path is to reformulate the central question scholars are 
prone to ask of a suspected forgery: instead of investigating whether or not the 
artefact is genuine, scholars might rather consider whether the artefact can be 
distinguished from a genuine artefact, given that the material reality limits the 
historian’s ability to answer questions according to what can be justified by 
referring to the material reality (e.g., documents, artefacts), which necessarily 
forms the basis of the historian’s conclusions. In other words, it is trivially true 
that a forger could conceivably have done many things that are inaccessible for 
the purposes of constructing them post hoc from the material artefact(s) 
themselves. As I have argued elsewhere (in [“Control of the Scribal Hand”]), this 
change in attitudes would bring the standards in contemporary studies on forgeries 
closer to those used in forensic studies.308
Another stepping stone follows: the tripartite, constrained criteria for acceptable 
instances of concealed indicators of authority—criteria that do not accept 
quantitativeness according to some vague “preponderance of evidence” but rely on 
qualitative, hermeneutic interpretations of the supposed mystificatory tactics.
3.1 Suggested Criteria for the Control of Concealed Indicators of Authority and  
Deliberate Actions of the Author
If literary, derivative relationships (hoax), concealed indicators of authority, and jokes must be 
controlled with qualitative criteria, what could such criteria consist of?
Once again, we must begin with what we have—physical details—which we employ to 
establish other details we wish to assert, like authorial action(s). Consider an extreme 
example of a concealed indicator of authority: that the present sentence was composed 
by Pope Francis, who deliberately embedded his title (papa) into this very sentence (as the 
22th, the 27th, the 64th, and the 80th letter). There might be good reasons to insist that Pope 
Francis did no such thing but none that could allow us to deny that the letters in question 
do spell out the word “papa”.
When dealing with such literary details, we can only argue about the reasons for which 
such assertions are made. Crucially, we must resist succumbing to the “realistic effect”309 
and entertaining ideas about realist absoluteness and certainty with our historical 
308 Paananen, “WWFD,” 18 n. 90.
309 As described by Roland Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” in Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook, vol. 3 
(ed. E. S. Shaffer; trans. Stephen Bann; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 7–20, at 17–18 as a 
confusion between the referent and the signified.
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assertions. In other words, we can never establish with precise certainty that Pope 
Francis did not access my computer just now, just as we can never decree with 
unarguable clarity that Smith did (not) act as the alternative narrative claims any more 
than we can (never) establish (to quote Quentin Skinner) “that life is not a dream”.310 
Rather, we can ask whether we can posit that Smith would have concealed indicators of 
authority in the text of Clement’s Letter to Theodore, much as we might find adequate 
reasons not to posit that the pope intervened in the process of my writing this 
dissertation or not to consider that we are living in a dream. Such reasons can be 
supported most straightforwardly by the use of a common set of criteria, which (in turn) 
allow one to assess whether or not a postulation is acceptable. Here, the notion of 
acceptability simply means that we would be content if such criteria were applied in 
other contexts according to the principle of consistency, as discussed in sub-subsection 
3.1.4.1, below.
I have already discussed my understanding of the role of robust criteria in the academic 
study of history in subsection 2.5.2, above. It is perhaps necessary to clarify at this point 
that, when I speak of criteria that enable historians to move beyond the physicality of 
historical artefacts, I simply mean the reasons behind the arguments of historians. For the 
majority of academic historical writing, such criteria are only implicitly present, as 
arguments about complex matters regarding a historical author (based on textual 
artefacts) cannot be presented with as much precision as the arguments about simpler 
matters regarding an author’s actions that might have to led to, for instance, derivative 
relationships between literary works. Consider the analogy of playing an instrument 
according to standard musical notation as opposed to playing “by ear”. For the most part, 
academic historians do their history writing “by ear” and only in some cases (such as with 
literary relationship) does there exist any sort of clearly defined notation system to 
ensure that everybody is playing the same tune.311
310 Quentin Skinner, Vision of Politics, Volume 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 122.
311 According to the scheme of “scientific reasoning” (abstracted to fit all academic disciplines) in 
Ebbighausen and Korn, “Circumstantial Evidence,” 288–292, academic history writing would fall mostly 
under the rubric of “interpretations,” though constrained criteria could be better placed under 
“rules”—i.e., constrained over the regulative idea of “acceptability” and mutable in principle should the 
notion of acceptability happen to change for some reason. One the latter point, see 3.1.4.1, below.
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As I have observed previously, the matter of distinguishing an authentic artefact from a 
fake has remained without a generally accepted set of robust criteria since the times of 
Mabillon.312 Contemporary forgery discourse is, consequently, largely a process of 
carrying the tune “by ear” and, as I have documented elsewhere,313 one of the worst of its 
recurring themes is performed out of tune to extreme dissonance, as the critical inquiry 
into fakes and forgeries has been pursued in a manner free of any justification by 
composing an internally coherent narrative from the imagined actions of the imagined 
forger.
Other historically minded disciplines have been plagued with problems of their own. In 
the literary study of mystification the requirement of common criteria has been 
repeatedly emphasized by scholars such as Jeandillou, whose Esthétique de la mystification 
(1994) remains the only presentation of the techniques of mystification with a robust 
theoretical basis. Jeandillou is confident that, even in the face of criticism as to its 
“lisibilité” (readability), mystification nevertheless “fournissent … des indices dont le 
repérage permet” (supplies … clues that allow for its identification).314 For the same 
reason he speaks of the “nombreuses contraintes” (numerous constraints) the inception 
of such rules of mystification would entail, especially those of “cohérence” (consistency) 
and “vraisemblance” (plausibility).315 Then, some two hundred pages later, he presents 
312 Paananen, “WWFD,” 2–5. It should be noted here that, since Mabillon, a variety of methods of 
“scientific” character have become established, especially in the discipline of forensic studies, 
beginning from Osborn, Questioned Documents (in the US) and Wilson R. Harrison, Suspect Documents: 
Their Scientific Examination (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1958) (in the UK). These are all generally well 
designed methods (cf. the discussion prompted by the 2009 report from the National Academy of 
Sciences in Paananen and Viklund, “Control of the Scribal Hand,” 276) when they work and allow the 
discernment of fake from non-fake artefacts. Oftentimes, however, they do not function well, as, e.g., 
the recent case of the Gospel of Jesus’ Wife has exhibited, for which see Janet E. Spittler, “Responses to 
Mark Goodacre, James McGrath, and Caroline Schroeder on the Gospel of Jesus’ Wife,” in Fakes, Forgeries, 
and Fictions: Writing Ancient and Modern Christian Apocrypha (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2015 
York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade, 2017) 349–374. Nevertheless, 
as Nyqvist and Oja, Kirjalliset väärennökset, 98–99 observe, “Kirjallisten väärennösten tutkimuskenttä ei 
ole lainkaan niin jäsentynyt ja ammattimainen kuin kuvataiteen puolella … Väärennösten tutkimisen 
pitäisi siis oikeasti alkaa siitä, että ensin tutkitaan ja määritellään vertailumateriaalin aitous. Koska 
näin ei yleensä tehdä, tutkimukset ovat kaikkea muuta kuin aukottomia” (The study of literary fakes is 
far less organized and professional than the study of artistic fakes … The study of fakes should be 
founded on the study of the authenticity of the material used for comparison. As this is seldom done, 
the results are far from certain).
313 Paananen, “WWFD,” 5–16; cf. 2.5.3.3, above.
314 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 24. Such permission follows from the existence of a “système latent” (hidden 
structure) of mystifications; Jeandillou, Esthétique, 214. Furthermore, Jeandillou refers to Josette Rey-
Debove, Le Métalangage: Étude linguistique du discours sur le langage (Paris: Le Robert, 1978) 291: 
“L’essentiel, c’est que le jeu soit lui-même structuré et reconnaissable. C’est ce qui doit décider de 
l’acceptabilité du texte littéraire. Dans cette mesure, la littérarité est un code, mais chaque œuvre 
littéraire retient ce qu’elle veut des immenses possibilités qui lui sont offertes; c’est pour cette raison 
qu’on est autorisé à parler du code d’un texte.”
315 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 9.
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the prime exemplars of “doute hyperbolique” (excessive doubt) who “rechercher—et 
découvrir!—des supercheries où il n’y en avait pas” (search for—and find!—forgeries 
where there are none): Jean Hardouin and Pierre Louÿs. Both are passed over briefly as 
“incapable qu’elle est d’apporter une preuve dirimante à l’encontre de la thèse officielle” 
(unable to provide compelling evidence contrary to the official explanation).316
Just as in my discussion of the “outstanding examples” of Love in subsection 2.5.2 
Jeandillou does not offer a solution, only the remark that “il convenait de laisser aux 
experts le soin de démasquer les auteurs ‘déguisés’” (it was appropriate to leave to the 
experts the unmasking of ‘disguised’ authors). This is noteworthy because of his explicit 
argument on the previous page that, “Le fin mot d l’énigme ne se limite pas à un 
orthonyme que l’on substituerait à une ou plusieurs signatures fantaisistes; il implique la 
mise en évidence des régles qui régissent un jeu du secret” (The final word concerning 
mystification is not limited to providing a real name as a substitute for one or multiple 
fanciful signatures; it consists of focusing on the evidence of the rules that govern the 
game of mystification).317 That is to say, just as Love noted the possibility that scholarly 
suspiciousness could “easily get out of hand,” Jeandillou recognizes a difference between 
admissible and “excessive” doubt—neither, however, suggests any criteria for the poor 
“scholars” and “experts,” whom they leave to deliberate over such matters on their own, 
presumably on a case-by-case basis.
The need for such rules has been discussed above in subsection 2.5.3.318 In brief, no 
boundaries as such exist between serious academic study and pseudoacademic 
ponderings, because, in the abstract, there are no boundaries unless boundaries have been 
drawn by us and—to quote Ludwig Wittgenstein on the topic of language games (such as 
scholarly discussions on fakes and forgeries)—“we can draw a boundary—for a special 
purpose.”319 That special purpose here is the demarcation between serious academic 
study and pseudoacademic ponderings, a distinction, as I have shown in subsection 2.5.3, 
has become blurred in the study of fakes and forgeries.
316 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 214–216.
317 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 213–214.
318 This possibility is also indirectly acknowledged by Jeandillou, Esthétique, 214: “S’ils ne sont pas 
illégitimes dans certains cas, les critères axiologiques ne sauraient suffire à rendre un compte fidèle des 
artifices d’écriture”; cf. Brown, “Twelve Enduring Misconceptions,” 320: “Since this approach 
[concealed indicators of authority as they are constructed within the alternative narrative] could 
connect [Clement’s Letter to Theodore] to any number of persons, I submit that it does not so much detect 
clues as invent them.”
319 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; New York: Macmillan, 1953) 
33.
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In the methodological discussion below, I have drawn from various academic disciplines, 
including cryptology, communication studies, and literary studies, as well as the long 
history of the so-called Shakespearean Authorship Question, a topic in which many of the 
issues raised here have already been discussed and the academic conclusions from which 
we could repurpose for a broader application—including to avoid missteps. The insights 
drawn from these fields culminate in the tripartite criteria I have suggested for 
evaluating concealed indicators of authority,320 according to which the primer (concealed), 
decipherment (authority), and plain-text solution (indicator) are to be separately 
assessed. That is, (literary) primer that indicates a concealed indicator of authority must 
first be identified, then its plain-text solution deciphered according to academic 
standards of decipherment.
3.1.1 Concealment of indicators of authority
Beginning with the concealed aspect of an indicator of authority and returning to the 
unambiguous example of McEwan’s “shocking attempted fraud” (see 2.5.1.2, above), it is 
worth noting that McEwan’s playful mystification went unnoticed by many readers. 
There was, after all, little reason to suspect that anything was amiss. As K. K. Ruthven 
observed, it was not even noticed by a specialist in psychiatry who reviewed321 McEwan’s 
novel.322 Such is the human condition that we are often blind to things outside our focus—
what psychologists have termed “inattentional blindness”—most famously demonstrated 
in an experiment in which participants failed to notice a man dressed in a gorilla 
costume, as they were prompted to count the number of passes made between one team 
of basketball players.323
320 On the alternative narrative and literary, derivative relationships (hoax) and jokes, see 2.5.1, above. It 
should be noted here that all of the jokes and most of the literary relationships (hoax) outlined in the 
alternative narrative could be assessed according to the model presented here. That is, the jokes 
identified in the alternative narrative can be considered less pertinent forms of concealed indicators of 
authority (see 2.5.1.2, above; 3.1.4.1, below), while the supposed literary relationships (hoax), especially 
those concerning Hunter’s novel, function only as further disguised indicators of authority, as 
discussed in n. 210, above.
321 Ronan J. McIvor, “Enduring Love,” Psychiatric Bulletin 23 (1999) 61.
322 Ruthven, Faking Literature, 175–176.
323 Discussed in hindsight by the scholars of the original experiment in Christopher Chabris and Daniel 
Simons, The Invisible Gorilla: And Other Ways Our Intuitions Deceive Us (New York: Crown, 2010). Such 
gorillas can also appear in expert material given to expert observers—and are missed in equal 
measures. This was at least the case in an experiment in which radiologists were given slightly doctored 
images for which they were instructed to perform a routine lung nodule detection, as reported in 
Trafton Drew, Melissa L. H. Võ, and Jeremy M. Wolfe, “The Invisible Gorilla Strikes Again: Sustained 
Inattentional Blindness in Expert Observers,” Psychological Science 24 (2013) 1848–1853.
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There was, nevertheless, one deliberate clue included in McEwan’s anagram that could 
have raised the suspicions of the reviewer—as it did others’.324 The (fictional) names of the 
authors of the alleged medical case study could have come into focus once the alleged 
publication choice (British Journal of Psychiatry) was discovered to be completely fictional, 
while further research would have revealed that the authors were likewise non-existent. 
The importance of such a literary primer to, first, raise the awareness of the possibility of 
doubt, and second, to beckon—like a mystagogue—to take another step towards the 
mysteries, is implicit in many descriptions of concealed indicators of authority, including 
the various concealed signatures of Smith within the alternative narrative.325
Although this notion of the primer is straightforward, it raises the question as to its exact 
function in the process of deciphering a concealed indicator of authority. To my mind, 
the concept of the primer offers solutions to three distinct problems that must be 
resolved before any deciphering can begin: inattentional blindness, cryptanalytic 
hyperactivity, and question-begging. It should be noted that the primer is foremost a 
theoretical tool in all three of its solutions. However, although the primer usually is a 
distinct entity that can be used to expose the concealment and is separate from the 
indicator of authority proper (e.g., the non-existent journal in the case of McEwan’s 
anagram is distinct from the actual steganogram326 “Wenn (and) Camia”), there is no 
reason for the mystificateur not to construct their primers more organically—i.e., as 
inherent parts of the indicators of authority themselves—though I suspect this is not the 
norm.
3.1.1.1 Primer Solutions (1): Inattentional Blindness
That a concealment of indicators of authority without a primer becomes meaningless as 
an act of mystification is evident in the example of Pope Francis I made up above. That is, 
nobody could suggest a game of mystification to be played in such an arbitrary and unfair 
(for both the mystificateur and the implied audience) manner. How could the reader be 
expected to choose four letters out of a sentence with over 150 to choose from? Why 
concentrate on that sentence in the first place? Consider, for another example, the case of 
“that most shameless scamp” in the alternative narrative: that the opposing printed page 
to the first handwritten page of Clement’s Letter to Theodore is deemed so important follows 
324 E.g., McCreadie, [No Title].
325 E.g., the primer in the form of spatial proximity, for which see, e.g., Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 87: “But 
then, on the opposite side, begins the letter of Clement”; Watson, “Beyond Suspicion,” 154: “not in 
isolation but in conjunction with.”
326 For an explanation of steganograms, see 3.1.1.2, below.
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directly from notions of fair play, as it would be largely meaningless for an indicator of 
authority to be concealed among the 360 printed pages that precedes “that most 
shameless scamp”—such as Ignatius’s words concerning Jesus in his Letter to the 
Magnesians, in which he notes that the result of our lack of voluntariness τ  ποθανε ν ὸ ἀ ῖ
ε ς τ  α το  πάθοςἰ ὸ ὐ ῦ  (to die into his misfortune) is that τ  ζ ν α το  ο κ στιν ν μ νὸ ῆ ὐ ῦ ὐ ἔ ἐ ἡ ῖ  
(his life we do not have; Ign.Magn. 5.2). That is, this notion in the Letter to the Magnesians 
can be contrasted with the first gospel extract in Clement’s Letter to Theodore as readily as 
the opposition between the (supposed) subversiveness of writing the supposedly invented 
Markan interpolations into the very book that explicitly condemns a similar practice, 
denounced as the work of “that most shameless scamp”. In other words, it would be 
absurd to expect a reader to make such a connection to the Letter to the Magnesians 
without an adequate primer to direct the reader’s attention to this passage. In this case, 
the primer in the last of the printed pages is its spatial relation (viz., proximity, as the 
opposite sheet) to the beginning of Clement’s Letter to Theodore—perhaps together with the 
contrast between the printed block letters and the cursive handwriting, as well as the 
Latin-language epilogue of the editor and the Greek-language beginning of the 
Clementine epistle—which might, at the very least, help alert the reader to the possibility 
that there is more to uncover here.327 Thus, the requirement that identification and 
evaluation of a primer precede the decipherment process is necessitated first by 
inattentional blindness, or the general human inability to identify inconspicuous details 
that have not had attention called to them when one is occupied with other details.
3.1.1.2 Primer Solutions (2): Cryptanalytic Hyperactivity
On the second type of solutions offered by primers, one example worth exploring is the 
so-called Shakespearean Authorship Question, which usually manifests itself as the 
pseudohistorical proposition that the plays (and poems) of William Shakespeare were 
written by somebody other than the playwright William Shakespeare (1564–1616) of 
Stratford-upon-Avon. This claim was first made in the mid-nineteenth century and, from 
the beginning, widely sought to identify notions of concealed indicators of authority.328 A 
327 Even then, this would be a difficult textual puzzle, despite the (supposed) spatial proximity as its 
primer.
328 For the most prominent nineteenth-century studies of this kind, see Delia Bacon, The Philosophy of the 
Plays of Shakspere Unfolded (London: Groombridge and Sons, 1857); Donnelly, Great Cryptogram. Note the 
various spellings of Shakespeare’s name around the time of Bacon’s publication, as explained by the 
editors in “Orthography of Shakespeare’s Name,” in Putnam’s Monthly Magazine of American Literature, 
Science and Art 3 (1854) 295: “We now spell the poet’s name Shakespeare, though heretofore we have 
spelled it Shakspere,” citing various reasons for the orthographic change that “have convinced us 
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recent survey of the number of alternative candidates posited for the authorship of the 
Shakespearean corpus arrived at a formidable figure of eighty.329 Unfortunately, despite 
the lengthy pedigree of the idea, much of the scholarly response has been in the form of 
ridiculing such claims.330 This uniformity has been facilitated by the divide between the 
discussants in this debate, as academic Shakespearean scholars in general have never 
accepted the proposal of alternative candidates of authorship. Consequently, the debate 
has been framed as the academic versus the dilettante or the respectable versus the 
bizarre, and there has been no incentive for scholars to deal seriously with such 
challengers at an academic level of argumentation.331 Only in the field of cryptology has 
the question of whether some of the Shakespearean candidates used legitimate 
cryptographic systems to construct concealed indicators of their authority been studied 
with a measure of seriousness. On the latter, William F. Friedman and Elizabeth S. 
Friedman, The Shakespearean Ciphers Examined (1957) remains the standard text.332
Drawing from the study of cryptology, a basic distinction should be made between the 
code (or cipher) and the steganogram, in that a code is visible, while the steganogram is not. 
In other words, the existence of the coded message is known (even if the solution is not), 
while the steganogram hides not only the solution but its own existence as well.333 The 
concealment of McEwan’s name as an anagram—viz., “Wenn (and) Camia”—makes this 
concealment device a steganogram (as the names “Wenn” and “Camia” can be easily 
almost against our will, that Shakespeare, not Shakspere is the better mode of writing the name.”
329 Matt Kubus, “The Unusual Suspects,” in Shakespeare Beyond Doubt: Evidence, Argument, Controversy (ed. 
Paul Edmondson and Stanley Wells; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 49–60, at 51.
330 The last name of John Thomas Looney, who authored “Shakespeare” Identified in Edward De Vere, The 
Seventeenth Earl of Oxford (London: C. Palmer, 1920), e.g., has been unnecessarily ridiculed, as noted in 
James Shapiro, Contested Will: Who Wrote Shakespeare? (London: Faber and Faber, 2010) 169. In Kathleen E. 
McLuskie’s assessment, the “persistent background in the authorship debate” consists, inter alia, of the 
“Mockery of mental illness … together with the anger and name-calling that also accompany it”; 
Kathleen E. McLuskie, “‘This Palpable Device’: Authorship and Conspiracy in Shakespeare’s Life,” in 
Shakespeare Beyond Doubt: Evidence, Argument, Controversy (ed. Paul Edmondson and Stanley Wells; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 163–177, at 163.
331 The one exception is perhaps Shakespeare Beyond Doubt: Evidence, Argument, Controversy (ed. Paul 
Edmondson and Stanley Wells; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
332 William F. Friedman and Elizabeth S. Friedman, The Shakespearean Ciphers Examined (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957). Note, however, that the importance placed here on the existence of 
a primer stands in direct contradiction with the stipulations in cryptanalysis—evidenced, e.g., by 
Friedman and Friedman, Shakespearean Ciphers, 26; namely, that for the existence of a cipher, “There 
must be no external clues.”
333 It should be noted that steganograms can technically work without coding their message in the first 
place, trusting only to their concealment for security. Additionally, it is possible to distinguish further 
within steganograms, as Friedrich L. Bauer does between the open code (in which the message is hidden 
in plain sight, with the expectation that the coded nature of the message would not be apparent to the 
outside observer) and the semagram (in which the message is encoded in, e.g., alterations in font, 
letters, or other minor changes such as pin pricks beneath certain letters); Friedrich L. Bauer, Decrypted 
Secrets: Methods and Maxims of Cryptology (Berlin: Springer, 2013) 9–24.
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mistaken for the proper names of actual scholars), just as Watson’s suggestion within the 
alternative narrative that the word μωρανθ ναιῆ , apart from being a legitimate choice in 
the Greek sentence it occurs, also conceals the personal name “Morton” within it.
Despite the long history of secret writing, the use of steganograms has received much less 
scholarly attention than the use of other forms of cryptography.334 Klaus Schmeh’s 
Versteckte Botschaften (2009) is one of the few recent studies on this phenomenon,335 in 
addition to Schmeh’s 2012 survey of the “pathology of cryptology,”336 the latter term 
referring to a concept first introduced by David Kahn in 1967.337 Here, the pathology in 
question exhibits its symptoms as “cryptanalytic hyperactivity,” or, as in Schmeh, “Code-
Fieber” (code fever), by which Kahn and Schmeh refer to a tendency to seek out hosts of 
“invalid solutions” to imaginary cryptographic puzzles—i.e., to discover coding devices 
where none exists.338 Regarding steganograms, such hyperactivity is exceptionally 
difficult to control, as any text in existence can theoretically function as a cover-text for 
some sort of hidden message.339 That is, in Schmeh’s words, “It is obvious that the non-
existence of a para-code … cannot be proven.”340 In general, “cryptanalytic hyperactivity” 
or “Code-Fieber” are the cryptanalysts’ terms of choice for the phenomenon that literary 
theorists such as Jeandillou have called “doute hyperbolique” (excessive doubt), an 
attitude that has enabled the likes of Hardouin to compose massive exposés on such 
334 It should be noted that with the introduction of information and communication technology, 
steganography can be linguistic or technical / digital; only the former is of interest in the study of 
concealed indicators of authority, while the latter relates to techniques of hiding data within digital 
structures.
335 Klaus Schmeh, Versteckte Botschaften: Die faszinierende Geschichte der Steganografie (Hannover: Heise 
Zeitschriften Verlag, 2009).
336 Klaus Schmeh, “The Pathology of Cryptology: A Current Survey,” Cryptologia 36 (2012) 14–45.
337 David Kahn, “The Pathology of Cryptology,” chap. 24 in The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New 
York: Macmillan, 1967).
338 Schmeh’s recent survey in “Pathology” contains examples as varied as Equidistant Letter Sequences 
(most famously applied to the Bible; hence commonly known as “Bible code”), the WOW Signal detected 
in 1977 by a radio telescope, the various decipherments proposed for the Voynich manuscript, and the 
notion that “Paul is Dead”—i.e., the idea that Paul McCartney died in 1966 and a look-alike was 
clandestinely recruited to the Beatles.
339 Kahn, Codebreakers, 873.
340 Schmeh, “Pathology,” 16. Emphasis mine. Schmeh does, however, suggest one approach that he dubs 
“absurd comparative code”. In short, if anyone insists that, e.g., the pyramids exhibit the Ancients’ 
knowledge of advanced mathematical concepts, because the relationships between various 
measurements can be described with them, one could just as well take a bicycle or a pasta spoon (to 
stand for the absurd) and demonstrate a comparable code in them, given that any dimensional object 
can be used for such derivations; Schmeh, “Pathology,” 16–17. In Shakespearean studies, such an 
approach has been used to show that cryptographic solutions can be provided for the name of the 
Stratford-upon-Avon playwright or that of any other figure. For example, consider Joseph Gilpin Pyle’s 
response to Donnelly’s The Great Cryptogram in his The Little Cryptogram: A Literal Application to the Play of 
Hamlet of the Cipher System of Mr. Ignatius Donnelly (St. Paul, Minn.: Pioneer Press, 1888) 25: “Don nill he 
[Donnelly], the author, politician and mountebanke, will worke out the secret of this play. The Sage [of 
Nininger—i.e., Donnelly] is a daysie.”
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conspiratorial deception.341 Thus, the requirement that identification and evaluation of a 
primer precede the process of decipherment is necessitated second by the difficulties of 
controlling “cryptanalytic hyperactivity” regarding steganograms, a mindset that can 
potentially make all texts of any kind carriers of hidden messages.
3.1.1.3 Primer Solutions (3): Question-Begging
The third type of solution offered by primers is their potential to help with the most 
devious of the problems inherent to the study of concealed indicators of authority: that to 
posit one is to beg the question. Scholars in the field of literature studies have had to 
acknowledge time and again that all techniques of mystification, strictly speaking, have 
to be assumed to be such techniques to even begin dealing with them. In other words, 
even though the circumstances of scholarly argumentation would enable the eventual 
admissible status of their identification as acts of mystification, to being the process 
scholars must first, if only temporarily, beg the question. Thus, Jeandillou notes that a 
study of mystification “présupposer … l’existence d’un tel objet” (presupposes … the 
existence of such an object),342 while Abramson, following the lead of Jeandillou, laments 
the “insurmountable hermeneutical difficulties,” when the mere undertaking of a debate 
on such techniques “not only presupposes their existence, but also assumes their 
successful identification as mystifications.”343 Consequently, the requirement that 
identification and evaluation of a primer precede the decipherment process is 
necessitated third by the circular logic involved in positing a concealed indicator of 
authority—i.e., the problem of begging the question. It should be noted that the logical 
fallacy is not effectively solved here, though it is somewhat mitigated by setting high 
standard for constructing such an argument. In the abstract, nevertheless, interpretation 
is as such inescapably circular and can never be so grounded as to be absolutely free of 
self-referencing, as much contemporary debate on the (anti)foundationalism of 
epistemology attests.344 This view has been most succinctly summarized by Andrew 
341 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 214–216. Cf. Love, Attributing Authorship, 185 (“the urge to deattribute [i.e., 
uncover a forgery] can easily get out of hand”), discussed in 2.5.2, above.
342 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 9.
343 Abramson, Learning from Lying, 151 n. 16. Similarly, in art history, as explained by Elkins, Pictorial 
Complexity, 179–181, “It could be said that the very act of searching for cryptomorphs is suspect, and, in 
fact, few art historians actively look for hidden images. Since they are born without historical method 
or critical control, it is best to be told about them by someone else … Even when forms have 
demonstrably been hidden, they also speak about the ‘stato dell’animo’ of the viewers—in this case, the 
historians—who choose to write about them.” Emphasis original.
344 On this topic, see Gary Brent Madison, The Politics of Postmodernity: Essays in Applied Hermeneutics 
(Contributions to Phenomenology; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001) 69–91;.cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 
(trans. Joan Stambaugh; rev. Dennis J. Schmidt; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010) 148: 
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Bowie:
The attempt definitively to ground knowledge is either … an infinite regress of 
reasons for reasons, or a circular argument that relies on reasons which themselves 
require grounding, or a breaking off of the attempt at grounding in the name of 
something which is taken as dogmatically self-evident.345
Following the above considerations on the importance of identifying and evaluating a 
literary primer, I suggest the following as the first criterion for the admittance of 
concealed indicators of authority as evidence of authorship.
Criterion #1: The beginning of the act of decipherment of a concealed indicator of authority must 
be preceded by a literary primer that is unambiguous to a high degree.
Rationale: A concealed indicator of authority is often signalled by a literary primer, even 
in cases of little theoretical sophistication, to combat inattentional blindness on the part 
of the implied reader, and must be treated as a distinct concept that is unambiguous to a 
high degree for two further reasons: to mitigate the problems of cryptanalytic 
hyperactivity and begging the question on the part of the scholar.
3.1.2 Authority of Concealed Indicators
Continuing with the authorial aspect of concealed indicators of authority, I turn to how a 
distinction can be made between valid and invalid solutions. In cryptology, the rules of 
decipherment, which must be unambiguous, are paramount from the perspective of the 
decipherer for two related reasons. First, it is only by following unambiguous rules of 
decipherment that the decipherer can ascertain the solution to be unique, or, as 
Friedman and Friedman write, “there is only one valid solution to a cryptogram of more 
than a very few letters which involves the use of a real key; to find two quite different but 
equally valid solutions would be an absurdity.”346 Second, it is only by following 
unambiguous rules of decipherment that the decipherer can ascertain the solution to be 
the one intended by the encipherer.347 Furthermore, the requirement to be able to 
“What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way … A positive possibility of 
the most primordial knowledge is hidden in it which, however, is only grasped in a genuine way when 
interpretation has understood that its first, constant, and last task is not to let fore-having, fore-sight, 
and fore-conception be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to guarantee the 
scientific theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves.”
345 Andrew Bowie, “Gadamer and Romanticism,” in Gadamer’s Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical 
Hermeneutics (ed. Bruce Krajewski; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 55–81, at 67–68. Bowie 
refers here to the philosophy of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) who, in Bowie’s interpretation, 
had already established as much against the standard Cartesian position taken by his contemporaries.
346 Friedman and Friedman, Shakespearean Ciphers, 22.
347 Friedman and Friedman, Shakespearean Ciphers, 18; Kahn, Codebreakers, 881.
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describe the decipherment process in an unambiguous manner sets a high standard to 
the practice of constructing concealed indicators of authority post hoc, or, as Jeandillou 
writes, “Le fin mot de l’énigme … implique la mise en évidence des régles qui régissent un 
jeu du secret” (The final word concerning mystification … consists of focusing on the 
evidence of the rules that govern the game of mystification).348 As such, the demand of 
unambiguousness for the act of decipherment serves, together with the demand of the 
identification and evaluation of a literary primer, as a second control on cryptanalytic 
hyperactivity.
Finally, it should be noted that the concept of decipherment as an act is foremost—just as 
much as the concept of literary primer—a theoretical tool to enable the admittance of 
authorial evidence from concealed indicators of authority into scholarly argumentation 
concerning authorship. As observed above, a steganogram can function without further 
encipherment, relying only on its concealment, in which case the act of decipherment is 
not necessitated. In other words, if a primer directs the reader’s attention to a message 
that is effectively not enciphered, there is no practical next step to be taken to obtaining 
the plain-text solution. Nevertheless, as a theoretical concept the act of deciphering is 
still inherent in the process. Consider the case of a simple acrostic: the act of 
decipherment is simply a process of isolating the first letter of each line of the text and 
rearranging them in consecutive sequence—an act that is practically never actually 
required with acrostics, as the plain-text solution can be read from the first letters of 
subsequent lines just as easily as each of the regular lines of text.
3.1.2.1 Decipherment of Anagrams: An Example
One of the most commonly observed devices for constructing concealed indicators of 
authority is the anagram (i.e., an unkeyed transposition cipher).349
348 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 213–214.
349 Cf. Albert C. Leighton and Stephen M. Matyas, “The History of Book Ciphers,” in Advances in Cryptology: 
Proceedings of CRYPTO ’84 (ed. George Robert Blakley and David Chaum; Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 196; Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985) 101–113, at 102: “Oddly, anagramming is often used as a last 
resort, especially by the unskilled, to unscramble impossible cryptograms even when there is no logical 
basis whatsoever for doing so.”
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Consider the aforementioned anagram of “Ian McEwan” as “Wenn (and) Camia”.350 If one 
accounts only for its cryptographic properties, it is practically unsolvable. First, natural 
languages include redundancy, meaning that certain letters and their combinations are 
more probable than others.351 The McEwan anagram is short, totalling nine letters, and 
happens to exhibit much less redundancy than a longer, random selection of prose in the 
English language might.352 This characteristic becomes important when considering 
unicity distance, a concept introduced by Claude Shannon in 1949 to refer to the minimum 
amount of ciphertext required for a unique solution to be theoretically achievable.353 For 
the most often used example, the unicity distance of a simple monoalphabetic 
substitution cipher in the English language—think of William Legrand in Edgar Allan 
Poe’s “The Gold-Bug” or Sherlock Holmes in Arthur Conan Doyle’s “The Adventure of the 
Dancing Men”—is about 28 characters.354 That is, the ciphertext message has to be at least 
28 characters long for a decipherer with unlimited computation power to be able to 
ascertain a unique solution.355 Thus, the fact that McEwan’s anagram has a per-character 
redundancy that is much lower than the normal implies a higher unicity distance compared 
to an average transposition cipher. That is, a transposition cipher with low redundancy, akin 
to McEwan’s anagram, would have to have more than 28 characters for a unique solution 
to be theoretically achievable; however, McEwan’s anagram comprises only nine 
characters.
350 Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography (Boca 
Raton, Flo.: CRC Press, 1996) 238: a transposition cipher produces a ciphertext c which corresponds to 
plain-text m = m1 … mt as c = Ee(m) = me(1) … me(t), where E is the encryption function, e is the encryption 
key, and t is the fixed period of characters encrypted. Following this notation, t = 9 and e = (7 6 9 3 5 8 4 
1 2), if m = IanMcEwan, meaning that c = wEnncaMIa, a code further concealed by spacing and 
capitalization of the ciphertext as “Wenn (and) Camia”.
351 Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone, Applied Cryptography, 245–246.
352 For standard frequencies, see Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone, Applied Cryptography, 247–248; 
compared to the normal frequency of single characters in the English language, the letter N in 
McEwan’s anagram occurs more than three times, as does the letter C, and the letter W occurs more 
than five times more frequently; of the 15 most common bigrams in the English language, McEwan’s 
anagram contains only one (AN), a frequency of more than six times more than normal.
353 Claude E. Shannon, “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems,” Bell Systems Technical Journal 28 (1949) 
656–715.
354 Martin E. Hellman, “An Extension of the Shannon Theory Approach to Cryptography,” IEEE Transactions 
on Information Theory 23 (1977) 289–294, at 291; Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone, Applied 
Cryptography, 247.
355 Though as noted in Cipher A. Deavours, “Unicity Points in Cryptanalysis,” Cryptologia 1 (1977) 46–68, at 
55, given limited resources, an effective unicity distance is calculated to be around 38 characters. Then 
again, other variables, such as the decipherer’s ability to employ higher-order relations once parts of 
the plain-text are revealed means that the practical unicity distance is only around 25 characters, as 
noted in Deavours, “Unicity Points in Cryptanalysis,” 55. Thus, William F. Friedman, “Cryptology,” in 
Encyclopædia Britannica (14th edition; vols. 24; Chicago, Ill.: William Benton, 1973) 6:844–851, at 848: 
“Practically every example of 25 or more characters representing the monoalphabetic encipherment of 
a ‘sensible’ message in English can be readily solved.”
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The second reason for the technical insolvability of McEwan’s anagram is, alternatively, 
that it fulfills Shannon’s requirements for “perfect secrecy,” or because of its high 
message equivocation. As with all traditional anagrams, McEwan’s anagram can be 
considered an example of an unkeyed transposition cipher—i.e., unlike many other 
variants of transposition ciphers, such an anagram is not keyed in its encipherment 
process in any specific manner.356 On the other hand, the encipherment of anagrams can 
also be described as keyed, albeit with an encryption key of equal length to the anagram 
itself.357 The latter option becomes crucial following Shannon’s further work on the 
theoretical concept of “perfect secrecy,” which requires that two conditions are met: that 
the keyspace (i.e., the theoretical maximum number of different keys in a given 
encryption scheme) is at least equal to the message space (i.e., the theoretical maximum 
number of different messages) and that the encryption key is of at least equal length to 
the message.358 Both of Shannon’s conditions are true of anagrams when they are 
described as keyed transposition ciphers, such that, as Craig P. Bauer has commented,
If the length of the transposition key equals the length of the message, the 
cryptanalyst is essentially playing Scrabble with a large number of tiles and may 
be able to form several meaningful solutions with no statistical reason for favoring 
one over another.359
356 This description is used, e.g., in Leighton and Matyas, “Book Ciphers,” 102. In contrast, other forms of 
transposition ciphers, which divide the plain-text into blocks of glyphs, are individually rearranged 
according to an encryption key. One example of a category of such keyed transposition ciphers is the 
route cipher, in which, e.g., a specific keyword can be used to indicate the “route” (i.e., the agreed 
order) the decipherer should take to produce the cleartext from the ciphertext.
357 Cf. n. 350, above, where McEwan’s anagram is described using the notation in Menezes, van Oorschot, 
and Vanstone, Applied Cryptography, 238. Such an example represents one instance where the 
encryption key is of equal length to the plain-text.
358 Shannon, “Secrecy Systems,” 679–683. The most often cited example of “perfect secrecy” is the Vernam 
system, or the “one-time pad” cipher, presented in its original 1917 form as a variant of the Vigenère 
(i.e., a polyalphabetic substitution) cipher. For a technical, yet concise explanation of the Vernam 
cipher, see John B. Anderson and Rolf Johannesson, Understanding Information Transmission (IEEE Press 
Understanding Science & Technology Series 18; Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2006) 219–220.
359 Craig P. Bauer, Secret History: The Story of Cryptology (Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications; Boca 
Raton, Flo.: CRC Press, 2016) 131. Regarding Bauer’s notion, it is sometimes necessary to consider the 
differences between key and message equivocation—roughly corresponding to the difference between 
“playing Scrabble” with five versus fifty tiles. Simply put, key equivocation decreases as message length 
increases (i.e., the longer the ciphertext, the less ambiguity there is about the correct encryption key, 
until at some point beyond the unicity distance of that particular cipher only one valid key remains 
possible), but the case is more complex in the case of message equivocation. When the message 
enciphered contains only a handful of characters, there is likewise only a handful of ways—due to the 
redundancy of natural languages—to put together a sensible message. Yet, as Jan C. A. van der Lubbe, 
Basic Methods of Cryptography (trans. Steve Gee; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 44 has 
observed, “As soon as [message length] increases, the number of possible messages increases 
dramatically and, consequently, the message equivocation rises,” only to plateau as the message 
equivocation curve approaches the key equivocation curve.
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Consider the anagrammatic challenge William F. Friedman issued in 1959, following the 
historical practice of such figures as Galileo Galilei (1564–1642),360 in which he enciphered 
his opinion on the meaning of the Voynich manuscript, a fifteenth-century manuscript 
written in a script that was never deciphered:
I PUT NO TRUST IN ANAGRAMMATIC ACROSTIC CIPHERS, FOR THEY 
ARE OF LITTLE REAL VALUE—A WASTE—AND MAY PROVE NOTHING.
—FINIS.361
After a number of incorrect anagrammatic readings were produced in the ensuing years, 
the intended plain-text message was revealed in 1970.362 Below, I have reproduced 
Friedman’s own decipherment, together with my own variant:
THE VOYNICH MS WAS AN EARLY ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUCT A CIPHER 
FOR A UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF AN IRRATIONALIST, IF MIRED, 
TYPE.
THE VOYNICH MSS WAS AN EARLY ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUCT AN 
ARTIFICIAL OR UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF THE A PRIORI TYPE.—
FRIEDMAN.
The meanings of these two solutions are mutually incompatible, and there is no intrinsic 
reason to favour one solution over the other. Furthermore, given the number of letters 
this anagram contains, many more equally plausible readings could still be devised, apart 
from my own and those suggested prior to 1970. Consequently, the Friedman anagram 
presents a clear example of an anagram with high message equivocation,363 as the high 
number of characters allows this purported opinion on the Voynich manuscript to be 
practically of any kind.364
360 In one famous example, Galileo enciphered a discovery of his—that “Cynthiae figuras aemulatur mater 
amorum,” i.e., (in Galilei’s own explanation) “Venere imita le figure della Luna” (Venus mimics lunar 
phases)—as “Haec immatura a me jam frustra leguntur, o.y.” See, e.g., Galileo’s letters dated 11 
December, 1610 and 1 January, 1611, in Edward Stafford Carlos (trans.), The Sidereal Messenger of Galileo 
Galilei and a Part of the Preface to Kepler’s Dioptrics Containing the Original Account of Galileo’s Astronomical 
Discoveries (London: Rivingtons, 1880) 93–94, 96–99.
361 William F. Friedman and Elizabeth S. Friedman, “Acrostics, Anagrams, and Chaucer,” Philological 
Quarterly 38 (1959) 1–20, at 19 n. 28.
362 Curt A. Zimansky, “Editor’s Note: William F. Friedman and the Voynich Manuscript,” Philological 
Quarterly 49 (1970) 433–443, at 438.
363 See n. 359, above, for a brief explanation of message equivocation.
364 Incidentally, the message Friedman intended is the second one, where the abbreviation MSS (usually 
indicating the pl. of manuscript) is used, though historians would generally refer instead to the 
Voynich MS (manuscript, sg.). Should the provenience of the two solutions become muddled somehow, 
some might argue that the erroneous (or, at least, less widely used) reference to the Voynich 
manuscript in plural could not possibly be the “correct” decipherment.
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McEwan’s anagram, on the other hand, with a length of only nine characters, has much 
lower message equivocation than the Friedman anagram—yet an anagram generator365 
was able to find 161 unique anagrams constructed of words that occur in English 
dictionaries for the input “IanMcEwan,” none of which includes “Wenn” or “Camia”. 
Expanded to include a list of all known surnames in the English language, the possibilities 
would be greater still. Given that the English language has an average word-length (in 
normal, running text) of 4.79 letters and that 80% of such words are between 2 and 7 
letters in length, there is reason to be suspicious of almost all anagrams of at least five 
letters in length,366 since already at this point the level of message equivocation becomes 
too high, given an unknown amount of redundancy (i.e., a short extract might deviate 
from expected levels of redundancy to a remarkable degree). Consequently, given purely 
mathematical considerations, a transposition cipher that uses a key equal to the length of 
its message of more than four characters can almost never be ascertained to have a unique 
solution.367
Why, then, do I claim that McEwan’s anagram has been solved in a way that is 
unambiguous to a high degree? As explicated above, there is no mathematical basis for 
this claim. Rather, other factors contribute to this evaluation. First, there is the author’s 
own words that “Wenn (and) Camia” was intended to be an anagram of “Ian McEwan”.368 
Second, a long tradition of mystification has been brought about by the unambiguous 
literary primer—namely, a non-existent (fictional) article having been “published” in a 
non-existent journal by non-existent authors (see 3.1.1.2, above). Third, this tradition 
exists within a larger tradition of mystification, where the personal names of fictitious 
authors and characters are used as concealed indicators of authority (see 2.5.1.2, 
above).369 Fourth, the plain-text solution “Ian McEwan” is unambiguous that it happens to 
fit the general circumstances that a fictional article has been described in a novel 
authored by a person with the same name as the plain-text solution (see 3.1.3, below). 
365 Internet Anagram Server / I, Rearrangement Servant, at wordsmith.org.
366 Peter Norvig, “English Letter Frequency Counts: Mayzner Revisited or ETAOIN SRHLDCU”; 
http://norvig.com/mayzner.html. Note that this study updates the standard work (Mark S. Mayzner 
and Margaret Elizabeth Tresselt, “Tables of Single-letter and Digram Frequency Counts for Various 
Word-length and Letter-position Combinations,” Psychonomic Monograph Supplements 1 (1965) 13–32) 
with data retrieved from Google books Ngrams, at 
http://storage.googleapis.com/books/ngrams/books/datasetsv2.html.
367 Cf. Friedman and Friedman, “Acrostics, Anagrams,” 6: “The anagrammatic method is as flexible as the 
ingenuity of the anagrammatist who employs it.”
368 McEwan, “Shocking,” 508.
369 Thus Lenain, Art Forgery, 293: “In the long tradition of literary mystifications, the clues (which only the 
cleverest and best-informed persons will notice) usually lie in the names of fictitious authors or 
characters, so endowed with the status of encrypted signs.”
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Consequently, it is the higher-order relations of these four points that allow us to be 
certain about the correct solution of McEwan’s anagram—in a way that would not be 
possible by applying mathematical considerations alone.
Finally, the above considerations concerning the properties of anagrams help explain 
why anagrams have been commonly used in pseudohistorical works. A high message 
equivocation (i.e., multiple solutions) results in a high degree of plasticity that can then 
be used to construct outrageous solutions to historical questions. Thus, contrary to Albert 
C. Leighton and Stephen M. Matyas, I find that there is nothing “odd” in the tendency for 
enthusiasts of pseudohistory to make use of anagrams as their means of decipherment: 
they have an outsized potential to supply a desired answer.370 For the same reason, it is up 
to the professional historian to discourage their usage in historical inquiries, as the 
anagram itself should never be taken as authoritative; only in connection with other, 
higher-order relations between the anagram and its environment can a historical 
argument be made on the basis of an anagram.
Following these considerations on the importance of describing the method of 
decipherment, using the decipherment of anagrams as our example, I suggest the 
following as the second criterion for the admittance of concealed indicators of authority 
as evidence of authorship.
Criterion #2: Following the prompting of the literary primer, the act of deciphering a concealed 
indicator of authority must follow a technique or method that is unambiguous to a high degree.
Rationale: A plausible technique of decipherment must be identifiable to guarantee the 
uniqueness of the solution—i.e., the decipherer should be able to arrive from a literary 
primer to the supposed plain-text solution via a defined technique. Consequently, the 
requirement that the method of decipherment be unambiguous to a high degree further 
mitigates the problems of cryptanalytic hyperactivity and question-begging.
3.1.3 Indication of Concealed Authority
How does a concealed indicator of authority indicate its concealed authority? Following 
the identification of literary primer and of the process of decipherment, we arrive at the 
identification of the plain-text solution, which I propose must be as unambiguous as the 
steps that precede it. Formally, then, the third criterion for the admittance of concealed 
indicators of authority as evidence of authorship is as follows:
370 Leighton and Matyas, “Book Ciphers,” 102.
106
Criterion #3: Following the prompting of the literary primer and the process of decipherment, both 
of which must have been unambiguous to a high degree, the plain-text solution to the concealed 
indicator of authority must likewise be unambiguous to a high degree.
Before explicating the rationale for criterion #3, I first briefly explain the recurring 
phrase “unambiguous to a high degree,” specifically as it pertains to the plain-text 
solution—though the following considerations are equally applicable in the first two 
criteria.
To ask whether the plain-text solution is unambiguous to a high degree is to ask whether 
the plain-text solution contains a meaning that is of sufficient clarity. The question of 
meaning (of whatever degree of clarity) is a complex topic in contemporary philosophy of 
language, yet there are two guiding notions that help in developing criteria for concealed 
indicators of authority. First, there is the communicative intent of the mystificateur 
themselves. From the perspective of literary studies of mystification, as Jeandillou has 
observed, “on interprète du même coup les intentions de qui le prend en charge et 
l’action exercée par ce biais sur les destinataires pressentis” (we interpret, at the same 
time, the intentions of the one in charge [i.e., the perpetrator] and the action that is 
taken in this way upon the intended recipients).371 Or, as Lenain formulates this point, a 
mystification has to be “conceived as active and intentional”—i.e., “defined as an 
expression in the proper sense, since it derives from a more or less conscious will to 
reveal, to communicate.”372 From the viewpoint of the cryptanalyst, this formulation can 
be constructed in an even more straightforward manner: “Ciphers are meant to be 
deciphered, or no one would use them.”373
Second, there is the subversiveness inherent in the study of the fake, as explicated in 
chapter 1 of this dissertation, which suggests that we approach the question of 
communicating meaning from the perspective of its opposite—i.e., failure to 
communicate. Such a failure might be described as an “unhappy” occurrence, as John L. 
Austin does in his speech-act theory:
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act [i.e., the speech act from 
the perspective of what the speaker intended their speech act to mean] will not 
have been happily, successfully performed.374
371 Jeandillou, Esthétique, 27.
372 Lenain, Leaning from Lying, 240.
373 Friedman and Friedman, Shakespearean Ciphers, 281.
374 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà; 2nd edition; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975) 116. Austin’s use of the word “happily” in the citation follows from his 
107
More forcefully, in his criticism of Austin, Jacques Derrida emphasizes that 
communication as a “signature event” takes place within a particular context—in other 
words, that a communicative act of any kind is radically interwoven with socially co-
accepted significations that compel the critic to distinguish meaning from intention to 
mean.375 Thus, failure becomes a realistic possibility because of the iterability376 of 
language itself. In Derrida’s words,
Iterability alters, contaminating parasitically what it identifies and enables to 
repeat “itself”; it leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is 
(already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other 
than what we say and would have wanted to say, to understand something other 
than… etc. … And the mis of those misunderstandings to which we have 
succumbed, or which each of us here accuses the other of having succumbed to, 
must have its essential condition of possibility in the structure of marks, of 
remarkable marks or … of oral or written utterances.377
How do these considerations allow us to understand the applicability of the plain-text 
solution? If mystification pretends to be a communicative genre, in which, inter alia, the 
mystificateur must at some point divulge their own authorship and if every manner of 
communication contains an “essential condition of possibility” of failure, then, regardless 
of the intention of the mystificateur to reveal, there must also exist instances of failed 
communication in the tradition of mystification. That is to say, instead of the peculiar 
“normal” of studying the historical fake according to instances where the fake has been 
poor enough to fail, the study of the failure to communicate in this context not only 
requires that the fake itself has failed but also that, whatever communication might have 
been intended, that communication and the hoax as whole are themselves failures—a 
thoroughly fail-u-r(e) of epic proportions.
observation that a failure of the speech act does not make it “false but in general unhappy … for this 
reason we call the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the 
doctrine of the Infelicities”; Austin, Things with Words, 14. Emphasis original.
375 Cf. Todd May, Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze (University Park, Penn.: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 96: “Writing, if it is more than mere scratches on a page, 
must convey a meaning that is a product of the code—the social system of signification—from which 
that writing draws its significative resources. That meaning is independent of the communicative 
intention of the person doing the writing in this specific sense: the writing has a meaning, a socially 
accepted signification, regardless of what the person who did the writing wants that writing to mean.”
376 Mark Alfino, “Another Look at the Derrida-Searle Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (1991) 143–152, at 
146 defines iterability as “the necessary possibility that any meaningful item of language will remain 
meaningful (though not necessarily possess the same meaning) through its repetition across contexts.”
377 Jacques Derrida, “Limited Inc a b c…,” in Limited Inc (trans. Samuel Weber; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988) 29–110, at 62.
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Taking into consideration both the (implied) author’s intention and their action as it 
pertains to their (implied) audience, as noted by Jeandillou above, does, however, offer a 
practical solution to this problem. Consider textual critics as an audience for 
mystification (not necessarily an audience the mystificateur might have had in mind). 
Different audiences differ in their ideas of unambiguousness and degrees of clarity, such 
that an illegible plain-text solution to one audience could well be considered legible for 
another.378 An analogous example might be the allusion, a communicative textual device 
for which admissibility as evidence for the purposes of scholarly debate has been 
considered extensively. Christopher A. Beetham, for instance, observes that,
An author has failed in his use of allusion as a literary device if the audience does 
not catch the reference. … The allusion may be there, embedded in the text, even 
though the audience missed it.379
The crucial point here concerns the duty inherent in communicative attempts, including 
the mystifier’s own authoring of concealed indicators of authority. Suppose I place a large 
potato into my mouth before beginning to speak. My listeners might insist that the 
message I would have intended to deliver and did deliver per potato might “be there,” to 
quote Beetham, and perhaps they would be right. From their point of view, however, I 
might as well have intended to speak in nonsensical verse, as the communicative result 
would be the same. Likewise, a mystificateur who has failed to follow certain precautions 
will have voluntarily (if unwittingly) made their game of mystification unwinnable. That 
is, their message of authorship will consequently become irretrievable post hoc just as my 
speech in the above example will have become inscrutable post potato.
Two examples of such epic failure to communicate can be cited here. First, there are the 
cases where one of the constituents of concealed indicators of authority has become 
wholly inaccessible to the intended audience. One such example is the case of Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer’s Marbot: Eine Biographie (1981), which resembled the author’s earlier Mozart:  
Biographie (1977) in all but one detail: neither Andrew Marbot (1801–1830) nor any of his 
family relatives were real people.380 Apart from this single unexpected detail, all the 
378 Consider how Poe explicated this notion through the character of Mr. William Legrand in his short 
story “The Gold Bug”: “This [cipher] was of a simple species—such, however, as would appear, to the 
crude intellect of the sailor, absolutely insoluble without the key”; Edgar Allan Poe, “The Gold Bug,” in 
Tales of Mystery and Imagination (Mineola, N.Y.: Calla Editions, 2008) 291-325, at 317. Cf. Edmunds, 
“Theognis,” 34 on the author’s mystificatory tactics: “The strategy consists in composing poetry for the 
agathoi, in a manner that only they can understand and only if they possess a sophia corresponding to 
the poet’s.”
379 Beetham, Echoes, 12.
380 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Marbot: Eine Biographie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981); Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 
109
features of a proper historical biography were present: among other details, 
reproductions of paintings allegedly portraying the Marbot family members and an index 
of historical characters. Given that the Marbot family is fictional, Hildesheimer in fact 
omits them from this index, and simply uses artworks as if they depicted family portraits
—for example, Sir Henry Raeburn’s Lieut-Colonel Bryce McMurdo (ca. 1800–1810) is labelled 
in the book “Sir Francis Marbot”.381 These details function as wonderful clues signalling for 
the reader to demystify and uncover the fictional nature of Marbot, prompting the reader 
to snap out of their inattention by recognizing the mislabelled paintings and identifying 
the fictional status of Andrew Marbot by noting, among other things, the absence of the 
Marbot family from the index of historical characters. This is at least the case in 
Hildesheimer’s German original, but the French translation of Marbot inexplicably adds 
the Marbot family members to the index.382 As Abramson notes, “Since the index of names 
is an authenticating device for the novel, and the omission of the false names a clue as to 
the mystification, this appears to be an error on the part of the translator.”383 This error—
i.e., removing an unambiguous authorial detail—leads to a rather catastrophic failure in 
Hildesheimer’s communicative attempts, for the inferences drawn solely from the 
mislabelled portraits are necessarily less unique without the enciphered message itself—
that Andrew Marbot (as marked by his absence from the index of historical characters) is 
a fictional character.384
Second, some concealed indicators of authority are so vague and ambiguous in all three 
constituent parts that it is impossible for the decipherer to succeed in demystifying them. 
A prime example of such a failure to communicate is the curious case of Ern Malley, a 
fictitious poet invented as a vehicle for mocking the Australian modernist movement in 
the 1940s, concocted by James McAuley and Harold Stewart.385 One of their deliberate 
Mozart: Biographie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977).
381 Ulrich Weisstein, “Wolfgang Hildesheimer’s Marbot: Fictional Biography and Treatise on Comparative 
Literature,” Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature 32 (1983) 23–38, at 36–37 n. 11.
382 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Sir Andrew Marbot (trans. Martin Kaltenecker; Paris: J.-C. Lattès, 1984).
383 Abramson, Learning from Lying, 174 n. 9. Abramson credits Jean-Marie Schaeffer, “Loup, si on jouait au 
loup? (Feinte, simulacre et art),” Autrement dire 6 (1989) 111–123, at 118 n. 10.
384 The primer, decipherment, and plain-text solution are presented here in a simplified manner; there is 
more to the portrayal of Andrew Marbot in Marbot that could legitimately be described equally as 
belonging to the various primers, ways of deciphering, and resulting plain-text solutions. My 
presentation here is only the most unambiguous manner of arriving at the conclusion that 
Hildesheimer, as Dorrit Cohn noted, “evidently intended [Marbot] to be recognized and admired for 
what it is: a masterful disguise”; Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2000) 79. Emphasis original.
385 For a comprehensive analysis, see the standard study of the so-called Ern Malley Affair by Michael 
Heyward, The Ern Malley Affair (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), which also reprints the complete poems 
of Ern Malley.
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“clues” to the non-existence of Ern Malley was concealed in a letter of (the equally 
fictitious) Ethel Malley, the sister of the recently deceased fictional poet, who wrote “that 
his death was due to Graves’ disease. If he had only taken better care of himself it need 
not have been fatal.”386
According to Stewart, “nobody dies of [that] disease. Wouldn’t you have thought that 
would have alerted them?”387 The problem with this primer, however, lies in the 
ambiguity of the original formulation of Ethel Malley, which does not claim that his 
brother died of Graves’ disease, but due to it, the latter having been attested in at least 
since the seventeenth century to mean “attributable to a particular cause or origin; 
derived or arising from; caused by, consequent on; as a result of.”388 Such consideration 
might appear to be splitting hairs, but a more direct causal link implied by the 
construction “die of” would have been preferable, because the death of Ern Malley now 
follows from his rejection to take “better care of himself”. That is, there is no 
disagreement between Stewart’s statement that “nobody dies of [Graves’] disease” and 
Ethel Malley’s words that his brother would still be alive, “If he had only taken better care 
of himself.” Furthermore, the ambiguity of this phrase must be read in the context of the 
letter itself—namely, that Ethel Malley is not a medical expert, nor does the letter 
purport to be an epicrisis chronicling the exact cause of death of the patient. Thus, there 
are several good reasons why dying “due to Graves’ disease” might not alert the critic as 
McAuley and Stewart had intended, since, in its context, Ethel Malley’s statement cannot 
be construed as unambiguous to a degree that would effectively snap the reader out of 
their inattention and thus to actively pursue other clues embedded within the poems 
themselves. This once again exhibits the unavoidable circular nature of deciphering a 
mystification and the importance of constructing them in the proper manner—i.e., not to 
design them so that they are unwinnable by design.
While many critics have claimed that the poems of Ern Malley are “full of clues to the 
status of its alleged author … as an imposter,”389 each one of these is nevertheless 
ambiguous to a degree that stymies the reader from deciphering the intended message. 
386 This citation from Ethel Malley’s letter was first published in Max Harris, “Introduction,” Angry 
Penguins 7 (1944) 2–6, at 2, a literary journal edited by Harris and to which the poems of Ern Malley were 
initially submitted for publication.
387 Quoted by Heyward, Ern Malley, 107.
388 Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “due, adj. and adv.”
389 Judith Ryan, “After the ‘Death of the Author’: The Fabrication of Helen Demidenko,” in Cultures of 
Forgery: Making Nations, Making Selves (ed. Judith Ryan and Alfred Thomas; New York: Routledge, 2003) 
169–198, at 178.
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As Ruthven observes,
You need either to know or at least suspect that “Ern Malley” never existed before 
you can recover “evidence” of that fact from the texts of his poems. Only then 
will they appear to bristle with clues … “Our serious frolic” will suddenly seem as 
revelatory a phrase as Ireland’s “solemn mock’ry,” and what looked like a mere 
Dylan Thomas-ism (“this No-Man’s-language”) will be read as a blindingly 
obvious clue when linked to the statement elsewhere in these poems “that a poet 
may not exist”. Not until you know that two people fabricated them will you 
experience “confirmation” of that fact in the phrase, “we are as the double almond 
concealed in one shell”.390
That is, more succinctly, “in matters of interpretation, no ‘fact’ pre-exists the hypothesis 
that constructs it as such, and no ‘clue’ precedes a suspicion.”391 The onus is again on the 
perpetrator of mystification to ensure that the message they intend to communicate 
remains, at least in principle, retrievable post hoc. In other words, given that at least 25 
characters are needed for a message in a monoalphabetic substitution cipher in English 
language to be decipherable in practice, composing any message with fewer characters 
than this bare minimum would be a fool’s work. Likewise, and given that anagrams of 
more than four characters almost never contain unique solutions, this particular literary 
device is always a poor choice for such a manner of communication.
To be unambiguous to a high degree is far from being an insurmountable obstacle for the 
mystificateur.392 That is, there are limits to the medium (of physical manuscripts and 
artefacts) to mediate between whatever events there were in the past and whatever 
academic historians end up writing about them. Without actively challenging the 
inattentional blindness of the intended audience, on one hand, and controlling for 
cryptanalytic hyperactivity and question-begging, on the other, while also ensuring that 
decipherment leads to a unique solution pertinent to the intended revelation, there will be 
difficulties in persuading the audience of the relevance of such a revelation, especially a 
skeptical audience, as academic historians are ideally meant to be.
To return to the topic of unambiguity of plain-text solutions, a concealed indicator of 
authority must not falter at the end but maintain a high degree of accuracy in its 
identification of a particular individual as its author. That is, even if its (literary) primer 
and technique of decipherment are unambiguous to a high degree, the plain-text solution 
390 Ruthven, Faking Literature, 176.
391 Ruthven, Faking Literature, 176.
392 As noted in Paananen, WWFD,” 4 n. 13, referring to Ruthven, Faking Literature, 177, there is a “complete 
lack, as Ruthven notes, of ‘interest in identifying criteria for evaluating spurious texts’ for their literary 
qualities, even when ‘it is widely acknowledged that some are better than others.’”
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itself must also be pertinent to whatever it was designed to indicate. Suppose, for 
instance, that Pope Francis really did embed his title (papa) to a sentence in section 3.1 of 
this dissertation: how would scholars establish that identity, since the title itself is 
common not only to Pope Francis, but also to his predecessors and successors? Scholars 
might, perhaps, begin by trying to locate the origin of this document, cross-referencing 
its production with other details known about its author, studying the file metadata of its 
various versions, etc. Should they fail, the plain-text solution itself would not offer the 
kind of unambiguity that would enable them to pick Francis over Benedict XVI.393 
Whatever decisions we might make on philosophical grounds over the notions of 
meaning or clarity, the message of the will to communicate is delivered “happily” only 
when both the sender and the receiver are able to agree that the same message was 
communicated.
Given these considerations, I present the rationale for the third criterion:
Rationale: From the perspective of fakes (mystification) as a communicative genre, it is 
crucial that the plain-text solution of a concealed indicator of authority is unambiguous 
to a high degree to ascribe the authorship confidently to a specific party.
3.1.4 Tripartite Criteria for Concealed Indicators of Authority in Action
Mystification is a delicate game. Genuine mystifications might fail to attract the attention 
they were designed for, while “hyperactivity” might transform a genuine work into a 
fantastic mystification. The tripartite criteria outlined in subsections 3.1.1–3.1.3 aim to 
provide a coherent framework for to analyse and evaluate concealed indicators of 
authority, a key convention in the genre of mystification.394 One question that remains, 
however, is the applicability of these criteria.
393 They would, however, argue the matter on numerous other counts; Pope Benedict XVI would be 
considered a less likely candidate by pointing, e.g., to the words of Greg Burke, senior communications 
adviser of the Vatican in 2012–2015, that “The pope [Benedict XVI] is not the kind of person like the 
rest of us who in a meeting or a lunch is looking at their BlackBerrys to see if any messages have come 
in,” as reported by The New York Times on December 4, 2012.
394 For the opposite exercise—to apply these criteria as a roadmap for creating one’s own concealed 
indicators of authority—I would suggest Jeandillou, Esthétique as an indispensable companion for such 
pursuits.
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Table 10: Criteria for the Admissibility of Concealed Indicators of Authority
Criterion #1: for admissible concealment of indicators of authority
The beginning of the act of decipherment of a concealed indicator of authority must be 
preceded by a literary primer that is unambiguous to a high degree.
Rationale: A concealed indicator of authority is often signalled by a literary primer, even in 
cases of little theoretical sophistication, to combat inattentional blindness on the part of the 
implied reader, and must be treated as a distinct concept that is unambiguous to a high 
degree for two further reasons: to mitigate the problems of cryptanalytic hyperactivity and 
begging the question on the part of the scholar.
Criterion #2: for admissible authority of concealed indicators
Following the prompting of the literary primer, the act of deciphering a concealed indicator 
of authority must follow a technique or method that is unambiguous to a high degree.
Rationale: A plausible technique of decipherment must be identifiable to guarantee the 
uniqueness of the solution—i.e., the decipherer should be able to arrive from a literary 
primer to the supposed plain-text solution via a defined technique. Consequently, the 
requirement that the method of decipherment be unambiguous to a high degree further 
mitigates the problems of cryptanalytic hyperactivity and question-begging.
Criterion #3: for admissible indication of concealed authority
Following the prompting of the literary primer and the process of decipherment, both of 
which must have been unambiguous to a high degree, the plain-text solution to the 
concealed indicator of authority must likewise be unambiguous to a high degree.
Rationale: From the perspective of fakes (mystification) as a communicative genre, it is 
crucial that the plain-text solution of a concealed indicator of authority is unambiguous to a 
high degree to ascribe the authorship confidently to a specific party.
3.1.4.1 General Application:
The question here concerns the elements of concealed indicators of authority themselves: 
how is one to recognize (i.e., make a valid interpretation of) primers or techniques of 
decipherment—or any other detail—about texts in the first place? This last question 
reiterates the perennial question of hermeneutics—about understanding and interpreting 
texts, whether textual, visual, or otherwise accessible to the senses. As discussed in 
subsection 2.5.2, above, I maintain that a demarcation should made between what we 
have and what we justify to our peers (based on what we have). Especially the 
justificatory criteria scholars apply to reach their conclusions are of prime importance, as 
they are often used implicitly, though they should be laid out explicitly. As David B. 
Resnik has observed, demarcations—even the grand demarcation between science and 
pseudoscience, but until recently thought of as an unanswerable conundrum395—are 
395 Esp. Larry Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” in Psychics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: 
Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum (ed. R. S. Cohen and L. Laudan; Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
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admissible so long as such decisions are “made with an eye toward promoting our 
practical goals and concerns.”396 To make a distinction, then, between textual details such 
as concealed indicators of authority and jokes, a pragmatic division (as discussed in 
2.5.1.2, above) can be made according to pertinence. That is to say, pertinence is a virtue 
of a clever, amusing concealed indicator of authority, the lack of which makes such an 
example merely a clever, amusing joke.397 The virtue of pertinence is a useful demarcation 
marker to distinguish textual devices that are admissible as evidence of authorship (since 
they pertain to a particular individual) from textual devices that are not.
If pertinence is a necessary virtue of a concealed indicator of authority, how should one 
then account pragmatically for the recognition of primers or of techniques of 
decipherment from a text—or, indeed, for the recognition of any kind of textual feature? 
As the scope of such a consideration is much wider than simply distinguishing between 
individual textual features such as concealed indicators of authority and jokes, the 
answer to this question might end up being too broad—i.e., unable to demarcate between 
the acceptability of one notion or another due to being too abstract. Nevertheless, I 
suggest here the notion of consistency as a useful line of demarcation, especially in 
matters related to suspected features of forgery.
Of all the scholarly virtues one would have classically assigned to academic history 
writing—for instance, impartiality (objectivity), evaluation of the quality of sources 
(source criticism), coherence of the emerging historical narrative (consistency), 
intellectual honesty according to the principle of charity when interpreting historical 
sources (historicism / contextualism)—the only one to survive decades of well-justified 
criticism in the philosophy of history is the notion of consistency. Here, consistency 
refers less to the classical sense of the virtue as it relates to historiography (wherein the 
coherence of the narrative itself is a trivial necessity) but to the practices ingrained in 
Science 76; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983) 111–127, at 125: “What makes a belief well founded (or 
heuristically fertile)? And what makes a belief scientific? The first set of questions is philosophically 
interesting and possibly even tractable; the second question is both uninteresting and, judging by its 
checkered past, intractable.” Emphasis mine.
396 David B. Resnik, “A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem,” Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science 31 (2000) 249–267, at 264.
397 The framing of the desired epistemic qualities as virtues can be traced back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics. My use of the word virtue here should not, however, be confused with the contemporary “virtue 
epistemology,” for which see Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 
(1980) 3–25. The pragmatic approach to virtue as a quality of demarcations themselves and not of the 
individual intellects making these demarcations is more attuned to the philosophies of history of 
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Keith 
Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London: Routledge, 1991).
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historiography, including the application of criteria to justify one’s historical arguments.
The importance of the virtue of consistency is easiest to explain through a historical 
example. Towards the end of the twentieth century, Religious Studies was still often 
practiced “under pressure from a hidden (although invariably unconscious) theological 
agenda.”398 This agenda manifested itself, e.g., in the study of Christian Origins in the 
tendency to read the Christian New Testament as a coherent whole, even up to the point 
of manufacturing various coherent syntheses of its contents under the label “New 
Testament theology”.399 The problems with this approach are manifold—for instance, the 
arbitrary decision to adopt a particular historical framework like that of the canons of the 
Christian New Testament as a limiting factor after one has described (and thus put a limit 
to) the diversity of early Christianity following the same arbitrary framework—a 
methodological move that could be justified, e.g., if writing to an audience of a faith 
community that accepts this same framework, but one that is harder to justify in the 
practice of academic history writing as a whole. One solution I borrow here from Heikki 
Räisänen for the control of such a “hidden … theological agenda” is the study of early 
Christianity from a conscious “history-of-religions point of view”. Such an approach 
would be descriptive rather than confessional (i.e., early Christian ideas would have to be 
studied “as human constructs” using “methods similar to those that [we] would apply to 
any other texts”)—in short, an exercise in “fair play”.400
Such “fair play” would require, among other things, the control of one’s application of 
methodology according to consistency—refusing to allow double standards to operate in 
the discipline. The virtue of consistency as a regulative force is to control the arbitrariness of 
criteria. That is, between the physical artefact itself and whatever conclusions happen to 
be drawn, remaining consistent ensures that the criteria facilitates scholarly discussion 
about both the conclusions and the criteria themselves. Such an outcome is ensured by 
requiring that only those criteria are applied that we are willing to live with. That is, the 
criteria themselves are acknowledged to be necessarily arbitrary choices that aim to fulfil 
practical goals—in the case of academic historians, this most often means persuading 
398 Donald Wiebe, “The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion,” Studies in Religion / Sciences 
Religieuses 13 (1984) 401–422, at 402.
399 Heikki Räisänen, Beyond New Testament Theology: A Story and a Programme (2nd edition; London: SCM Press, 
2000) 126–133. In the words of Frank Matera, New Testament Theology: Exploring Diversity and Unity 
(Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007) 423, “The unity of the New Testament is a 
presupposition of faith.” Matera’s treatise is an excellent, sympathetic take on the history and future of 
writing such “New Testament theologies”.
400 Heikki Räisänen, The Rise of Christian Beliefs: The Thought World of Early Christians (Minneapolis, Minn.: 
Fortress Press, 2010) xvii, 3.
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their colleagues, since the community of academic historians is the ultimate arbiter of the 
end results.401 This communal dimension of academic study is beautifully described by 
Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Massimo Pigliucci in their evolutionary description 
of science:
The scientific worldview is a product of collective, cultural design. In some cases, 
single individuals take great leaps forward, but even their achievements would not 
have been possible without the collective work of their predecessors. Even 
geniuses need the shoulders of other giants to stand on. Moreover, brilliant ideas 
need skillful defenders and promoters to win over the scientific community. As 
much as many scientists work in relative isolation, sooner or later they need to 
face the severe “selection” routines of their fellow experts.402
The requirement for consistency in the application of the criteria ensures (together with 
the guild as arbiter) that academic history writing is not an “anything goes” affair. In 
practical terms, such demands about textual features such as concealed indicators of 
authority serve effectively as controls on the questions academic historians choose to 
debate. Criteria that are too loose in their admission of alleged concealed indicators of 
authority into the conversations about authorship could result, for example, in most of 
the 80 candidates for the authorship of the Shakespearean corpus in becoming admissible 
into serious academic consideration. If this is an end result we are not willing to live with, 
the criteria of admissible evidence for authorship must be made stricter. Whatever the 
criteria themselves, the one regulatory test that must always be performed is that of 
consistency—no special pleading should be allowed, and no historical source excused 
from the common application of the criteria, notwithstanding their arbitrariness.
401 Cf. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Philosophical Papers 1; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) 42: “When we suggest that one of the few things we know (or need to know) 
about truth is that it is what wins in a free and open encounter, we are told that we have defined ‘truth’ 
as ‘satisfies the standards of our community.’ But we pragmatists do not hold this relativist view. We do 
not infer from ‘there is no way to step outside communities to a neutral standpoint’ that ‘there is no 
rational way to justify liberal communities over totalitarian communities.’ For that inference involves 
just the notion of ‘rationality’ as a set of ahistorical principles which pragmatists abjure. What we in 
fact infer is that there is no way to beat totalitarians in argument by appealing to shared common 
premises, and no point in pretending that a common human nature makes the totalitarians 
unconsciously hold such premises.”
402 Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Massimo Pigliucci, “What Makes Weird Beliefs Thrive? The 
Epidemiology of Pseudoscience,” Philosophical Psychology 28 (2015) 1177–1198, at 1180.
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3.1.4.2 Specific Application:
McEwan’s Anagram
McEwan’s anagram has been used extensively above, as it functions as an unambiguous 
contemporary example of a concealed indicator of authority. A breakdown according to 
the tripartite criteria outlined above might look like this:
Table 11: McEwan’s Anagram
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
Non-existence of the alleged 
journal of publication / non-
existence of the alleged 
authors
Anagram:
“Wenn (and) Camia”
“Ian McEwan”
McEwan’s anagram passes at least two of the suggested three criteria of unambiguity with 
ease: there is an unambiguous primer and an unambiguous technique of decipherment. 
The fact that its plain-text solution is not unique is unfortunate, being a function 
inherent in the cryptographic properties of anagrams, but, as discussed at length in sub-
subsection 3.1.2.1, there are at least four reasons nevertheless to accept “Ian McEwan” as 
the correct solution and treat the case of authorship as settled.
Morton’s Anagram
On the other hand, the one alleged anagram (almost a cryptic crossword) in the 
alternative narrative breaks down as follows:
Table 12: Morton’s Anagram
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
The reference to “salt” 
(Theod. I.13–15) is 
supposedly a technological 
anachronism, and the word 
λαςἅ  (salt) is followed by the 
word μωραίνω (pass, of salt, 
lose its savour)
Anagram (cryptic 
crossword):
μωρανθ ναιῆ
→ μωρ[αν]θ ν[αι]ῆ
(transliteration:
m  r [a n] th ē n [a i])оо
“Morton”
The primer in McEwan’s anagram is straightforward to verify, unlike the above primer 
that, first of all, requires extensive knowledge of foodstuff in the ancient world to assess. 
This convolution does not in itself disqualify the primer, however, as the intended 
audience of this particular concealed indicator of authority would have been Smith’s 
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colleagues, who would have been cognizant of such matters (or might otherwise have 
known how to investigate further on this detail). More difficult for the supposed 
technological anachronism is that, as argued cogently by Brown, it requires a misreading 
of the Greek sentence in Theod. as an analogy that its syntax does not allow. Among other 
problems, the conclusion—i.e., that mixing salt with a substance that would result in it 
losing its savour requires an anti-caking agent that was invented by Morton Salt Company
—is simply wrong, as salt in the ancient world could not only lose its savour due to 
impurities403 but could also be mixed with other substances with the help of ancient 
technology: mortar and pestle.404 The additional step of the primer (i.e., that of noting 
another word that follows the (alleged) keyword) would then otherwise be more 
acceptable, given that the meaning of the second word would then be reasonably 
connected to the first—but the first word does not imply an anachronism as presented 
within the alternative narrative.405
Another take on the primer is to imagine that Smith simply made a poor job when 
composing it. Yet entertaining such possibility is to summon the historicist notion 
discussed in subsection 2.5.2 and section 3.1: no matter the historical scenarios we are 
able to conceive, the key difference between the scholarly and the pseudoscholarly lies in 
one’s ability to distinguish those that can be asserted post hoc from the material reality 
they have been embedded in with reference to some sort of rigorous methodological 
framework from those that cannot be. In other words, to borrow the historical realist 
perspective of Ephim G. Fogel, sometimes such things “must be rejected as unreal 
mockeries even, paradoxically, when they are genuine.”406
If the primer above is problematic, the decipherment is worse still. The Greek word that 
is suggested to divulge the name “Morton” contains ten letters, while the plain-text 
solution proposed contains only six. Discarding four of the letters is peculiar enough but 
inexplicable decisions must further be made in transliterating the Greek. In Classical 
403 See, e.g., Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 310: “The imagery in [Theod.] presupposes an impure form 
of salt that can lose its sodium chloride without the compound disappearing altogether. Many of the 
salts used in antiquity were of this sort. As Pliny noted, the salt in these impure compounds was 
occasionally dissolved away by water, leaving ‘salt’ that lacked its distinctive savor.”
404 Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 306–311.
405 Alternatively, the primer for this cryptic crossword (viz., Morton) has been argued to be its spatial 
proximity to another concealed indicator of authority—one that uses etymological explanation as its 
method of decipherment—which would require that the acceptability of the latter for authorial 
evidence would be established first.
406 Ephim G. Fogel, “Salmons in Both, or Some Caveats for Canonical Scholars,” in Evidence of Authorship: 
Essays on Problems of Attribution (ed. David V. Erdman and Ephim G. Vogel; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1966) 69–101, at 101.
119
Greek, omega <ω> should stand for a long  /ɔ/ (as opposed to omicron <ο>, which stands 
for a short /o/), but this is perhaps an acceptable variation given that the Latin alphabet 
does not make such a distinction, so that both omega and omicron can be transliterated as 
<o>. On the other hand, theta <θ> is more usually transliterated <th>, given that 
unaspirated /t/ sound corresponds rather with tau <τ>, which likewise more closely 
corresponds with the pronunciation of the letter t in “Morton”. Nevertheless, the 
decision to transliterate eta <η> with <o> cannot be justified in any manner I can imagine, 
as in none of the archaic Greek alphabets nor in any of the Greek dialects does this letter
—which is sometimes used to represent a vowel, sometimes a consonant, and in some 
occasions both a vowel and a consonant—stand for a sound that would correspond to the 
second syllable of “Morton”.407 This is a long way to say what should be obvious by 
looking at the transformation from μωρανθ ναιῆ  to “Morton”—i.e., that it plays loosely 
with the idea of deciphering the former and arriving upon the plain-text solution 
represented in the latter that it is indistinguishable from nonsense (as established in 
2.5.3.2, above). Due to its ambiguity, this concealed indicator of authority is inadmissible 
as evidence of authorship.
Other candidates within the alternative narrative fare equally poorly. I will present each 
of the five remaining cases with a brief commentary on their ambiguities.
Morton Salt Association
Table 13: Morton Salt Association
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
Reference to “salt” (Theod. 
I.13–15) is allegedly
a) unlike Clement,
b) a technological 
anachronism
Association of a supposed 
technological anachronism to 
the twentieth-century 
provider of the technology: 
“Morton Salt Company”
“Morton”
Apart from the supposed technological anachronism discussed above, this candidate 
includes an adjacent primer—viz., the metaphoric use of salt found in Theod. being at odds 
with undisputed works of Clement of Alexandria. Unfortunately, this argument derives 
from an erroneous translation of the Greek text, from Clement’s Stromateis (1.8.41.3–4), 
which was used as a standard of comparison for the metaphoric use of salt. Namely, a 
407 Roger D. Woodard, The Textualization of the Greek Alphabet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
36–46.
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crucial omission of the Greek negation οὐ transforms the meaning of Clement’s sentence 
to its opposite, as Brown has explained.408 Thus, without an acceptable primer, given the 
non-existence of the supposed technological anachronism used to construct the 
associative link between the American food company Morton Salt and the text of Theod., 
there is little to commend this particular attempt: only the final step from “Morton Salt 
Company” to “Morton” could be considered unambiguous to an acceptable degree.
Smith’s Etymology
Table 14: Smith’s Etymology
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
The reference to “salt” 
(Theod. I.13–15) is 
supposedly a technological 
anachronism, and the word 
παραχαράσσω (falsify) 
used in the passage carries 
different layers of meaning, 
also in translation
Etymological explanation:
παραχαράσσω
→ to forge
→ to smith
“Smith”
Once again, this candidate is built upon the alleged technological anachronism discussed 
above. Compared to the ambiguous Morton’s anagram (or cryptic crossword), that the 
Greek word for falsifying occurs in the same passage is much weaker than the observed 
connection between “salt” and the notion of “salt losing its savour”. Furthermore, 
etymological explanation as a technique of decipherment can be easily abused, as 
discussed in sub-subsection 2.5.3.2, above. There, James reasons from French “corbeau” 
(referring to a corbel above the entrance to the Church of Saint Mary Magdalene in 
Rennes-le-Château, France) through its Latin inscription “Terribilis,” via a number of 
etymological explanations and translations between French and Latin, that “corbeau,” in 
reality, “means” (to borrow James’s own terminology) something completely different 
(viz., “au Berço”). Curiously, such argumentative practices using loosely associated 
inferences were standard in pre-modern etymological studies, which aimed at uncovering 
the true nature or meaning of words. As Robert A. Hall, Jr. explains:
The idea of a natural association of word and meaning dominated most 
etymological speculation in ancient times, so that philosophers hoped thereby to 
obtain an insight into the true (etymos) origin of things … This type of etymology 
(often called Platonic from Plato’s use of the procedure in his Cratylus) led to 
408 Brown, “Letter to Theodore,” 568–569. Note that the above mistranslation is only the most 
straightforward of the many problems with this supposed anachronism.
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fanciful results, being based upon a wholly non-comparative, non-historical, and 
subjective view of one’s own language alone, with no guiding concept of 
historical development, especially in phonetics.409
To start with the Greek word παραχαράσσω and infer—following Latin fabricare, then 
French forger—that the English word “forge” is worked by the “forger” as well as the 
“smith” which also happens to be the surname of Morton Smith, is a rather extreme 
example of such a tendency, and, given the non-existent primer for the Greek word in 
question, a prime example of the “cryptanalytic hyperactivity” discussed in sub-
subsection 3.1.1.2, above. That the technique of etymological explanations through loose 
association between words and concepts, along with the anagrammatic readings, is 
prominent among pseudoscholarly treatises is again explained by their potential to 
supply desired answers to questions that are, themselves, legitimate. That is, it is 
perfectly within reason to question whether Smith concealed an indicator of authority 
somewhere in the text of Theod. or its paratextual material. It is not, however, within 
reason to assert a concealed indicator of authority without a valid primer, especially 
when decipherment must be made through a loosely constructed chain of inferences 
between a matrix of meanings involving various words of various languages.
This following of associative whims to a self-fulfilling conclusion is wonderfully captured 
in the literary exemplar of Poe’s ur-detective C. Auguste Dupin, who is portrayed to be 
able to observe his companion’s train of thought with inhuman precision: from his street 
encounter with a fruiterer, he then considers the street’s cobblestones, which leads him 
to think about Stereotomy, then Epicurus, then Dr. Nichols, then the Orion constellation, 
finally to land on the actor Chantilly—at which point Dupin comments on the diminutive 
stature of the actor, echoing his companion’s opinion that Chantilly would be unsuitable 
to play Crebillon’s Xerxes.410 This notion is further encapsulated as a proverb of sorts—
uttered by Casaubon in Umberto Eco’s novel Il Pendolo di Foucault (1988)—that “Le 
connessioni ci sono sempre, basta volerle trovare” (there are always connections, one 
only has to will to find them).411 Such attitudes are nevertheless equally frequent in non-
409 Robert A. Hall, Jr., “Etymology,” in Dictionary of World Literature: Criticism, Forms, Technique (ed. Joseph T. 
Shipley; New York: Philosophical Library, 1943) 221–222, at 221.
410 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” in Tales of Mystery and Imagination (Mineola, N.Y.: 
Calla Editions, 2008) 177–209, at 181–184.
411 Umberto Eco, Il Pendolo di Foucault (Milan: Bompiani, 1988) 180. Neither Poe nor Eco intended to 
encourage such attitudes. As Gary Richard Thompson observes, Poe’s detective exemplifies irony in 
“the discrepancy between appearance and actuality; and the ease of Dupin’s solutions contrasts with 
our mystification, as in the extravagant train of association in ‘Murders in The Rue Morgue’ whereby 
Dupin guesses what his friend is thinking, or as in the absurdly simple irony in ‘The Purloined Letter’ of 
hiding an object in plain sight where no one would think of looking for it”; Gary R. Thompson, Poe’s 
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fictional (though not necessarily scholarly) literature. Through association, one leaps 
from Jesus of Nazareth, through his early Christian symbol of the fish, to another mystical 
sea beast of Neptune (bestea Neptuni Quinotauri similis), one of the legendary procreators of 
the Merovingian dynasty, to conclude that the Frankish monarchs were descendants of 
the Jewish house of David (through Jesus himself!).412 Likewise, one could travel from the 
blood-covered head on a platter in the (probably) thirteenth-century Peredur fab Efrawg, 
through the severed heads of Celtic traditions, to the severed heads of Greek myths, 
including the prophesying head of Orpheus, forwards to the Jean Cocteau film Orphée 
(1950), to the figure depicted in the Shroud of Turin, in which the fold line across the 
figure’s neck is argued to be due to decapitation, and conclude that Leonardo da Vinci 
was the manufacturer of the shroud, as he was depicted in a nineteenth-century poster as 
Keeper of the Grail (before jumping back to the grail quest of Peredur).413 Similarly, from 
Gabriel Harvey’s 1578 address to Edward de Vere—in its original Latin, vultus tela vibrat 
(your countenance shakes spears)—to then assert that an Elizabethan pun on the word 
vultus (face, countenance) was intended to be read vultis (second person plural present 
indicative active of volo, “wish, mean”), translating this verb as “you will” meaning “You, 
Will[iam],” then coupling “Will[iam]” together with “Shakes” and “Spear(s),” to then pick 
up another reference from a late sixteenth-century play Arden of Faversham of uncertain 
authorship, whence the evil murderers Black Will and Shakebag are connected through 
the former having once committed robbery at Gads Hill, a location which also features a 
robbery in Shakespeare’s Henry IV and in The Famous Victories of Henry V, another 
Elizabethan play of uncertain authorship, to finally conclude that “Will[iam] 
Shakespeare” was in fact a pseudonym of Edward de Vere, the seventeenth Earl of 
Oxford.414
Associative arguments are fascinating to read, but they lack in persuasiveness due to lack 
of control, leading too often to implausible and fanciful conclusions.
Fiction: Romantic Irony in the Gothic Tales (Madison, Wis.; University of Wisconsin Press, 1973) 174–175. 
For their part, Eco’s main characters are done for by the end precisely because they adopt such a “will 
to connect” to a tragicomic degree.
412 Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh, and Henry Lincoln, Holy Blood, Holy Grail (New York: Dell, 1983) 235, 314, 
387.
413 Lynn Picknett and Clive Prince, The Templar Revelation: Secret Guardians of the True Identity of Christ (New 
York: Touchstone, 1998) 358.
414 Richard Malim, The Earl of Oxford and the Making of “Shakespeare”: The Literary Life of Edward de Vere in 
Context (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2012) 34, 77–78, 87.
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Goldsmith’s Ellipsis
Table 15: Goldsmith’s Ellipsis
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
Smith’s assertion in his 
commentary on Theod. I.13–
15 that Matt 5:13 alludes to 
Jer 10:14 LXX (Smith, 
Clement of Alexandria, 18–
19), is supposedly faulty
Reading the words omitted 
from a direct quotation (of 
Jer 10:14 LXX):
κατ σχύνθη π ς ῃ ᾶ
χρυσοχόος π  τ ν ἀ ὸ ῶ
γλυπτ ν α τοῶ ὐ ῦ
“goldsmith”
→ Smith
In previous section, I may have been overly generous in accrediting the proposed plain-
text solutions of the concealed indicators of authority in the alternative narrative. 
Regarding the example here, however, I can ascertain with ease that even the simple 
translation of the Greek word χρυσοχόος as “goldsmith” does not function as an 
unambiguous post hoc establishment of authorship to Morton Smith.
In the primer, there is a theoretically exemplar candidate for cutting through the 
reader’s “inattentional blindness,” since Smith is argued to have proposed an indirect 
literary connection (allusion) on the basis of the English translation of the original Greek. 
This would have been a cardinal mistake for a historian and one that would be reasonably 
obvious upon closer examination by his peers. However, Smith does not anywhere 
establish this allusion on the basis of the English translation—such an inference was 
solely due to a critic’s failure to comprehend Smith’s argument—but on the basis of a 
verbal parallel (sc., μωραίνω) and the general notion in both passages of worthless things 
perishing.415
Thus, regardless of the validity of the proposed allusion, as a primer it is not 
unambiguous to a high degree, nor is the consideration of words omitted from the 
passage in Jeremiah unambiguous, as this assertion is based on loose associative 
reasoning. Specifically, one would have to proceed from Smith’s comment on how, “In 
III.183.23ff Clement identifies as ‘the salt of the earth’ those ‘more elect than the elect,’ 
‘who hide away … mysteries not to be uttered’,”416 link this to the previously discussed 
Morton Salt association that “signifies that this comment applies to himself—that [Smith] 
has hidden away a mystery not to be uttered” and end up with the conclusion that an 
415 Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 311–313.
416 Smith, Clement of Alexandria, 18–19. Smith refers here to Quis dives salvetur? 36 according to its placement 
in the third volume of Stählin’s four-volume critical edition of Clement; Clemens Alexandrinus.
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ellipsis in the citation must indicate a clue about authorship—based on the English 
translation “every goldsmith is confounded because of his graven images.”417 Compared 
to this chain of thought, where the previous assertion of concealed indicator of authority 
is argued to “signify” that another sentence should be interpreted as pertaining to the 
supposed author of the previous concealed indicator—specifically, that a word that is 
“not uttered” but is a “hidden … mystery” is to be discovered from an ellipsis—the final 
move from “goldsmith” to the plain-text solution of “Smith” seems comparatively 
feasible. I would argue, however, that this final step is the more problematic one in light 
of the criteria that the plain-text solution be unambiguous in its association with 
authorship.
Consider the logic of this concealed indicator of authority: a historian constructs an 
unambiguous primer by suggesting a literary connection based on his own language 
rather than the language of the historical documents themselves, enciphering the 
message (or, as in the case of steganography, merely hiding it) in an unambiguous 
manner in an ellipsis within a quotation and pointing towards the ellipsis in an 
unambiguous manner, only for the plain-text solution to suddenly introduce ambiguity 
by making the keyword translate to “goldsmith” instead of “smith”. In other words, if 
Smith wanted to prime his readers with an obvious, critical error—with his technique of 
encipherment remaining the same—why would he choose “goldsmith” rather than 
“smith” as the message enciphered? In the Septuagint (whence the quotation from 
Jeremiah is drawn), there are a number of words more suitable for such a use than 
, which exclusively means “goldsmith”.χρυσοχόος 418 Since the supposed primer has no 
inherent reason to cite Jeremiah instead of, say, Isaiah (where two instances of “smith” 
occur), the choice to refer to “goldsmith” introduces unnecessary ambiguity. Perhaps this 
ambiguity does not render this particular concealed indicator of authority irretrievable 
post hoc. However, combined with the non-existent primer and the highly ambiguous, 
associative journey needed to draw out the intended word from the ellipsis, this instance 
of supposed communication about authorship can hardly be argued to be unambiguous 
and is, consequently, inadmissible as evidence of authorship according to the criteria 
outlined above.
417 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 62–63.
418 Such words include χαλκεύς, “coppersmith” also used as a more general term for the “worker in metal” 
(Gen 4:2 LXX; Isa 41:7 LXX; Isa 54:16 LXX; Sir 38:29 LXX); τέκτων, sometimes (albeit rarely) used to refer 
to metal-workers (e.g., 1 Kgdms 13:19 LXX); συγκλείων, meaning precisely “smith” in 4 Kgdms 24:14 
LXX.
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Baldy Swindler’s Cryptonym
Table 16: Baldy Swindler’s Cryptonym
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
Handwriting supposed being 
the same as in another Mar 
Saban manuscript, which 
contains a supposedly 
fictional personal name
Association of the spelling of 
a name and personal 
characteristics to an 
etymological explanation:
Μ. Μαδιότης
→ M. “baldy swindler”
M. “baldy swindler”
→ Morton Smith
The above primer is invalid, given its construction from flawed data (as discussed in 
2.5.3.2, above); furthermore, a rigorous, scholarly methodology to connect a sample of 
only a handful of letters to another sample of handwriting does not exist.419 The non-
existence of the primer is thus a crucial omission, as without one there is nothing to 
control the critic’s “cryptanalytic hyperactivity” and, consequently, no basis for 
deliberating on the particular name of Μ. Μαδιότης (alternatively spelled Μαδεότας and 
Μοδέστος) instead of all the other handwritten personal names in the same manuscript, 
including (in their Anglicised forms) “Joseph,” “Dionysus,” “Anobos” (or “Jacob”), and 
others.420 Had the decision to concentrate on the name of “Madiotes” been justified, we 
would still be left with a highly ambiguous chain of inferences from “Madiotes” through 
the Greek verb μαδώ that arguably underlies the personal name, to the translation of M. 
the “baldy swindler,” and finally to adopt this pseudonym to Morton Smith. While a 
clever wordplay such as this could be acceptable, should it be framed by a strong primer 
and an equally strong plain-text solution, neither exists here. As Brown has noted, “The 
verb swindle implies defrauding people of their money, which … is not the objective of a 
hoax.”421 In other words, given the logic of the proposed concealed indicator of authority, 
to compose a pseudonym from a verb that does not even describe what the author is 
doing is to introduce further ambiguity to one’s act of mystification. Whether this 
discrepancy is due to sloppiness on the part of the author or is the result of a deliberate 
act or, for that matter, to there being no concealed indicator of authority here, ambiguity 
419 Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 293–298. Note the two corrections recorded in Pantuck and Brown, 
“Morton Smith as M. Madiotes,” 119–120 n. 32.
420 Pantuck and Brown, “Morton Smith as M. Madiotes,” 110–115, 122–123.
421 Brown, “Factualizing the Folklore,” 295 n. 15. Emphasis original. As described in section 1.2, above, 
there is considerable uncertainty regarding Smith’s motive for constructing a fake manuscript akin to 
the alternative narrative. That Smith did not try to benefit financially from the publications of Theod. 
means that swindle would have nothing to do with his actions even within the alternative narrative. Cf. 
Brown, “Question of Motive”.
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diminishes the admissibility of these concealed indicators. Here, since the non-existence 
of the primer already disqualifies this concealed indicator of authority as acceptable, such 
considerations about its decipherment and plain-text solution are intended only to be 
instructive.
Innuendo Sphragis
Table 17: Innuendo Sphragis
Primer Technique of decipherment Plain-text solution
Alleged anachronisms in 
Theod. portrayal of sexuality
Recognition of sexual 
innuendo
Sexual innuendo
→ Morton Smith’s literary 
sphragis
The final concealed indicator of authority from the alternative narrative to be considered 
is somewhat removed from the other examples discussed above. The line of reasoning is 
presented in at least three distinct forms, with some overlap, the crux of which is the 
recurring use of sexual innuendo as a literary technique that either is sufficient in itself 
for the purposes of identifying the author or constitutes a distinct literary sphragis that is 
pertinent to Smith in particular.422 It is argued first that the alleged sexual innuendo 
alludes to previous (pre-1958) works of Smith;423 second, that the thickness of the alleged 
sexual innuendo corresponds to the thickness of alleged sexual innuendo in both pre- and 
post-1958 works by Smith;424 third, that in alluding to Smith’s previous (pre-1958) works a 
“coupling” of these allusions forms a “linkage” creating Smith’s personal “seal of 
authenticity”.425
The problem here is manifest in its lack of consistency. The homoerotic renderings of the 
gospel extracts within Theod. are not the only interpretative options, scholars having 
described these passages, to quote Brown, “as benign” so “the fact that interpreters 
disagree on whether there are sexual overtones … shows that the evidence can be 
construed either way.”426 This ambiguity regarding the method of decipherment would 
422 For discussion of the use of sphragides in antiquity, see 2.5.1.2, above.
423 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 71–72; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81–89; Piovanelli, “Halfway between,” 164–165.
424 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 65–72; Jeffery, The Secret Gospel of Mark Unveiled, 93, 127–131, 209–211, 242.
425 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 71–72, 81. Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81–89 duplicates Carlson’s argument as a 
less robust, more general reference to Smith’s pre-1958 writings.
426 Brown, “Question of Motive,” 366–367; cf. Tony Burke, “Apocrypha and Forgeries: Lessons from the 
‘Lost Gospels’ of the Nineteenth Century,” in Fakes, Forgeries, and Fictions: Writing Ancient and Modern 
Christian Apocrypha (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2015 York University Christian Apocrypha 
Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade, 2017) 231–264, at 260: “To those who see homoeroticism in the text, 
[Theod.] betrays its twentieth-century composition; but perhaps in a few decades it will be more clear 
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not itself disqualify the proposed concealed indicator of authority, but similar problems 
plague the primer and the plain-text solution. The claim of historical anachronism—an 
observation that cannot be described adequately by historical explanantia—is highly 
ambiguous, since the community arbiter of academic historians is likewise divided here, 
as in the case of the alleged “telling anachronism” in “the uncanny resonance of [Theod.] 
with mid-twentieth-century notions of sexual identity and legal regimes” that follows the 
interpretation of a passage from the Gospel of Mark (14.51–52) in light of the gospel 
extracts within Theod.427 According to the same interpretative schema, other scholars 
have suggested that ancient notions of “sacred mysteries” are what underly these 
passages.428 That is not to say that scholarly consensus is a prerequisite for the criterion 
of consistency to be met, though (reasonable) unanimity would certainly be beneficial for 
the argument. On the contrary, the notion of “fair play” pertains foremost to the criteria 
themselves, such that the lack of scholarly consensus here is best understood as a 
consequence of the misapplication of these particular criteria rather than itself a reason 
for their dismissal. That is, if only Theod. merited the extensive readings of innuendo—if 
χείρ (hand) is a euphemism for penis only in Theod., when Jesus grasps (with his hand) a 
youngster by the hand, but not when Jesus and Judas dip their hands into a bowl in 
Matthew 26.23—such an argument is likely just an example of begging the question, as 
the reading of such innuendo would then presume a modern provenance for the text, in 
addition to a failure of the test of consistency.429 
that it is the perception of homoeroticism that is contemporary.”
427 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 71.
428 Marvin Meyer, “The Young Streaker in Secret and Canonical Mark,” in Ancient Gospel or Modern Forgery? 
The Secret Gospel of Mark in Debate (ed. Tony Burke; Proceedings from the 2011 York University 
Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2013) 145–156, at 151. For further 
endeavours to locate a plausible ancient context for Theod., see Brown, Mark’s Other Gospel; Brown, 
“Letter to Theodore”; Jeff Jay, “A New Look at the Epistolary Framework of the Secret Gospel of Mark,” 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 16 (2008) 573–597; Eckhard Rau, “Das Geheimnis des Reiches Gottes: Die 
esoterische Rezeption der Lehre Jesu im geheimen Markusevangelium,” in Jesus in apokryphen 
Evangelienüberlieferungen: Beiträge zu außerkanonischen Jesusüberlieferungen aus verschiedenen Sprach- und 
Kulturtraditionen (ed. Jörg Frey and Jens Schröter; Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen 
Testament 254; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 187–221; Brown, “Behind the Seven Veils, I”; Scott G. 
Brown, “Behind the Seven Veils, II: Assessing Clement of Alexandria’s Knowledge of the Mystic Gospel 
of Mark,” in Fakes, Forgeries, and Fictions: Writing Ancient and Modern Christian Apocrypha (ed. Tony Burke; 
Proceedings from the 2015 York University Christian Apocrypha Symposium; Eugene, Ore.: Cascade 
Books, 2017) 95–128; Michael T. Zeddies, “Did Origen Write the Letter to Theodore,” Journal of Early 
Christian Studies 25 (2017) 55–87.
429 Others might contend that not failing this test would be the more dramatic option here. For another 
example, see Brown, “Twelve Enduring Misconceptions,” 309, who observed of the youth in 
Gethsemane in Mark 14:51–52 that “very few people find anything sexually suggestive … when Jesus is 
arrested, even though in this instance the sheet actually comes off as the young man evades capture.”
128
All the same problems pertain to the thickness of innuendo, even more so as the 
argument holds that the thickness of this literary feature pertains to a particular 
individual—viz., Smith. As a plain-text solution the criterion of consistency is misapplied 
to the other extreme: for the alleged thickness of innuendo in Theod. to function in a 
pertinent manner, all other writings of Smith are argued to be equally thick with innuendo 
to the degree that the critic ends up finding objectionable content “in almost every 
paragraph.”430 Such an excess is akin to a Hardouin level of explanans, and given that no 
other scholar has agreed with this assessment, “cryptanalytic hyperactivity” is most 
likely responsible for the critic’s perception of an abundance of sexual innuendos in 
Smith’s corpus, especially given that no perceivable control for this notion is suggested.
The notion of sphragis as the alternate, more pertinent form of the suggested plain-text 
solution is, in the abstract, a more robust manner to conclude the argument about 
perceived sexual innuendos. As discussed in sub-subsection 3.1.4.1, above, there is a limit 
to the pertinence of jokes and witticisms, regardless of the deliberateness with which 
they have been composed. For this reason, the mere innuendo is hardly sufficient, and 
the alleged anachronistic portrayal of sexuality in Theod. would have to contain a 
component that would have to be more accurate in its association with a specific 
individual, a problem that would be solved by the notion of sphragis. The argument here is 
that the secrecy motive in Theod. is brought together with the notions of forbidden sexual 
relations and the mystery of the kingdom of God, a “coupling” that constructs a “linkage” 
that thus forms a sphragis, the authorial seal.431
The trouble with this notion is that the presence of all things supposedly sexual in Theod. 
is contested by other scholars. Even if we were to grant that Theod. has “coupled” the 
“linkage” described above,432 we might still ask what primer would have drawn our 
attention specifically to the notions of secrecy and the mystery of the kingdom of God. 
That is, an anachronistic portrayal of sexuality is insufficient in its capacity to direct the 
reader towards such specific themes without further signposting.
Such a primer is implied to exist in the notion that Smith’s “linkage” is “quite unusual” to 
the degree that the strangeness might render it recognizable to a fellow scholar of 
ancient religions.433 If this were the case, the primer could, arguably, be accepted into 
430 Jeffery, “Clement’s Mysteries,” 232. Emphasis mine.
431 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 71–72, 81; Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81–89.
432 Note that the notions of “coupling” and “linkage” are never defined by the critics.
433 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 82.
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further discussion. In this particular case, nevertheless, the claim that Smith “linked” 
together the “mystery of the kingdom of God” (Mark 4:11) with “forbidden sexual 
relations” (Tosefta, tractate Hagigah 2.1), is mistaken, as has been extensively discussed 
by Brown and Pantuck.434 The error lies the critics misreading of Smith’s 1951 treatise 
Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels, which, in fact, explicitly connects the “mystery of the 
kingdom of God” to the notion that for those who possess this “mystery,” “God helps 
[them] to become better”—i.e., that “mystery” leads one to develop more virtuous 
morals.435 Rather, the only connection between this “mystery” and “forbidden sexual 
relations” is their spatial proximity, being within 65 words of each other.436
There is yet another problem with this argumentation on a more general level—namely, 
with the idea that a “coupling” of themes could create a “linkage” that would establish a 
personal sphragis, an authorial seal. Within the alternative narrative, two types of 
methodologic considerations are employed to justify this approach. First, there is the 
more austere justification that “elements” that are “connected” together in scholarly 
prose can function as a person’s “own sphragis”.437 This notion is extremely ambiguous. 
Over the course of one’s scholarly career, “elements” are “connected” together in the 
thousands. As a technique of encipherment, the practice makes no sense: how would the 
decipherer be able to discern which of the many elements, or even how many such 
elements, are intended to be part of the author’s personal sphragis? Such a technique 
would require a highly unambiguous primer to sift through the texts it would be 
embedded in and, furthermore, would have to be repeated enough times so as to create 
an unambiguous link to a single individual to be recognizable as its author. In this case, 
however, Smith’s sphragis is established without a primer of any kind, after such elements 
are allegedly used twice—once in a scholarly monograph and once in a scholarly article.438
Another line of argument is that “themes of interest”—present in anterior publications 
that are, furthermore, “quite unusual” such that they have been “advanced by no one 
else”—can be construed as a “linkage” by the fact that they have “perhaps hinted” at, or 
even “echoed” such themes.439 Compared to mere “elements” the requirement of “themes 
of interest” does constitute a step towards unambiguity—albeit a small one—but the 
434 Brown and Pantuck, “Craig Evans,” 104–119.
435 Smith, Tannaitic Parallels, 136. This observation was originally made in Brown, “Factualizing the 
Folklore,” 324.
436 Smith, Tannaitic Parallels, 155–156.
437 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 71.
438 Carlson, Gospel Hoax, 71–72.
439 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 81–84.
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literary techniques of “perhaps hinting” and “echoing” are hardly distinct from simple 
“connecting”.440 The one clear improvement to the previous line of argumentation is the 
explicit requirement for the uniqueness of such a “linkage”. As such, the argument has 
the potential to extent beyond the requirement for a primer, given that a substantially 
unique “linkage” is proposed.441 However, to accept mere “hinting” and “echoing” as 
sufficient is to betray the tactic of decipherment involved. There is no confusion as to 
how these readings came about within the alternative narrative: a particular 
interpretation of Theod. as sexually suggestive text was followed by a search through 
Smith’s previous publications for matches that could then be described as “linkages” and 
used evidence. As such, they once again exemplify the dangers of “cryptanalytic 
hyperactivity” and question-begging, and the importance of their control by the 
requirements that not only primers but also techniques of decipherment and plain-text 
solutions be unambiguous to a high degree.442
Following these examples of the use of the criterion of ambiguity for assessing proposed 
concealed indicators of authority, it has been made clear that the adoption of this 
relatively simple criteria allows the drawing of useful distinctions between the various 
allegations presented above. One of the cases for the requirement of strict unambiguity is 
that it changes little in how the discipline of history is currently practiced, whereas a 
looser criteria would—as the related regulative criterion of consistency might demand—
entail the introduction of such techniques for interpretation as loose association and 
etymological explanation in the study of historical sources, as well as having to contend 
with most, if not all, of the 80 candidates for the authorship of the Shakespearean corpus. 
In other words, the proposed criteria would limit the admissibility of claims about 
concealed indicators of authority. For the alternative narrative, this proposition is an 
unfortunate conclusion, as no arguments in the alternative narrative seems to pass the 
bar of unambiguity established in this section.
440 Though Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 89 uses “elements” as a substitute for “themes”.
441 In this case the problem, as noted above, is not the uniqueness of the themes but that the proposed 
“linkage” is based on a misreading of Smith’s Tannaitic Parallels. Even if this were not misread, there 
seems still to be confusion between Theod. as a textual artefact and Smith’s own interpretation of Theod. 
That is, to argue that Theod. connects themes of secrecy, mystery, and forbidden sexual relations 
because that was the interpretation of Smith of Theod. (misrepresented) and is further linked in Smith’s 
previous writings (misrepresented), is to collapse together Theod. as a textual artefact and Smith’s 
interpretation of it (misrepresented)—i.e., the argument begs the question in assuming that Smith’s 
interpretation (misrepresented) of the text follows from his supposed authorship of the document.
442 Evans, “Grounds for Doubt,” 83–85 introduces a second article in which Smith uses “themes of interest,” 
bringing the tally of Smith’s allegedly unique “linkage” to one scholarly monograph and two scholarly 
articles—still hardly sufficient for establishing a recognizable authorial indicator, thus also failing to 
establish an unambiguous connection between the supposed author and the plain-text solution.
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4 Conclusions
In the introduction I explicated four reasons for revisiting the question of constrained 
criteria for the study of fakes and forgeries: 1) renewed academic interest in the subject, 
2) the absence of such criteria, which has resulted in methodological confusion in 
academic history writing, 3) changing cultural discourses regarding the validity of 
argumentation, and 4) changes in the status of perpetrators of fakes and forgeries.
Considering 1) and 2), the scholarly discourse on fakes and forgeries should be performed 
at a higher degree of robustness. As described at the end of “WWDF,”
It is a widely accepted notion that academic scholarship cannot be distinguished 
from other knowledge-generating endeavors except by its dedication to a 
particular, rigorous methodology, one that demands constant debate about its 
applicability. The limits of scholarly means are often at the heart of these debates. 
Samuel Sandmel, for example, warned biblical scholars in 1961/1962 of the 
dangers of parallelomania, or the tendency to ascribe literary relationships 
between ancient texts … [for] ever since Mabillon ventured on the quest for 
(constrained) criteria to distinguish the real from the faux, only loose rules of 
thumb have become somewhat established in academia. These were perhaps 
adequate in earlier times but not anymore. For we are working at times of 
suspiciousness and hypercriticality, and the repeated epistemic highs offered by 
the application of WWFD to the task of constructing (yet another) non-
provenanced literary document as a forgery.443
As for 3) and 4), a description by Kathleen Stewart about the scholar’s tendency to pursue 
“a skeptical, paranoid, obsessive practice of scanning for signs and sifting through bits of 
evidence for the missing link” reads like an eloquent attempt to summarize my previous 
analysis of suspiciousness and hypercriticality.444 This attitude is perhaps most pronounced 
in contemporary inferences in which “an overreliance on intentionality and personal 
attribution” is practiced as an “attributional style,” to cite Jovan Byford, where the 
author comes “back, over and over again, to the same cause … for every event in terms of 
the same [explanation].”445 Such studies take each detail under scrutiny as positive 
evidence for the case of forgery—contrary to normal practices within literary criticism, 
443 Paananen, “WWFD,” 16–18, referring to is Samuel Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” Journal of Biblical Literature 
81 (1962) 1–13, at 1. A brief, historical overview of such (failed) attempts to formulate constrained 
criteria is provided in Speyer, literarische Fälschung, 99–102.
444 Kathleen Stewart, “Conspiracy Theory’s Worlds,” in Paranoia Within Reason: A Casebook on Conspiracy as 
Explanation (ed. George E. Marcus; Cultural Studies for the End of the Century 6; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999) 13–20, at 14.
445 Byford, Conspiracy Theories, 136. Cf. Stephan Lewandowsky, Klaus Oberauer, and Gilles E. Gignac, “NASA 
Faked the Moon Landing—Therefore, (Climate) Science Is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated 
Rejection of Science,” Psychological Science 24 (2013) 622–633, at 630, who refer to a specific “personality 
factor or cognitive style” common to conspiracy theorists.
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where such monomania is viewed as a warning sign of overreach in one’s theory. The most 
egregious examples of such an overreach is presented in the two non sequuntur discussed 
in subsection 2.5.2, where details are forced into the narrative, despite that their 
inclusion does not mean anything.446
That such a pliable, ambiguous literary technique as the concealed indicator of authority 
can be made acceptable so long as it conforms to the three criteria outlined in section 3.1 
is both an accomplishment and a triviality. It is trivial in that the malleability of 
concealed indicators of authority should come as a given, since every other literary 
technique can be (and some have traditionally been) described with the help of various 
criteria for their post hoc identification from literary texts. The development of such 
criteria also constitutes an achievement for having that much done in a (reasonably) 
rigorous manner, though this comes with a caveat: the acceptance of such arbitrary 
criteria would necessitate embracing certain arbitrariness of the whole endeavour of 
studying history. In other words, the historian’s demands for explanation are arbitrarily 
“fulfilled” insofar as the historian’s curiosity is satisfied, to borrow Mary Fulbrook’s 
formulation—or, as I have stated throughout chapter 3, insofar as we are willing to live 
with the results of our criteria, given the demands of the regulative virtue of 
consistency.447 Lastly, as Derek Turner has written, one must acknowledge that the study 
of history perennially suffers from “local underdetermination problems,” as almost all 
examples of academic history writing tend to be empirically equivalent (i.e., all scholars 
generally have access to the same physical artefacts, such as documentary sources)—yet 
in the absence of such artefacts, “there is nothing anyone can do about it.”448
That is, should we move towards a rigorous framework of the study of fakes and adopt 
constrained criteria to alleviate the feverish thrill of “discovering” more and more 
“forgeries,” we would also have to acknowledge that some artefacts would end up being 
deemed genuine even if they were fake and vice versa. This would merely follow from the 
general principles of justification in historical studies and the perceptibility of fakes and 
forgeries—in other words, only artefacts that can be distinguished from authentic ones can 
446 Byford, Conspiracy Theories, 136 quotes favourably Michael Billig, “Extreme Right: Continuities in Anti-
Semitic Conspiracy Theory in Post-War Europe,” in The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics 
and Political Thought since 1789 (ed. Roger Eatwell and Noël O’Sullivan; London: Pinter, 1989) 161, who 
notes the tendency to insist on “personal attributions to the point of absurdity,” as one of the 
“emotional aspects” of “this style of belief.”
447 Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory (London: Routledge, 2002) 122–140.
448 Derek Turner, “Local Underdetermination in Historical Science,” Philosophy of Science 72 (2005) 209–230, 
at 227.
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be deemed fake, while only features that can be warranted by referring to their physical 
grounding in the artefacts themselves can be deemed distinguished. On this point, there 
is an almost prophetic quality to Christopher A. Rollston’s observation:
I am confident that forgers read academic articles and books about epigraphy, 
sometimes attend academic meetings and symposia, they use the best lexica of the 
ancient languages, they have ready access to pottery, papyrus, and stone of the 
right kind, they purchase or gain access to ancient carbonized remains (e.g., the 
remains of an old beam or carbonized seeds from an excavation) to assist in the 
fabrication of inks and patinas, and they know the sorts of laboratory tests that are 
being performed on inscriptions from excavations and on inscriptions from the 
antiquities market. … In fact, I believe that the time will come in the near future 
when there are some modern forgeries that will be quite perfect.449
The link between the past and history would remain severed, and that severance would 
only be emphasized; as a trade-off, we would gain, to cite Hayden White, “a practical 
past”450 on in which we would be able to add robust agreement about forged artefacts to 
“all those memories, illusions, bits of vagrant information, attitudes and values … to 
justify, dignify, excuse, alibi, or make a case for actions to be taken in the prosecution of a 
life project.”451
As a rationalising species, we will always be able to come up with new rationalisations. As 
scholars, ours is only to decide which of these myriad rationalisations we are willing to 
live with—whether or not they might concern a study in authenticity.
449 Rollston, “Epigraphic Forgeries,” 81.
450 Hayden White, “The Practical Past,” Historein 10 (2010) 10–19, at 16–17 distinguishes “historical 
past”—“an end itself and for its own sake”—from “practical past,” the latter always “in the service of 
the present.”
451 Hayden White, The Practical Past (FlashPoints 17; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2014). 
Cited in Robert Doran, The Ethics of Theory: Philosophy, History, Literature (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) 105; 
Doran, Ethics of Theory, 203 n. 37 notes that this quote is drawn from the manuscript version of White’s 
The Practical Past, and that “this passage does not appear in the published version.”
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Timo S. Paananen, “From Stalemate to Deadlock: Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore in Recent Scholarship,” Currents in Biblical Research 11 
(2012) 87–125.
Abstract
This article reviews the literature pertaining to the recent debate over the question of 
authenticity of Clement’s Letter to Theodore (including the so-called Secret Gospel of Mark) 
and argues that the academy has tied itself into a secure deadlock. The current ‘trench 
warfare’ situation is due to various scholarly malpractices, which include the practice of 
non-engagement with other scholars, abusive language towards them and 
mischaracterization of their position. In order to remedy the situation and move the 
discussion forwards a number of correcting acts are suggested.
Keywords
Clement of Alexandria, forgeries (modern), Letter to Theodore, Secret Gospel of Mark
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Roger Viklund and Timo S. Paananen, “Distortion of the Scribal Hand in 
the Images of Clement’s Letter to Theodore,” Vigiliae Christianae 67 
(2013) 235–247.
Abstract
This article discusses Morton Smith’s famous manuscript find, Clement’s Letter to Theodore 
(including the so-called Secret Gospel of Mark), and critically assesses Stephen C. Carlson’s 
study of its handwriting (2005). Carlson’s analysis is found to be wanting due to line 
screen distortion introduced by the halftone reproduction process in the images he used. 
We conclude that the script in the manuscript of Clement’s Letter to Theodore lacks all 
and any kind of “signs of forgery”.
Keywords
Clement of Alexandria, forgeries (modern), handwriting analysis, Letter to Theodore, 
Secret Gospel of Mark
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Timo S. Paananen and Roger Viklund, “An Eighteenth-Century 
Manuscript: Control of the Scribal Hand in Clement’s Letter to 
Theodore,” Apocrypha 26 (2015) 261–297.
Abstract
This article discusses Morton Smith’s role as a self-professed manuscript hunter in 
uncovering the only known copy of Clement’s Letter to Theodore, and critically assesses 
the existing studies on its handwriting. We argue that Stephen C.  Carlson’s analysis is 
flawed due to its dependence on distorted images, that Agamemnon Tselikas’s study has a 
number of problems due to the unsuitability of applying standard palaeographic practices 
to a case of suspected deception, and that Venetia Anastasopoulou has made a sustainable 
case by arguing that Smith could not have imitated the difficult eighteenth-century script
—a qualitative verdict strengthened by our quantitative study of the lack of signs of 
control. We conclude that the handwriting is indistinguishable from authentic 
eighteenth-century handwriting.
Cet article discute le rôle de Morton Smith comme dénicheur de manuscrits en raison de 
sa découverte de la seule copie de la Lettre de Clément à Théodore, et évalue critiquement 
les études paléographiques menées sur cette copie. Nous estimons que l’analyse de 
Stephen C. Carlson est hypothéquée par la confiance excessive que ce paléographe 
accorde à des photographies médiocres, que l’étude d’Agamemnon Tselikas présente 
l’inconvénient de ne pas appliquer les critères paléographiques usuels dans le cas de faux, 
et que Venetia Anastasopoulou a produit une étude solide, à nos yeux, en argumentant 
que Smith ne pouvait pas avoir imité l’écriture difficile du XVIIIe siècle—un verdict 
qualitatif renforcé par notre étude quantitative sur l’absence de signes de contrôle. Nous 
parvenons à la conclusion que l’écriture du manuscript ne peut être distinguée d’une 
écriture authentique du XVIIIe siècle.
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Timo S. Paananen, “WWFD or What Would a Forger Do: A Critical 
Inquiry of Poorly Argued Contemporary Cases for Forgery,” 1–24. 
(forthcoming)
Abstract
This article discusses the contemporary debates on fakes and forgeries, and notes the lack 
of constrained criteria in the evaluation of suspected manuscripts. Instead of controlled 
criteria, scholars have opted for an informal and inexplicated method—here labeled 
WWFD (What Would a Forger Do?)—in which an internally consistent story from the first-
person perspective of the alleged forger functions as its own justification. Lacking any 
kind of qualitative control apart from the low bar of internal coherence, WWFD has the 
potential to make forgeries out of all non-provenanced literary documents. The use of 
WWFD in practice is documented in three varieties: unconcealed, concealed, and 
hyperactive. In each of these instances WWFD is used as a framing device to construct 
material details as suspicious, with little consideration on the warrant of such framing.
Keywords
Dead Sea Scrolls, forgeries (ancient), forgeries (modern), Hippias of Elis, manuscript 
forgery
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